

# Cyprus

# Redefined

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## Introduction

As crude as it may be, war is an instrument to conduct policy. For the purpose of verification of this rather inhumane, and perhaps disappointing realist statement, I recommend a closer look at the past, present and future of Cyprus. The end of Cold War and the recent advancement of negotiations for the acceptance of Cyprus into the European Union lead to new security, political and economic realities and a new juncture with respect to the question of Cyprus, a state divided between the Turks in the north, and the Greeks in the south since 1974. On the security side, the geo-strategic location of the island and the continual partition may flare up a serious conflict between two NATO allies, Greece & Turkey, and most possibly involve United Kingdom, Russia and the United States. On the political side, the official acceptance of Cyprus' European Union membership application despite the de-facto division on the island and before Turkey's acceptance creates a set of new internal and external challenges for Turkey, Greece, United States, and the European Union. On the economic side, the competition between Russia and Turkey over oil and gas transportation routes from Central Asia and the wide economic disparity between the Greek Cyprus and the Turkish Cyprus add fuel to the problem. Some now argue that the silently ticking bomb of the northeast Mediterranean Sea can only be disengaged with a speedy acceptance process of Turkey into the European Union along with Cyprus.

Is a peaceful reunification possible in Cyprus, and if no, should we anticipate a serious regional conflict to develop in the next few years? This is the central question I will attempt to answer in this research paper. First, in an attempt to

define the problem at hand, I will outline the historical and current situation of the island by combining a number of sources from both sides of the stalemate. Second, I will explain the existing security interests of the states affected by this stalemate. Upon this analysis, I will conclude my paper by addressing three different policy options aimed at altering the current status quo.

## **Past to Present– A Historical Review**

### **Ottoman Administration of Cyprus**

Greeks from Anatolia began settling in large numbers in Cyprus, which was at that time occupied by Phoenicians, in 1400 BC.<sup>1</sup> Due to the strategic location of the island Cypriots lived under the mercy of a number of conquering powers, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman and the British.<sup>2</sup> With the arrival of Christianity, Cyprus became a part of the Greek Orthodox Church. However, the Crusaders under Richard I of England, Coeur de Lion, defeated the last Byzantine Greek ruler, Isaac Commenus, in 1192. For the next three centuries following Isaac's defeat, the Orthodox faith was severely oppressed, and the "Catholic Church was established as the official Church of the land. Roman Catholic bishops replaced the Orthodox, and Roman Catholic sees were established and endowed with lands taken from the Orthodox Church."<sup>3</sup> During the same period Cypriots were ruled under a feudal system of serfdom:

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<sup>1</sup> John T.A. Koumoulides, Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence, (Athens, Greece, National Centre of Social Research, 1971), 21

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 41.

All inhabitants of Cyprus are slaves to the Venetians... every man of them is bound to work for the state two days of the week wherever they shall please to appoint him...<sup>4</sup>

In 1570 and 1571 Sultan Selim II captured the cities of Nicosia (Lefkoşe) and Famagusta (Magosa), ending the Venetian rule of the island. The Ottomans abolished the serf status of the Greek Cypriots, destroyed the Catholic Church, and elevated the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church to a position of supremacy in the island.<sup>5</sup> Ottomans recognized the Dragoman and the Archbishop as the representatives of Cyprus' Christian population. The Office of the Dragoman of the Serai, or the Interpreter of the Palace was responsible for the diplomatic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The Dragoman, elected by the bishops and confirmed by the Sultan, acted as the mediator between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. Archbishop of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church was recognized as the spiritual and political leader of Cyprus' Christian community. While the "Greeks...preferred to be subject of the Ottoman...so far as concerned their rites and customs," their standard of living and economy entered a downward spiral with the Ottoman's neglect of investment in the agricultural and industrial prospects of the island.<sup>6</sup> The worsening situation, further exasperated by the Ottomans strict and sometimes physically punitive tax collection methods, caused "many Christians to leave the island, which in turn reduced the revenue collected by the Sultan."<sup>7</sup>

A number of administrative changes and appointments, aimed at minimizing the expenses of the island to the Ottoman Empire can be blamed for the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 44.

ensuing security dilemmas in Cyprus. The removal of the two assistants of the Governor and later annually placing the Governor position up to the highest bidder yielded the effective administration of the island to the Archbishop. The necessary dependence of the Governor, who often had little acquaintance with official business, on the Christian leadership met with deep resentment from the Turkish Cypriots. One of the first cases of ethnic violence between the Turks and Greeks on Cyprus surfaced in 1804 with the growing shortage of basic resources. Rumors circulated in the island suggesting a shortage of foodstuffs and an increase in taxes.

