

## MEMORANDUM

To: Professor Sheldon Gen  
From: Nikole Pagan, PA 715, Fall 2007  
Date: 10/17/2007  
Re: Japanese Redress Stakeholder Analysis

---

### **BACKGROUND**

After the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japan that brought the U.S. into World War II, there was a government, military and public backlash against Japanese Americans on the West Coast that resulted in their 'evacuation' into 'relocation' or internment camps for the duration of the war. Executive Order 9906 forced many Japanese Americans to sell at a loss or simply abandon their property to be relocated to the middle states at best, or lose their freedom entirely and be housed in camps under armed guard at worst.

In the 1970s, there began to be a call from the Japanese American Community for redress. Former internees and sympathizers wanted the U.S. Government to apologize for the Internment as well as compensate former internees and their families. The path to the passage of this legislation was long and multi-phased, ultimately resulting in a governmental apology and payments of \$20,000.00 to former internees or their families. This case primarily examines the first phases of policymaking from Agenda Setting through Policy Adoption. (Theodoulou, 1995; Theodoulou & Kofinis 2004)

### **STAKEHOLDERS – THE PLAYERS**

There were a number of stakeholders involved in this issue with varying degrees of importance and influence. The following outlines 4 key groups of stakeholders.

*Japanese American Citizen League (JACL)* was the citizen organization who began to raise the idea of redress in the 1970s. John Tateshi served as JACL Chairman from 1978-1985, later replaced by Minoru Masui. JACL leadership sought passage of Redress Legislation as quickly as possible, desiring an acknowledgment of and apology for Internment, along with monetary compensation. As a non-institutional

player in the policy process, the strength of JACL lay in its ability to organize Japanese Americans across the U.S. and in access to Japanese American members of Congress. In order for Redress to succeed, JACL leadership recognized the need to build coalitions within the houses of Congress, calling on two leading lobbyists, Grayce Uyehara and Grant Ujifusa, to reach out to members of congress not swayed by their Japanese American colleagues. JACL's efforts put the civil rights of a small minority group on the national agenda for over 10 years, and their strategic use of action alerts to galvanize Japanese American citizens and utilization of lobbyists to sway Congress and the Executive branch were key to eventual adoption of redress legislation.

*Japanese American Members of Congress* – Senators Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga (D, Hawaii), S.I. Hayakawa (R, Calif), and Representatives Norm Mineta and Robert Matsui (D, Calif) were powerful proponents of Redress legislation. Their goal was two-fold. First, they needed to gain the support of other members of congress for redress through passage of legislation to form a commission to investigate internment and make recommendations. When the commission findings were released recommending Redress, the Japanese American congressmen proposed bills in their respective houses of congress calling for redress. With the JACL, they were instrumental in framing the agenda of redress legislation. They and their staff were largely responsible for policy formulation, drafting bill language to be presented to congress. Without their use of relationships with fellow members of congress and willingness to tell their own stories of Internment, it is likely Redress legislation would have died in committee.

*Congressional Committee Members* - Although Sen. Sam Hall (D, Texas), Rep. Dan Lundgren (R, Calif), Rep. Thomas Kindness (R, Ohio), Sen. Alan Simpson (R, Wyoming) were not a cohesive group, their roles and goals in this policy issue were similar and they can be discussed as a single stakeholder group. For reasons such as Republican fiscal conservatism in the face of huge budget deficits, patriotism Hall, Kindness, Lungren and Simpson were all vocal opponents of redress. Lungren was the sole

dissenting member of the Redress Commission, and continued his opposition in the House in subcommittee debates. Committee and subcommittee Chairs have disproportionate influence over policy because they have the power to set the agenda of their committees. (Cahn, 1995; Theodoulou & Kofinis 2004) From their positions on Administrative Law subcommittees charged with debating the legislation, Simpson and Hall had and used capacity to block redress legislation from ever making it to a full vote in either House.

*The Executive Branch* – While ultimately responsible for signing legislation and therefore a key player in the adoption of policy, the Executive Branch did not utilize its powers of agenda setting. (Cahn, 1995; Light, 1984) Carter revoked Executive Order 9906 and signed the commission legislation into law. Later, the Reagan White House let it be known that a Redress Bill would be vetoed.

## **ANALYSIS**

Once there was enough momentum within the Japanese American community, the JACL needed access to institutional policy players. (Cahn, 1995) Their first step involved convincing the Japanese American Members of Congress to sponsor redress legislation, framing it as a civil rights/constitutional issue instead of one of property rights. (Naito & Scott, 1990) Redistributive policies that are also symbolic in nature are controversial, and never more so than in times of economic downturn. (Lowi, 1964; Theodoulou and Kofinis, 2004)

While the JACL wanted Redress from the beginning, Senator Inouye, the most senior Japanese American member of Congress convinced the Redress Committee that a commission and its accompanying public testimony would help garner support for redress with the rest of the congressional body. This path was ultimately successful. Not only did it allow members of Congress to hear the moving and often harrowing tales of internees, it allowed the American public for the first time to hear what had really happened during Internment.

By the time the first "Civil Liberties Act" related to Internment was filed in 1983, there were numerous Senators and Representatives acting as co-sponsors of the bills introduced into each house of Congress. Building a broad coalition of congressional members for Redress would prove instrumental in eventual passage of the legislation. Republican chairmen of the subcommittees that had jurisdiction over used their powers to stop the Acts of 1983 and 1985 from ever coming to a full vote. (Cahn, 1995; Theodoulou & Kofinis 2004). Recognizing the need to alter their game plan, the JACL hired seasoned lobbyists to act on their behalf, and switched their focus from education to lobbying, centralizing their campaign efforts in Washington D.C.

Some lesser though still influential players in this issue were Government Officials and Military Leaders involved in internment, and WWII Veterans and former POWs all sought to block redress legislation. Largely their objections were emotional responses to be expected by people involved in the Internment or who suffered their own sorrows during the war. While the number of people against Redress in the general population seemed to far outweigh those for it, and this stakeholder group was successful in dragging the passage of the policy out for more than 10 years, ultimately their emotional arguments were neutralized by the JACL lobbyists' personal and proxy campaign.

While Redress seemed stymied in committee, the off-year election in 1986 turned the tide. Congressional leadership changed from Republican to Democrat, and that had an enormous effect on the bills' progress in committee. