

Supported Theory by Chaim Kaufmann

Kaufmann advocates the creation of homogeneous demographic groups and population movements supported by the international community as a solution to ending ethnic civil wars. He discounts solutions, which are based on eliminating the common causes of the initial violence, such as the failure of local political institutions or primordial hatreds. Rather, Kaufmann focuses on the newly emerged or intensified security dilemmas during and in the aftermath of this violence. He writes: "restoring civil politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the possibilities of ethnic cooperation...To save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states"¹

For Kaufmann, a clear distinction between civil wars of ideology and civil wars of ethnicity must be made in order to correctly comprehend the dynamics of ethnic wars and the resulting security dilemmas. With respect to the **dynamics of ethnic wars**, Kaufmann identifies three components all with different implications when compared to civil wars of ideology. These three components are identity, loyalties and territories.

He views the first component, **ethnic identities**, as the hardest, "since they depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change."² On the other hand, religious, ideological, and neighborhood/friendship identity is more fluid. Intensifying conflict makes cross-ethnic appeals to include members of the opposing groups impossible due to rhetoric and/or increasing real threats. The individual identity choice is diminished once the ethnic conflict intensifies by two occurrences. First extremist in each community impose sanctions even on co-ethnics who do not contribute. Second, acts of revenge from the other side against one's group reinforce ethnic identity. Kaufmann quotes a Bosnian Muslim school teacher to

¹ Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 20. No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 137.
² C. Kaufmann, pp. 141.

illustrate this second occurrence: "We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered, because we are Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers."³

The second component which distinguishes ideological civil wars from ethnic civil wars is the ease of which **loyalties** can be identified in the latter based on outward appearance, dialects, accents, surnames, posture, church records and identity cards, etc. The elimination of individual identity choice by definition delineates the person of a particular ethnic group loyal only to that ethnic group, and dangerous to any other ethnic group.

The third component, the **decisiveness of territory** sums up the implications of the first two components, whereby acquisition of territory by one group automatically guarantees the expulsion of residents of that territory who belong to another group. In ideological civil wars the occupier cannot easily identify individuals of a newly occupied territory as loyal. However, in ethnic civil wars the distinction of loyal and disloyal is much more clear. Furthermore, the occupier and the occupied do not believe that conversion of loyalties across ethnic lines is possible.

The resulting **security dilemmas** emerge as the members of an ethnic community become convinced that they cannot rely on the state to protect them. Under such circumstances each group's mobilization becomes necessary for its own security. While perhaps warranted, mobilization becomes a threat to the safety of other groups together with the nationalistic rhetoric, which typically accompanies it. And offense for survival rather than defense for survival becomes a more advantageous strategy in multiethnic areas, where "isolated pockets are harder to hold than to take."⁴ The creation of mistrust during and in the aftermath of the mobilization for war is in effect almost irreversible. As

³ C. Kaufmann, p. 144.

⁴ See offense/defense alliance theories by Christensen & Snyder. And for more on perceptions defining military course of action. See Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine Before WWII," Peter Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Kaufmann puts it: "Even if an international force or an imperial conqueror were to impose peace, the conflict would resume as soon as it left."⁵ Since the value of territory acquisition is driven by the size of its ethnic minority, only a homogeneous territory can deter incentives for offense. When interethnic areas are the reality, population movements and ethnic separation can be the only long-term solution to immediate prevention of civilian lost of life.

Next, Kaufmann evaluates the shortcomings of the **four alternatives** to ethnic separation: suppression, reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing and state building. **Suppression** can only be a temporary end to violence. Cross-ethnic violence reoccurs or at best requires decades to lead to genuine political assimilation such as the case of English in Scotland. In any event, suppression can never be a goal of humanitarian interventions. A constructivist favorite, **reconstruction of ethnic identities** can never function in the midst of ethnic violence. International institutions may dissolve the security threats and the extreme hyper-nationalist rhetoric, and allow a re-emergence of a more moderate political leadership. However, as soon as the peacekeepers leave, security threats once again will become the central issue. Kaufmann concedes that the banality of ancient past may be avoided but recent history of intense violence that creates "personal experiences of fear, misery and loss" will continue to "lock people into their group identity and their enemy relationship with the other group."⁶ **Power sharing** requires the voluntary acceptance of the stronger party to adhere to the veto of the minority group. This alternative may work if balance of power is struck thru a persistent international agenda of arming the minority group, and blockading the stronger group. But power-sharing works best if the two groups are already separated, which gives the minority veto more muscle power because threat of secession hangs over the stronger group. Lastly, **state-building**, which aims at bringing free, and fair elections is only a round-about way of getting to the same predicament of

⁵ C. Kaufmann, p. 150.

power-sharing. Kaufmann sees all of these alternatives to ethnic separation inapplicable and unhelpful in the midst of an already progressing ethnic war.

According to Kaufmann, intervention to resolve ethnic civil wars should be guided by two principles. "First, settlements must aim at physically separating the warring communities and establishing a balance of relative strength that makes it unprofitable for either side to attempt to revise the territorial settlement. Second, although economic and military assistance may suffice in some cases, direct military intervention will be necessary when aid to the weaker side would create a window of opportunity for the stronger, or when there is an immediate need to stop ongoing genocide."⁷ With respect to the first principle, the following considerations must be acknowledged:


1. Partition without population transfers encourages future rescue operations by the majority group of all sides and ethnic cleansing.
2. Ethnic separations need not create completely homogeneous populations. However, the remaining size of the minority population must be small enough to not constitute a military threat to the majority group, or instigate a rescue operation by members of its co-ethnic group across the border.
3. Minorities should not be concentrated in a strategic or disputed geographic area.
4. Inter-group borderlines should be short, and be drawn along defensive terrain. Access to sea or to a friendly neighbor is also crucial. "If there is an existing stalemate along defensible lines, the international community should simply recognize and strengthen it."⁸
5. Offensive weapons acquisition of both sides should be curtailed.

⁶ C. Kaufmann, p. 154.

⁷ C. Kaufmann, p. 161.

⁸ C. Kaufmann, p. 164.

With respect to the second one, the intervention strategy directed at eliminating the security dilemma may begin with economic sanctions against the stronger group, followed by military aid to the weaker group, and lastly direct military intervention. Kaufmann views direct military intervention as the most effective policy, and elaborates on a step-by-step progression. Here's an illustration of the fundamentals of his approach:



In a final section, Kaufmann responds to the five common objections to ethnic separation and partition. First, partition doesn't encourage splintering of states because predictable counter force of the government against secession attempts makes such attempts too costly. Second, population transfers do not have to cause suffering if capable relief services and adequate planning and resources are allocated. In addition, interning civilians in acquired territories would be safer for them, and similar to population transfers, conditions will depend on resources and planning. Third, the track record of ethnically partitioned solutions to civil wars demonstrates that separation doesn't merely substitute international for civil wars. On the flip side, an interstate war will likely be much less harmful to civilians than intercommunal slaughter. Fourth, economic and military viability of the rump states should not be a great concern. Peace and security often promise economic viability to the newly partitioned areas. In any event history "records no examples of ethnic partitions

which failed for economic reasons.”⁹ If military viability is a concern, interveners should provide military aid and possible security guarantee until the newly created state of the previous minority group becomes self-sufficient. And lastly, the argument that partition doesn’t resolve ethnic hatreds may be accurate, however, an insignificant goal next to the prevention of large-scale violence.

Kaufmann concludes bringing lasting safety to peoples endangered by ethnic war is very much feasible if interveners acknowledge partition and population transfers as a legitimate possible solution. According to Kaufmann, in addition to overcoming the taboos attached to redrawing state maps, “world’s major powers must decide whether they will be willing to spend any of their own soldiers’ lives to save strangers, or whether they will continue to offer false hopes to endangered peoples.”¹⁰

Opposing Theory by John Mueller

In contrast, Mueller defines a solution to ethnic wars from its causes by challenging the commonly portrayed Hobbesian character of ethnic civil wars. He is particularly concerned with Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and advocates a more reductionist analysis which suggest that these “ethnic wars” were not neighbor-against-neighbor conflicts cutting between ethnic lines, and were instead the work of small groups and armed thugs. Yugoslav polls and election results conducted in 1990 as well as Serbian (Yugoslav) army’s high desertion and high draft-dodging rates show that ethnic hatred and propaganda at the outset did little to alter general public opinion which was in support of a cohesive, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia.

The **shallowness of militant nationalism** didn’t fall deeper than unfairly won elections, and public demonstrations carried out by mobs, which were manipulated by the resulting leaders of these unfair elections. These militant nationalist mobs were paid by free food, transportation, and liqueur. The ardent

⁹ C. Kaufmann, p 172.

¹⁰ C. Kaufmann, p. 175.

leader of militant nationalism, Slobodan Milosovic who won 78% of the seats had the support of less than half the vote. According to Mueller, Milosovic's victory cannot be an indication of grass-roots support for militant nationalism and a credible indication of a serious ethnic divide between the citizens of Yugoslavia. Results of a national poll during the election year more accurately represents public opinion... Only 16% of poll respondents answered, "completely agree" to the question "Do you agree that every (Yugoslav) nation should have a national state of its own?"¹¹

Mueller targets the causes of violence in solution generation because unlike Kaufmann, Mueller believes the cause can be eradicated. Kaufmann sees little usefulness in attempting to eliminate the causes of violence, which are to a large extent tales of irreversible historical atrocities of one group against another. Mueller on the other hand shows us that the thugs and hooligans had to be recruited by politicians for the violence. In effect, the neighbor-against-neighbor Hobbesian image of ethnic wars wasn't the reality in Bosnia and Rwanda. The rhetoric couldn't even inspire the Serbian army to favor government-sanctioned violence, and "Serb soldiers... often mutinied or deserted en masse."¹² Evidently, recruitment became such a serious problem that special units and irregulars had to be relied upon. The use of paramilitary groups whose "primary motive was not fighting against the enemy but robbery of private property and inhuman treatment of Croatian civilians" further decreased the professional soldiers morale.¹³ Co-ethnics who did not succumb to brutal paramilitary groups risked being forced out, killed, or cowed into submission.

Perhaps Mueller's greatest contribution to the literature on ethnic civil wars is his identification of the four stages of war and ethnic cleansing: takeover, carnival, revenge, occupation and desertion.

¹¹ John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War," *International Security*, Vol. 25 No. 1 (Summer 2000), p 46.

¹² J. Mueller, p. 48.

¹³ J. Mueller, p. 49.

1. **Takeover:** Paramilitary group enters town and quickly takes control thru willingness to use force and police alliance. Members of the other ethnic group flee with stories of violent intimidation or death. Co-ethnics resisting paramilitary actions suffer the same consequences and are quickly muted.
2. **Carnival:** Paramilitary group begins looting, destruction, rape, arbitrary violence and murder. Opportunistic locals exploit the given situation by participating in looting, and sometimes more violently in other injustices against cross-ethnics.
3. **Revenge:** Stories of violent intimidation and death by refugees promotes further avenging counter-violence in other areas. "Members of each group would quickly find, sometimes to their helpless disgust, that their thugs at least were willing to fight to protect them from the murderous thugs on the other side."¹⁴
4. **Occupation and Desertion:** Continued occupation of the paramilitary group results in intra-ethnic violence. Once the properties of the other ethnic group are completely looted, paramilitary action redirects itself to locals of their ethnicity. This miserable occupation leads to flight of opportunistic moderate locals to a safer place.

Mueller ends with three conclusions. First, ethnicity is important only as an ordering device and not as the primary motivating force of violence. Second, a relatively small, yet organized international police force could probably have been effective in preventing civilians' attack on civilians in Bosnia and Rwanda. Mueller's key assertion here is that armed thugs often in very small numbers caused a disproportionate level of human suffering by sadistic and arbitrary use of violence. The case in a Bosnian town, Visegrad depicts how a group of 15 well-armed men forced 14,500 Muslims "to leave and suppressed any

expressions of dissent from local Serbs-many of whom took advantage of the situation to profit from the Muslim exodus.”¹⁵ And at last, what happened in Yugoslavia and Rwanda could happen anywhere and wasn’t inevitable. Since ethnicity is only an ordering principle, and not inherently the cause of violence, ideological civil wars or even more arbitrary separation methods based on for example, the left-handed within a population versus the right handed, are not different from ethnic civil wars. Sound economic and political policies can develop competent governments and police forces, and prevent future power abuse. Perhaps the following Bosnian expression best wraps up his entire analysis: “It is difficult for the people when the smart keep quiet, fools speak out, and thugs get rich.”

Supporting Data by David Makovsky

David Makovsky looks at the current stalemate in the aftermath of the Oslo process and concludes that the trust building remedies required for the process to work cannot be accomplished within the current context. Only disengagement by both sides, or Israel unilaterally when a joint treaty with Palestinians cannot be established, can make up for the escalation of violence caused by the lack of leadership and increased security dilemmas rejuvenated from continued settlement building. In agreement with Kaufmann the state-for-security bargain of the Oslo agreement could not have been achieved while security dilemmas on the Palestinian side were ignored at best, and intensified at worst by continued settlement in West Bank and Gaza. Particularly in the West Bank, cluster of separate ethnic communities are scattered completely across the land. Some full Palestinian communities around Jerusalem are surrounded completely by full Israeli controlled areas. Makovsky implements his own conquer and divide strategy to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, initiated with disengagement: “...Disengagement will provide Israel with more rational and

¹⁴ J. Mueller, p. 56.

¹⁵ J. Mueller, p. 54.

defensible borders and give the Palestinians the potential for a viable state. Israel should consolidate its settlements in the West Bank ...while dismantling all of the other smaller and less defensible settlements elsewhere in the territories. Israel could then annex the consolidated West Bank settlement blocks as envisioned at Camp David. This would serve Palestinian interests as well. The Palestinians would still get the overwhelming majority of the West Bank and Gaza. And consolidation would make their territory contiguous, not split apart by scattered Israeli settlements and access roads. Meanwhile, keeping the populations apart and erecting borders between them would reduce the grinding friction that has poisoned relations over the last 33 years."¹⁶

¹⁶ David Makovsky, "Middle East Peace Through Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80 No. 2 (March/April 2001), p. 41.

The Table, Questions, and Quote Correlation

| | Partition | State-Building | Israel and Palestine |
|--|---|---|--|
| Is partition the most effective solution to ending ethnic wars? | YES "Regardless of the causes of a particular conflict, once communities are mobilized for violence, the reality of mutual security threats prevents both demobilization and de-escalation of hyper nationalist discourse...lasting peace requires removal of the security dilemma. The most effective and in many cases the only way to do this is to separate the ethnic groups." ¹⁷ | NO "...The crucial dynamic of the wars, however, was not in the rising of neighbor against neighbor, but in the maraudings of comparatively small groups... Police...need simply to protect the many from the few, rather than everyone from everyone. Thus it seems likely that a large, impressively armed and well-disciplined international policing force could have been effective in pacifying the thug-dominated conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda." ¹⁸ | YES "The idea of partitioning the region first arose in 1937, when the United Kingdom, which then held the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, set about to restore order after the Arab riots of the previous year. In its report on the violence the Peel Commission wrote: An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible... Neither of the two national ideals permits a combination in the service of a single state." ¹⁹ |
| Can security dilemma be eliminated and multi-ethnicity be achieved by simply eradicating the troublemakers? | NO "It is not clear that it is in anyone's power to resolve ethnic hatreds once there has been large-scale violence, especially murders of civilians. Ethnic hostility cannot be reduced without separation. As long as either side fears, even intermittently, that it will be attacked by the other, past atrocities and old hatreds can easily be aroused." ²⁰ | YES "...The violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia...were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds or by frenzies whipped up by demagogic politicians and the media as by the ministrations of small-sometimes very small-bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance." ²¹ | NO "Israel helped create an armed PA, giving it the security apparatus the Palestinian leaders deemed essential to wage war against the Islamist extremist of Hamas. Nonetheless, during the first three years of the PA's existence...172 Israelis were killed. All the while, Palestinian state-run media and state-backed Islamist preachers in mosques have launched unrelenting, venomous attacks against Israel and Jews. Palestinian schoolchildren are often thought to hate from a young age. And they are prevented from learning anything about Israel; the Jewish state's existence and location are conspicuously absent from many of the textbooks." ²² |
| Does ethnicity determine loyalty to one group versus the other during ethnic war? | YES "...Ethnic identities are fixed by birth. While not everyone may be mobilized as an active fighter for his or her own group, hardly anyone ever fights for the opposing ethnic group... extremist within each community are likely to impose sanctions on those who do not contribute to the cause. Conciliation is easy to denounce as dangerous to group security or as actually traitorous." ²³ | NO "...The casual notion that each ethnic or national group in Yugoslavia (or indeed anywhere) is united by deep bonds of affection is substantially flawed. Serbs in Serbia have expressed little affection for the desperate and often rough rural Serbs who have fled to their country from war-torn Croatia and Bosnia." ²⁴ | YES "When asked whether they would recognize Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem if Palestinians gained sovereignty over East Jerusalem, an overwhelming 74 percent of Palestinians said no. Furthermore, 60 percent said they did not think there was a chance for peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israel. Another Palestinian poll released in December found that a full two-thirds of Palestinians supported "suicide operations" against Israel." ²⁵ |

17 C. Kaufmann, p. 159.

18 John Mueller, pp. 63-65.

19 David Makovsky, p. 44-45.

20 C. Kaufmann, p. 173.

21 J. Mueller, p. 42.

22 David Makovsky, p. 31-34.

23 C. Kaufmann, pp. 140-142.

24 J. Mueller, p. 47. See Sanjoy Banerjee- self-self and self-other.

25 D. Makovsky, p. 34.

Is partition the most effective solution to ending ethnic wars?

Kaufmann would probably not agree with Mueller's approach because it deals too much with the causes of violence, and optimistically believes in state-building as a way of eliminating the security dilemma.

Kaufmann argues that the only lasting solution to removing the security dilemma is through separation of ethnic groups. Mueller on the other hand, focuses on the elimination of the causes of violence and doesn't believe that resulting ethnic tensions from the war can survive under a more orderly situation. And in empirical support of Kaufmann's arguments for partition, Makovsky's citation of a 1937 Peel Commission report



Over 1,000 Bosnian Serb high school children gathered Wednesday in Brcko demanding separated school systems and education. The unrest erupted Friday when a group of Serb students beat up a Muslim student after classes. Serb and Muslim students share the same school buildings but attend class in two shifts. (Associated Press)

alludes to the fundamental differences between Jews and Arabs, and how

neither of the two national ideals permits a single multi-ethnic state. The non-stop violence between Palestinians and Jews for another sixty years after the introduction of this report is a clear testimony to the accuracy of Peel Commission's conclusions at the time. Like Kaufmann, Makovsky views partition as the most effective solution to ethnic intra-state violence. Perhaps though, best empirical support for Kaufmann's assertions are present in his follow-up article, which analyzes four cases of high violence partitions of Ireland, India, Israel, and Cyprus:

Very few people today would suggest that the partition of Palestine could have been avoided. From 1946 onward, the Jewish population mounted a revolt that British forces could not control, forcing their withdrawal. A unified independent Palestine was impossible because Jews would not submit to rule by the Arab majority, and the Arabs would not accept any arrangement that allowed for political power for Jews or even continued Jewish immigration.²⁶

The underlying basis of Kaufmann's and Mueller's disagreement on whether ethnicity is the be-all and end-all of all questions about loyalty is addressed in my last question.

Can security dilemma be eliminated and multi-ethnicity be achieved by simply eradicating the troublemakers?