It provoked rioting, which ended in the killing of a number of Turkish citizens in Nicosia. The death of the Turkish citizens was more than enough to excite the people; a large number of Turks from the villages around Nicosia and soldiers from the army under one Ismail Agha besieged the capital...a large group of soldiers and civilians marched to the house of the Dragoman. <sup>8</sup>

Dragoman Hajigeorgakis successfully escaped to Istanbul, where he explained the acts of rioting in Cyprus to the Sultan, who sent two thousand troops to the island to end the Turks' revolt. The Turkish Cypriot insurgents were beheaded. Despite, and perhaps because of this heavy-handed handling of the situation, following "the insurrection of 1804 the Christians were living in a tense atmosphere amid the hostility of the Turks."<sup>9</sup>

## **Greek Independence**

The dynamics of the Greek War of Independence after four centuries of Ottoman rule carved a deep divide between the Turks and the Greeks of Cyprus. First, the success of the war relied on the support of the British, French, and the

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 58.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 67.

Russians. In their rightful struggle for self-rule, the Greeks did not have the benefit of the self-determination argument, which emerged nearly a century later as the basis for independence of other colonized areas of the world. In order to elicit support a clash of civilizations argument had to be developed and accepted:

The Greek war for independence aroused every impulse behind the romantic movement. It recalled the crusades in its heroism and in its struggle between Cross and Crescent. It sufficiently evoked the old sense of the unity of Christendom for both the Pope and Louis XVIII of France to contribute money to the cause. As committees in nearly every country, including the United States, raised funds to help the Greeks, the new generation of romantic writers threw its influence into the struggle.<sup>10</sup>

Second, direct financial and moral support of Greek Cypriots caused the overt friction between the two communities of the island reach a boiling point. The sparks were ignited with Sultan's firman, ordering all Christian subjects of his domain to surrender weapons due to the ensuing revolution in Greece. Conduct of the janissaries in implementing this firman led to a series of massacres. Archbishop Kyprianos, the bishops, and a number of prominent citizens were executed under the undiplomatic and uncompromising administration of the despised Ottoman governor, Kuchuk Mehmed.

Finally in 1827, thanks to the their [Greek] bravery, determination and the favorable and sympathetic public opinion throughout Europe, the Great Powers—Great Britain, France and Russia—decided to intervene and bring peace in the East [Eastern Europe]... the Powers were determined to take the necessary steps to stop hostilities in the East. These measures were stopping any transportation of Turkish troops and ammunition to the islands and mainland of Greece.

This agreement formally known as the Treaty of London in 1827 and the consequent mobilization and the increasing strength of Greek forces against

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 69.

the Ottoman led to further violence on the island against the Greek Cypriots. Prior to his execution Archbishop Kyprianos communicated to mainland Greece that Cyprus' proximity to present day Turkey and Egypt, which was held by the Ottomans at the time, as well as the long distance that separates Cyprus from mainland Greece made it impossible for Cyprus to take an active part of the Greek struggle. Nevertheless Greek Cypriots played an important role in Greece's struggle for sovereignty against the Ottomans by lending material support and manpower to mainland Greece. In July 1821 Archbishop Kyprianos and his archdeacon were hanged by a firman to Kuchuk Mehmed from the Ottoman Sultan on a charge of conspiring with the insurgents in mainland Greece. During this period hundreds of Greek-Cypriots were persecuted and many executed due to reported violations of the Sultan's disarmament firman, or due to a direct and indirect support of the Greek War of Independence.

The Greek War of Independence ended in the establishment of the present day Greece, however, Cyprus remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire until its transfer to British rule in 1878. The Ottoman Sultan ceded Cyprus to Britain, which was to occupy and administer the island in exchange for a promise to help Turkey defend itself against Russian expansion. How did this

come about? Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Ottomans fought several battles with the Russians and lost all of them. Russia, which was an Orthodox Empire, supported the Orthodox Greek Church in order to have access to the “warm waters” of the Mediterranean Sea through Greek territory. After each battle, the Russians claimed territory from the Ottomans for the newly established Greece. In 1876, two years prior to the transfer of Cyprus’ administration from the Ottomans to the British, Russia was amidst plans to take over Istanbul. Russian expansion was also a threat to the British, who had an enormous interest in the Middle East. Thus in 1878, the Ottomans and the British agreed that Britain would support the Ottomans against Russian expansion. In return the Ottomans transferred Cyprus to the British Crown “to occupy and administer.” The agreement was confirmed in an intergovernmental debate, known as The Cyprus Convention, and later sanctioned by the Berlin Congress of June–July 1878.<sup>11</sup>

### **British Administration of Cyprus**

The British Landing in June 1878 marks the beginning of the 82–year British occupation of Cyprus and the end of 307 years of Ottoman occupation and

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<sup>11</sup> Stavros Panteli, Historical Dictionary of Cyprus, (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1995), 43.

