

To: Sheldon Gen  
From: Wilson Wong  
Subject: Memorandum #2—Japanese Redress  
Date: October 24, 2005

## **POLICY PROBLEM**

World War II was a troubled time for Japanese-American (JA) citizens in America. Viewed with suspicion, Executive Order 9066 was signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 and approved the mandatory evacuation of 120,000 Japanese Americans (of which over 73,000 were US citizens) in the West Coast into “relocation centers”. There the JA stayed for the majority of the war—losing their homes, jobs, and dignity. In the late 1970’s, JA sought redress from the US government through legislation and policy, wanting not only an acknowledgement and an apology for the forced internment, but also monetary compensation.

Initial reparation efforts were made by Congress with the passing of the Evacuation Claims Act in 1948, however, due to the limited scope and extent of the policy, only 33% of eligible families filed claims and less than \$37 million was distributed—an average of \$200 per family that claimed.

Starting in 1978, a specially formed JACL National Committee for Redress (NCR) successfully helped established a federal commission to explore any wrongdoing of the US government with respect to internment. The commission finally recommended an official apology and \$1.5 billion for individual reparations and establishment of redress education. The primary goal of establishing the commission was to educate the public regarding redress and get official acknowledgement of misconduct.

However, the next steps of formulating policy languished—many congress members agreed with the notion of redress, yet had issue with individual compensation

and opposition from constituents. The JACL Legislative Education Committee (LEC) started a lobbying campaign to push through a reparations bill. Through grassroots lobbying by JA, support of other civil rights organizations, and additional co-sponsors, the reparations bill was approved by both the House and Senate. With additional citizen lobbying and support from a governor, in 1988 President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 into legislation, largely unchanged from its inception. JA would finally receive their official apology and \$20,000 per family.

## **ANALYSIS OF THE STAKEHOLDERS**

### ***A) Conflicts:***

<b>Players in Conflict</b>	<b>Conflicting Goals?</b>	<b>Conflicting Powers?</b>	<b>Checks on Powers?</b>
*JACL-NCR *JA Congress Members	<i>Federal Commision</i> JACL-NCR wanted immediate route with appropriations bill. JA Congress members sought intermediate step of establishing a federal commission. Finally, it was decided to go with commission.	JA Congress had agenda setting powers and the JACL-NCR needed their support for any proposed legislation	None. JA Congress members, especially Daniel Inouye, were the most powerful JA in Washington. Though NCR were citizens and had voting power, hurting members would hurt JA causes further
*Opponents in Congress *JACL-NCR *JA Congress Members	<i>Civil Liberties Act, 1983</i> JACL-NCR and JA Congress Members sought to push through CLA of 1983. Some opponents in Congress disagreed with financial redress, while others believed internment was justified.	JACL-NCR had protesting and public awareness powers; however, they already established educating the public. Congress was the one with power, while JA Congress members, though equal, need more Congress support.	No. The public was still largely against reparations, with oppositional letter writing outnumbering redress support 10 to 1.
*JACL--LEC *JA Citizens *Civil Right Org *Congress *Opponents	<i>Civil Liberties Act, 1985</i> JACL-LEC and JA Citizens made push for another bill. Strong Congressional sub-committee opposition argued this would set precedent for redress by others	JACL-LEC had “going public” power, which they utilized—getting public support from civil rights groups and JA citizens contacting their legislatures. Ultimately, Congress still had decision making powers and let bill languish.	Sort of. The JACL—LEC took full advantage of enlisting public support and even leveraged leader’s Ujifusa’s <i>Almanac of American Politics connections</i> .
*Supporters *Congress *Opponents	<i>Civil Liberties Act, 1987</i> Final successful push for bill passage in House and Senate.	“Going public” vs. Decision-making.	Yes. JACL—LEC brought emotional testimony to Congress and leveraged more support.
*President *JACL-LEC *Opponents and War Vet.	President wanted to please constituents, yet also show that he supported racial justice. JACL-LEC wanted bill to be made into law. Opponents	President has power to approve bills and exercised that power. JACL-LEC and opponents had voting power, but Reagan was not up for reelection so voting power had little impact.	Informally yes. Though the JACL-LEC had little over power, they took advantage of Reagan’s anecdotal compassion.