A primary difference of thought between Kaufmann and Mueller emerges with the latter's central emphasis on the bandits and the troublemakers who terrify ethnics groups of all sides. Mueller specially quotes election and military recruitment statistics to drive home the point that before the bandits security dilemma did not exist to the extent that it couldn't be countered by police forces and fair, unbiased state mandate. Before the bandits, or the soccer hooligans and ex-cons, and before their sadistic scare tactics, there was multi-ethnic peace. And before these bandits there were Yugoslavs, not Muslims, Croats, and Serbs.

On the flip side, Kaufmann aims at addressing the following question: "Now that there are Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, can we overcome the new security

²⁶ Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails," *International Security*, Vol. 23. No. 4 (Fall 1998), p. 144.

dilemma?" Naturally, Kaufmann's qualified answer is yes, provided that ethnic communities are separated from each other into defensible units:

Partitions that do not unmix hostile populations actually increase violence, as they did in Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and Palestine, and when Croatia and Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia. Defensible boundaries are essential: the UN partition plan for Palestine, which gave each side three disconnected patches of land, could only generate a bloody civil war.²⁷

Empirical support from Makovsky shows us that once ethnic violence erupts even an establishment of a fair and capable police force cannot resolve the disputes. Palestinian Authority, which was formed and financed by Israel to eliminate anti-Israeli radical groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, proved ineffective in circumventing the violence despite CIA acting as a liaison between PA security forces and Israelis.²⁸ Today, in direct contradiction to Mueller's assertions, violence in the West Bank and Gaza are generated by Arafat's publicly expressed doubts about Jewish attachment to the land of Israel, and by his speeches hailing the principle of jihad.²⁹

An important criticism of Kaufmann and Makovsky is voiced by a fourth author Radha Kumar over the question on whether partition merely extends civil conflicts into international ones. Kumar brings up the following counter observation over partition of Cyprus:

While casualties have been restricted since then, the division of Cyprus is little a long standoff that remains volatile and continues to require the presence of U.N. troops. Nor can the conflict be confined to Cyprus. Over the 20 years since partition, its short fuse is evident. A violent demonstration by Cypriots in August 1996 resulted in Greece and Turkey threatening war. The costs of containment, therefore, include permanent vigilance on the part of NATO and the Atlantic allies.³⁰

²⁷ Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails," *International Security*, Vol. 23. No. 4 (Fall 1998), p. 155.

²⁸ D. Makovsky, p. 33.

²⁹ D. Makovsky, p. 31.

³⁰ Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76. No. 1 (January/February 1997), p. 29. Kaufmann views Cyprus as one of the most successful cases of partition: "...the situation has remained remarkably stable since 1974. There have been only twelve deaths in ethnic strife on the island in twenty-four years. This generation of calm compares starkly to the escalating ethnic violence on Cyprus from 1955-1974." Chaim Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails," *International Security*, Vol. 23. No. 4 (Fall 1998), p. 148.


Does ethnicity determine loyalty to one ethnic group versus the other during ethnic war?

Kaufmann sees ethnic civil wars quite different from ideological wars because one's ethnicity automatically determines her loyalty. But in Mueller's point of view questions of loyalty need not matter, because they are superficially and temporarily enforced in the crisis of the situation. While

Kaufmann views ethnic loyalties during ethnic conflicts as a basis for his partition argument, Mueller sees the lack of ethnic loyalties during relatively peaceful times as a basis for his multi-ethnic peace argument.

Yet, supporting empirical data from Makovsky shows the deeply etched ethnic identities among Palestinians run so deep that even with

the promise of partition, 2/3rds of Palestinians still supported "suicide operations" against Israel.



Waving Hamas flags, mourners carry the coffin with the remains of Yehiya Ayyash through Gaza City during the funeral procession Saturday Jan 6, 1996. Thousands of angry mourners vowed vengeance and told Israel to "prepare the body bags" as they marched in the funeral procession of Ayyash, also known as the engineer, masterminded of a string of suicide bombings that killed dozens of Israelis. (Associated Press)