administration.<sup>12</sup> The agreement of the Cyprus Convention was announced null and void by Britain in the Cyprus Annexation Order in November 1914 after the Ottoman Empire joined the Triple Alliance (Germany and Austro-Hungary). In 1923, at the end of the Turkish Independence War following World War I, and the Sevres Treaty, Turkey renounced its rights over Cyprus in the Treaty of Lausanne. Two years later in March 1925 the British proclaimed Cyprus a Crown Colony.<sup>13</sup>

In Cyprus, the British are known to follow the same millet policy, unaffectionately referred to in some circles as “divide and rule” method. “For linguistic and religious reasons the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had been separate before British rule and remained so during it.”<sup>14</sup> The British attempts to unify the educational system under a single umbrella in order to set in intercommunal standards were vehemently opposed. The famous Teachers’ Training College at Morphou was one such attempt by the British to establish a common curriculum for the Island’s youth regardless of their spoken mother tongue. Prior to this attempt the curriculum of Greek Cypriot schools were designed to fit uniformly with the educational guidelines of Greece, and the

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>14</sup> Rebecca Bryant, “An Education in Honor,” in Cyprus & Its People, ed. Vangelis Calotychos (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pg 56.

curriculum of Turkish Cypriot schools were designed to fit uniformly with the educational guidelines of Turkey. Yet, the British were defeated in their quest for creating a unique Cypriot identity due to opposition from both the Greek and the Turkish communities, who continued to identify with their separate “motherlands”: Greek Cypriot’s celebrating the national holidays of Greece with Greek flags waving proudly on air, and Turkish Cypriots celebrating the national holidays of Turkey with Turkish flags waving proudly on air. This record suggests that we must refrain from attributing the relatively peaceful co-existence in the past to a romantic effectiveness and skill the two distinct communities have had in living together. Instead, we ought to give due credit for the delay of the eruption of ethnic violence on the island to the high importance Britain placed on keeping Cyprus as a crown colony.

British politicized the communal differences between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus to serve their own strategic interests in the Middle East... This politicization of ethnic identity paralleled the rise of antagonistic nationalisms. Each ethnic community thus came to nurture a different vision for its homeland resting on its “primordial attachments” to the respective “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey. During the ensuing anticollonial struggle in the 1950s, Greek Cypriots sought enosis (union) with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots opposed it in favor of taksim (partition).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Lenos Trigeorgis, “An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37.2 (1993): pg. 343.

## **Cypriot Independence from the British & the Turkish Offense on Northern Cyprus**

In 1948, the Ethnarchy Council of the Greek Cypriot Church was revamped and its leader, Bishop Makarios took upon himself the responsibility for reuniting Greek Cypriots under the church banner. Makarios pitched himself into the emotional campaign for enosis and called for his “enslaved people” to join the “noble struggle for union with the Motherland” Makarios organized an unofficial referendum on the issue of enosis and he claimed that of the 224,700 who participated, 215,000 were in favor. This referendum helped Makarios win the election for Archbishop. When Makarios assumed the mantle of political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriot majority, Britain now faced a political force to be reckoned with. The Turkish Cypriots protested the referendum and sent letters to the political parties in Turkey to prevent enosis. Archbishop Makarios successfully took the issue to Greece, where despite the support of the general public, Greek heads of government were somewhat reluctant to yield their full support to the Greek-Cypriot struggle in order to preserve Anglo-Greek ties in good terms.

How did the flames develop into the large fire, the partition, the effects of which we are wrestling with to this day? Makarios initially pursued the

possibility of peaceful resolution to the problem of British rule on Cyprus. Strategic importance of Cyprus for the British prevented a friendly bilateral solution to the Cyprus problem. The 1954 NEVER statement made by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, in the House of Commons on the topic demonstrates the unwavering British position at the time:

It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth, which, owing to their particular circumstances, can NEVER expect to be fully independent.<sup>16</sup>

The “particular circumstances” described in Hopkinson’s can be summarized by the British evacuation from Egypt in 1954, the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and the events at Suez in 1956.

Despite the British reluctance to grant independence to Cyprus, UN remained a viable second outlet for pursuing a peaceful solution. Yet Makarios was faced with the realization that the issue of Cypriot independence will not be given serious backing in the United Nations after the introduction of the issue for the first time by Greek Prime Minister Papagos in May of 1954. The merits of the issue suffered a further set back in the United Nations, because the item brought forth called for union with Greece, rather than simply an outcry for

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<sup>16</sup> Ioannis D.Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pg. 63.

self-determination.<sup>17</sup> At that point General Grivas and Archbishop Makarios made the decision that the only way for self-determination is thru undermining British authority over the island thru guerilla warfare.<sup>18</sup> The independence struggle against the British rule on the island quickly and persistently developed into inter-communal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the island. In the period of 1955 to 1960 five hundred and nine people died as a result of the five-year guerrilla warfare path pursued by EOKA, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, which was established to bring a political union with Greece. While the scale of violence was limited, i.e. only 1% of Cypriot population at the time, the divisive course taken thru pursue of enosis can legitimately be blamed for the subsequent intercommunal tensions in 1963-1964, and 1967, and the carving of a larger security dilemma on the island. The historical matters dated back to early 19<sup>th</sup> century, which I've summarized earlier in this research paper, are also to blame for whipping the sensitive independence struggle against the British into a full-blown communal conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 245.