**B) Existing and potential common ground:**

<b>Coalitions Groups</b>	<b>Reason for Support</b>
JACL-LEC, JA citizens, and other civil rights organizations (up to 200 of them supported the appropriations bill).	Building broad support amongst these groups shows national unity on the issue and that racial injustice is not just a concern of the few. Coalitions with numbers have a larger impact in terms of constituency.
JACL-LEC, JA Congress and other Congress members.	Building support in Congress for passage of the appropriations bill required co-sponsors to get enough votes to move the bill through. Realistically, the strategy was an informal coalition to obtain a minimum of neutrality, though a positive vote and support from Congress members would be ideal.

**C) Prognosis:**

*Outcomes:* Given the contentious racial and monetary nature of the issue of redress, the Civil Liberties Act of 1987 was passed by both the House and Senate and finally signed by President Ronald Reagan on August 10, 1988. The bill remained virtually unchanged from the federal Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians recommendations. Eligible JA families would be awarded \$20,000 and a public apology admitting wrongdoing was given during a signing ceremony.

*Influential Players:* There were several influential players in this policy struggle, which included establishing coalitions to build enough power to influence the outcomes. Though several players had significant power in their own right, they needed each other's support to overcome the policy struggle. The two branches of the JACL (LEC and NCR) had significant influence in directing the course of redress, however, without the support of JA citizens, JA Congress members, civil rights organizations, and co-sponsor Congress members, there would not have been enough momentum to overcome the overwhelming odds against them. No one single player had enough power to change the course of the redress issue, but rather a culmination of support swayed the day.

## DESCRIPTIONS OF THE STAKEHOLDERS

Identification	Player Type	Preferences	Potential Powers	Stage of Power
JACL—NCR	Interest Group	Educate public about wrongdoing and start motions for monetary reparations	*Protesting *Going public—Sort of, goal was to educate public *Litigation—No, too costly and would not generate enough publicity	*Agenda Setting—Direction of policy and decided exact reparation goals *Formulation
JACL—LEC	Interest Group	Lobby Washington for bill appropriation to implement individual redress	*Protesting—Yes, sought to neutralize opponents, while gaining additional co-sponsors of a bill *Going public—Yes, encouraged grassroots efforts to lobby legislature *Litigation—No	*Formulation *Decision Making
Civil Rights Organizations	Interest Group	Broad support to right racial injustice	*Protesting—Yes, supported lobbying efforts *Going public	*Formulation *Decision Making
JA Citizens	Citizens	94% of them wanted urgent recognition and compensation for internment.	*Elect legislature and executive—Yes, lobbied and protested their representatives, using their voting loyalty as leverage *Litigation—No	*Agenda Setting—through opinion polls and personal stories *Formulation—stories and lobbying helped win support
Opponents and War Veterans	Citizens	Did not want any JA redress—if so, then payments for US internees in Japan	*Protesting—Yes, massive letter writing campaigns overwhelmed redress letters almost 10 to 1. *Going public—Not really *Litigation—No	*Formulation *Adoption—lobbying stopped the bill process two times and hindered the process with President
Commission on Wartime Relocation	Congress	Objective review of Executive Order 9066, military involvement, and provide recommendations.	*Set Agenda *Evaluation-Yes, determining whether there is need for public policy in redress	*Agenda Setting *Evaluation
House and Senate	Congress	*Proponents: redress, some had issue with monetary reparations *Opponents: reparations for US internees in Japan and to please constituents	*Decision Making—Yes, it took three attempts for the bill to pass through both houses *Set Agenda—Yes, Congress's support of the bill was essential	*Formulation *Adoption—approving policy for redress
JA Congress Members	Congress	Effective and successful redress	*Decision Making—Yes, JACL sought their support before going forward with any strategy *Set Agenda—Yes, influenced direction of policy routes	*Agenda Setting *Formulation *Adoption
President—Ronald Reagan	Executive	Please constituents, but also be consistent in his public messages	*Decision Making *Adoption—Yes, signed and approved the redress bill into law.	*Adoption