In 1959 the Republic of Cyprus, independent and unified, was formed with the Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Guarantee. The London Agreements, as the three treaties are commonly referred to, were not popular even prior to the signatures of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and the British. While Greek Cypriots fought in the name of unification with Greece, they were offered independence under a constitutional scheme that would eventually prove inoperable. Indeed during the London negotiations prior to the agreement, Archbishop Makarios raised thirteen objections to the treaties. However, he soon realized that the agreements were put on the table as a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition “with a clear implication that ‘leaving it’ meant partition and his [Makarios’] own destruction.<sup>19</sup>

An independent Cypriot state, no matter what its form can never be considered as a sufficient or an ultimate geopolitical goal by Greek-Cypriots as long as they regard themselves primarily as Greeks rather than Cypriots. They thus viewed the creation of the Republic of Cyprus, on 16 August 1960, as a politic rather than a just situation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, (New York: Quartet Books, 1984), pg. 50

<sup>20</sup> Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, (Ontario: Department of Geography Publication Series, 1976), pg. 28.

**Table 1: London Agreements of 1959<sup>21</sup>**

<b>Treaty of Establishment</b>	Safeguards British Military Bases: ninety-nine square miles of Cyprus remained under British control with no set date for relinquishing those territories to Republic of Cyprus. Approximately 4000 British troops are currently stationed on these bases.
<b>Treaty of Alliance</b>	Defense Pact Between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, which established the Tripartite Military Headquarters in Cyprus to be commanded in yearly rotation by an officer of each of the three states, with 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers under its command.
<b>Treaty of Guarantee</b>	Britain, Greece, and Turkey are named guarantors for the independence, territorial integrity and the constitutional structure of the Republic. The treaty gives the right for unilateral or joint action against enosis or partition.

Kaufmann (1998) credits the random population settlement pattern for the security dilemmas on Cyprus, and the resulting four major rounds of civil wars which took place between 1955 and 1974. The Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the 1960s were spread throughout the island with only a slight bias of Turkish concentration towards the North.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Van Coufoudakis, "The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies–The Cyprus Case" in *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, ed. Van Coufoudakis (New York: Bella Publishing Co, 1976), pg. 38.

<sup>22</sup> Patrick, 8.

Table 2: Summary of Violence on Cyprus 1955–1998 <sup>23</sup>

YEARS	CAUSES OF VIOLENCE	OUTCOME
1955–1960	<p>EOKA Attacks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ British Forces</li> <li>▪ Greek “Collaborators” &amp; Communists</li> <li>▪ Turkish Cypriots Serving in the British Government &amp; the Police</li> <li>▪ Turkish Civilians</li> </ul> <p>Turkish Terrorist Groups Attack:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Greek Civilians</li> </ul>	<p>Died 509</p>
1963–1968	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Power-Sharing Principles of the Constitution Breached</li> <li>▪ All Turkish Cypriot Representation in the Cypriot Government Ends</li> <li>▪ Turkish Air Force Reinforces Turkish Cypriots Only Remaining Outlet to the Sea</li> <li>▪ 12,000 Greek Army Troops from Greece Deployed on Cyprus</li> <li>▪ Greek Cypriots Attack Turkish Villages</li> </ul>	<p>Died 600 Displaced 25,000</p>
1971–1974	<p>Terrorist Attacks by EOKA-B and Bloody Coup Displacing Makarios with Sampson<sup>24</sup></p> <p>Turkish Forces Invaded Cyprus and Overran 37% of the Island</p>	<p>Died 2000 (Greek) 1000 (Turk) Displaced 260,000</p>
1974–1998	<p>Separate Communities Under Greek and Turkish Cypriot Administrations Divided by the “Green Line” and UNFICYP Presence</p>	<p>Died 12</p>

<sup>23</sup> Chaim Kaufmann, “When All Else Fails,” *International Security*, Vol. 23 No. 2 (Fall 1998), pgs. 149–151.

<sup>24</sup> “Sampson was elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in 1969 on the slogan of “Death to the Turks!” Kaufmann, pg. 151.

While ethnic, political, linguistic, and religious differences between the two communities, and the population settlement pattern can be credited for the ethnic violence, a deeper analysis must also point the finger of blame to the unworkable constitution by which Cypriots had to administer their domain. The constitution which Britain, Greece and Turkey were to guarantee assumed that only Greeks could adequately represent Greeks, and only Turks could adequately represent Turks in a democratic parliamentary system by which both communities agreed to administer the new Republic of Cyprus. Major sources of constitutional tensions were the provisions for the 70:30 ratio in public service, the separate majority vote in the parliament, the establishment of separate municipalities in the same town, and the right of the president and vice-president to veto decisions of the council of ministers and the parliament.<sup>25</sup> According to Patrick (1976), the period between December 21, 1963 and August 10, 1964 was the most violent period between the two ethnic groups, where an estimate of 350 Turkish civilians, and 200 Greek Cypriots and Greek Army persons lost their lives.

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<sup>25</sup> Norma Salem, "The Constitution of 1960 and its Failure," in *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, ed. Norma Salem (Ottawa-Canada: St Martins Press, 1992) pg. 121.

On December 21, 1963...two Turk-Cypriot civilians and one Greek-Cypriot policeman were shot dead. This incident marked a major crisis in the Cypriot inter-communal conflict.<sup>26</sup>

Greek-Cypriots began implementing their plan to isolate the Turkish Cypriot population centers when the fighting took to the streets on December 23<sup>rd</sup>.

Telephones were disconnected, and roadblocks were erected around the main Turk-Cypriot villages and quarters...most Turkish Cypriots did not dare to venture out into their fields or on to the roads...some Turk-Cypriots moved to the security of larger Turkish-Cypriot centers and a refugee movement began to gather momentum. Government radio and television broadcasts, as well as Greek-Cypriot newspapers, portrayed the fighting as a Turkish-Cypriot revolt...fomented to provide an excuse for Turkey to invade and impose partition...this propaganda generated an intense Greek-Cypriot enmity against the Turkish-Cypriot community, and encouraged a number of revenge murders throughout the island. Many Turkish Cypriot employees were turned out by their Greek-Cypriot employers...most Turk-Cypriots simply found it too dangerous to attempt to go to work in Greek-Cypriot areas.

The Turkish-Cypriots official government Web site refers to these events as the “Bloody Christmas”. The major center of the events took place in Nicosia (Lefkosa). “Bloody Christmas” has etched itself in the minds of a large number of Turkish Cypriots who have grown up with fearful stories told by their parents and grandparents.

The causes of ethnic conflict and divisions between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots pivot around group formation based on two completely distinct interpretations of history and identity. The external actors’ strength and their willingness to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus make the identification of the precise cause of the current partition very difficult. Certain voices debating over the causes in an attempt to find what appears to be good-hearted solution to the current stalemate often point the finger to Turkey for

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<sup>26</sup> Patrick, pg. 45.

the partition of Cyprus. However, we must acknowledge that without the pronounced differentiation of the two groups on the island the de-facto partition would have never taken place, and sustained for more than 25 years.

Those differences have typically been taken advantage of by leaders with a particular aim in one direction or another, often in the detriment of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. The outcome of World War II with the help of the citizens of British colonies led to the spread of ideals of self-determination throughout the British Empire. Makarios and Grivas, two legendary leaders of the anti-British enosis movement, used Hellenic secondary education in Greek Cypriot schools as the means to justify their rhetoric and solidify a base of support. Since “for linguistic and religious reasons, the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had been separate before British rule and remained so during it,” the division of Cypriots into two presented little challenge to Makarios and his followers.<sup>27</sup> “A political organization called PEKA was set up, and many of its members were teachers and priests. Its role was to indoctrinate the villagers and children with pro-enosis propaganda.”<sup>28</sup> The Greek Cypriot education legitimized ethnic violence by invoking historic fears of invading barbaric Turkish tribes destroying the grandeur of the Greek Byzantine Empire, which has “become the present small Greek state after the expulsion of the Greek population in 1922...”<sup>29</sup>

...The Turks lurk in search of more Greek lands, as their threats in the Aegean and Western Thrace show and as the 1974 invasion of northern Cyprus and the expulsion of its Greeks to the south proves... In the

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<sup>27</sup> Bryant, pg. 56.

<sup>28</sup> Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1999), pg. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Yiannis Papadakis, “Enosis and Turkish Expansionism,” in Cyprus and Its People, Vangelis Calotychos (eds.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1998), pg. 70.

Turkish case the scenario is reversed: in the liberal millet system of the glorious Ottoman Empire it was the treacherous Greeks, who despite their privileged position, stabbed us in the back by first revolting against us, gradually capturing more and more territories, to attack even the heart of Anatolia in 1922 in the name of the Megali Idea, so inciting the 'Rums' of Cyprus for enosis which is what they tried to bring about with the 1974 coup.<sup>30</sup>


Both Makarios and Grivas needed a devout base of supporters in the violent struggle against the British, who could not let democratic ideals get in the way of Britain's strategic need of Cyprus. This one-sided Hellenic educational campaign with the youth resonates to this day in the perceptions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, whose beliefs deviate only slightly from the completely divergent interpretations of the past stated above.

Contrary to common wisdom, the partition of the island is not the reason for the vast religious and linguistic differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots today. Those cultural differences were already there with the Ottomans 'millet' system, and the subsequent British approach of 'divide and rule.' We may even argue that the pre-existing differences paved the way for the communal violence during the enosis campaign, and the subsequent military intervention of Turkey on Cyprus. The divide between the two communities, from urban towns to rural villages existed well before the dramatic events of 1955, the beginning of attacks by EOKA Greek Cypriots against British installations, which later followed by an assessment of Turkish Cypriots as secondary targets. 1946 Cypriot Census Data describes the lack of integration and intermarriages between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by explaining the percentage of Turkish

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pg. 70.

Cypriots who were registered as Greek Orthodox, and speak Greek, as well as Greek Cypriots who were registered as Moslem and speak Turkish.<sup>31</sup>



The resulting separate education curriculum produced not only strong Greek and Turkish patriotism, but also reinforced the “villainous roles into which Greeks and Turks have historically cast each other.”<sup>32</sup> Hence, initially while Greek-Cypriots advocated reunification with Greece, Turkish Cypriots advocated reunification with what they perceive as their motherland [anavatan], Turkey. Turk-Cypriots later altered their initial position, and yielded all of their support to the British military and police activities, aiming to destroy the enosis campaign.

The Republic of Cyprus was an overly optimistic attempt at creating a supranational concept above national interests, where two nations could live under one roof without surrendering their identities. The 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus safeguarded the rights of Turkish Cypriots, yet scarcity of economic resources, the differences in the perception of each community about the other, the population settlement on the Island, and the unfulfilled

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<sup>31</sup> Patrick, pg. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pg. 13.

goals which were lost in the comprise of the London Agreements prevented peaceful coexistence on Cyprus.

President Makarios offered amendments to the basic principles of the constitution, including an end to the end of veto powers, the removal of the separate municipalities, the reduction of the quota of Turkish Cypriots in the bureaucracy and military, the abolition of separate community voting on fiscal and other matters, and the election of the President and Vice President by the House of Representatives in which the Greeks were majority, rather than electing the President from the Communal Chamber of Greek-Cypriots, and the Vice-President from the Communal Chamber of Turkish-Cypriots. Vice President Fazil Kutchuk's refusal to the amendments led to an effective denial of Turkish-Cypriot participation in the governmental affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish deputies and officials left their posts following the 1963 events.<sup>33</sup> Chronological events leading to the invasion are complicated, but indisputably factual:<sup>34</sup>

<b>April 1967</b>	Military coup in Athens led by Col. Papadopoulos replaced George Papandreou.
<b>November 1973</b>	In Greece Ioannides replaced Papadopoulos as the leader of the military junta
<b>July 1974</b>	Grivas led coup replaces Makarios with Sampson
	Turkish Offense: A peace operation for Turkish-Cypriots, an invasion for Greek-Cypriots

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<sup>33</sup> Salem, pg. 123.

<sup>34</sup> Panteli, pgs XX-XXVII.

## Strategic Analysis– Security and Economic Interests

### Greek–Cypriots

Security concerns rather than economic ones heavily influence Greek Cypriot position in this stalemate. The presence of Turkey's troops on the island, while viewed as crucial by Turkish Cypriots for peaceful co-existence on the island, is viewed by Greek Cypriots as a serious threat to their survival.

For the Greek Cypriots, Turkish troops and guarantees constitute a threat by a more powerful neighbor (there are 60 million Turks) who may one day intervene again, this time, taking the whole island.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the obvious economic benefits of a settlement of the Cyprus issue, we witness the overwhelming influence of high politics in Greek Cypriots approach to resolving the stalemate. An interview conducted by Professor Zeliha Khashman, International Relations Department Chair at Near East University in Cyprus on April 2, 2003 suggests that efforts of building trust have been not been as successful at easing the security dilemma for Greek Cypriots as it has been for Turkish Cypriots. The Annan plan, the latest plan proposed by the United Nations late last year is strenuously opposed by most Greek Cypriots. The Annan plan guarantees the return of the only really fertile area in Northern Cyprus to the Greek Cypriot state, and accepts the general right of Greek Cypriots displaced in 1974 to return to their properties. The Annan plan denies

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<sup>35</sup> Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Lenos Trigeorgis, pg. 348.

Turkish Cypriot demand for an “equal partnership state” enjoyed under the 1960 constitution and in subsequent UN proposals. The Annan plan is structured around a Switzerland or Belgium federal government model, where a central government is responsible for foreign relations, monetary policy and immigration, despite calls by Turkish Cypriots on a looser confederate structure. The Annan plan eliminates the veto powers exercised by the Greek and Turkish communities, one of the sources of conflict in the 1960–1963 period of joint governance. Yet, most Greek Cypriots reportedly do not believe that the Annan plan gives the Greek Cypriots the political control and enough of the property and territory abandoned in 1974.<sup>36</sup>

The double minority situation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots may be one of the most significant reasons in the inability to bring a resolution to the stalemate. Why do Greek Cypriots, despite being the clear majority on the island, and having the upper hand in terms of legal recognition as the legitimate government of Cyprus by almost the entire world community, react as a nation under threat, or in the words of Christopher de Bellaigue, an underdog?

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<sup>36</sup> Clement f Dodd, “A Shotgun Deal for Cyprus That Could Backfire,” Financial Times, 5 December 2002,13.

...a nervous minority population (around 200,000 Turkish Cypriots) derives physical security from a much larger neighbor, Turkey, whose evident military might, in turn, makes the (660,000 strong) majority Greek Cypriots feel at risk. Both sides claiming underdog status, Ioannis Kasoulides, the Cypriot minister of foreign affairs, recites a familiar mantra when he says “Turkey is ready to grasp any opportunity that is offered to advance into the free areas and occupy the island.”<sup>37</sup>

## Turkish–Cypriots

Can the acceptance of Cyprus into the European Union act as a catalyst, and facilitate a fast resolution to the current situation on Cyprus? Turkish Cypriots insist on the rights given to them by the 1960’s Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance, and Treaty of Guarantee. As Cyprus approaches full membership status of the European Union, Turkish Cypriots are divided along a generational gap with respect to their general attitude towards finding a solution to the current situation on the island. An informal interview I’ve conducted on January 29, 2003 with Simge Boyacioglu, a twenty–five year old native Turkish–Cypriot psychologist suggests the divide is apparent and very real: “Younger generations, those who were born after 1974 do not feel an animosity towards their Greek–Cypriot neighbors– in fact, they want the Annan plan to be signed immediately, and enter the European Union with Greek Cypriots. But my mom and grandfather, and those who are around the same age group as them never trust the Greek Cypriots, and they are scared of new killing raids, or Greek–

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<sup>37</sup> Christopher de Bellaigue, “Conciliation in Cyprus?” *The Washington Quarterly*, 22 ed. 2 (1999): 186.

Cypriots gaining control of the entire island, and subsequent necessity of Turkish Cypriots to flee as refugees.” Verifiably, the same observation presents itself in my interview with Prof. Khashman: “I believe that the general feeling of Turkish Cypriots regarding their Greek neighbors on Cyprus are divided. The younger generations consider Greek Cypriots as any other nation without much negative feelings despite past experiences. On the other hand, the older generations who have lived in the 1960s are more suspicious but still not negative.” The following question and answer segment of my interview with Prof. Khashman sheds a light into the perception of Turkish Cypriots regarding the European Union’s ability to facilitate a solution to the conflict:

Question: Is the full European Union membership of Cyprus by itself sufficient for Turkish Cypriots to feel a sense of security?

Answer: EU membership definitely is not sufficient for sense of security. First of all, still it is an intergovernmental organization where in case of conflict in the island will not be able to give a united decision as what’s happened in the Iraqi war. Secondly even if it gives a decision, it will not be binding. The most important fact for a long lasting and secure future for Cypriots depends on their willingness not on imposed solutions. Nationalism is still the prevalent feeling and ideology in the world. Even in the European Union itself look at Catalans, Wallons, Flemings, etc. whose aspirations are to achieve their self-determination. This fact also should be taken into consideration in creating a new structure in Cyprus.

One thing we can expect with respect to the Turkish Cypriot attitude in this historical opportunity for a solution is despite the dramatic economic benefits, a promise of rising income levels, and a reduction in unemployment rates, low

politics of economic security will most likely not dominate the high politics of societal security. Hence, we see the Turkish Cypriots democratically elected President Rauf Denktash successfully rallying support for his resistance to the Annan plan, and the rejection of a ticking time bomb set by Cyprus' acceptance as a full member into the European Union. The physical security argument and the fears of being bought off by the wealthier Greek Cypriots is a decisive factor in Turkish Cypriot's rationale. While European Union does provide a certain level of security, Turkish Cypriots are not all together convinced that European Union is a supranational entity, which can safeguard their security and survival as a Turkish Cypriot partner on the island. Prof. Khashman's comments on what actually does provide security for Turkish Cypriots is not surprising to Turkish Cypriots, but highly problematic to Greek Cypriots who view the presence of Turkey's military a threat to Greek Cypriot security:

"The Turkish Cypriots emphasize the importance of the existence of Turkish Troops in the island for their security but this number can be negotiated if an agreement is to be reached. As you know international forces like UN is inefficient in not only preventing, but also stopping the aggression. So that's why the presence of Turkish troops is crucial in the island."


## Conclusion

Greek and Turkish Cypriots have experienced a long period of peace, which I will define as the absence of ethnic violence, since the swift invasion (or the

peace operation, depending on whom you ask) of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974. Writings by a well-distinguished scholar on security, Sun Zhu, indicate that periods of long peace are followed by periods of long wars. Another distinguished scholar on the topic of security, Clausewitz, alarms us further by suggesting that short wars are merely unfinished wars. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the academic field of security, are we to anticipate a peaceful resolution on the Cyprus issue? Let us take a closer look at the three ways in which a long-lasting peaceful resolution can be reached.


First tool I'd like to introduce is currently being used by United Nations as well as other smaller non-profit organizations. In calling for an **End to the Endless Cycle of Securitization**, this approach concentrates all efforts on intercommunal grassroot activities.

Second tool, **Evolutionary Approach**, established by the Trigeorgis, advocates an unprecedented, unique, bold, and creative approach based on the principles of developmental model of negotiation.<sup>38</sup>



<sup>38</sup> Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, pg. 340.

**New Territorial Adjustments Proposed by Trigeorgis**



We can name the third tool as the **European Union Catalysts**. We can categorize the envisioned catalytic effects of EU's advancement of negotiations with Cyprus for a final admission into the union under three main headers.<sup>39</sup> European Union and Greek Cypriot policy makers and analyst at large believe that these catalytic effects will bring a more peaceful and speedy resolution to the conflict.

The first, “**carrot catalyst**,” highlights the economic and security benefits which the Turkish Cypriots will obtain from the inclusion of an undivided Cyprus into the European Union. Regarding economic benefits, the integration with the European market provides an undisputable trade benefit to the Turkish Cypriots, provided they overwhelmingly seize their support of the de-facto partition and of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots in the north, largely due to their administration's under-recognized legal status in the world, and their consequent near total dependence on Turkey for access to the international markets have fallen far behind the Greek Cypriots in the south. “Because of both access to the European market and the financial assistance that is to be expected from the

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<sup>39</sup> Thomas Diez, Last Exit to Paradise? “The EU, the Cyprus Conflict, and the Problematic “Catalytic Effect”, *Columbia International Affairs Online*, [www.ciaonet.org/wps/dit02.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/dit02.html).

EU's Regional and Structural Funds", optimists defend an inevitable voluntary inclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in the Cyprus-EU negotiations, which the Turkish Cypriots so feverishly refuse at the moment.<sup>40</sup> Regarding the security benefits, with improvements in its judicial system as required by the European Union, Cyprus will be able to provide greater protection of minority rights of Turkish Cypriots than it has been able to prior to the 1974 "peace operation."

The second, "**stick catalyst**," argues that a firm European Union commitment in Cyprus' full membership will pressure Turkey to yield from its seemingly unrelenting position of a bi-communal, bi-zonal Cyprus.

Cyprus has been a problem for so long because too many security interests of the heaviest and most influential worldwide and regional actors are involved. The problem is complicated with extremely challenging mythistography and by the often uncompromising willingness on the part of all actors involved to force, both diplomatically and militarily a solution to the problem. While satisfaction of Greece, Turkey, EU, United States, and Russia is important in the final resolution to the current stalemate, the inhabitants of Cyprus are ignored and disengaged. Incentives for resolving the conflict in a fashion, which is satisfactory to both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, ought to be the first priority in order to prevent a future security dilemma for Cypriots. In drafting a solution we cannot ignore the obvious issue of security of life and property for Cypriots. When the United Nations and the influencing member states mount on drafting a solution which involves uniting two separate and distinct cultures with opposing heroes, conflicting interpretations of history,

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

different religion and a different language under a single national identity, as solution debaters, we have the responsibility to see to it that the solution is workable over the long-term. We also have the responsibility to make sure that the solution does not result in a return of violence and forced immigration under the gun for Cypriots. While a quick resolution to such conflicts is preferable, perhaps we must give due consideration to the fact that a forced reunification of Northern Cyprus and the Southern Cyprus may very possibly lead to further violence and conflict initially involving only the island inhabitants, but with a potential to spread to a wider conflict involving Greece, Turkey, Russia, and a likely weakening of NATO and even possibly the relationships between the so called East and the West.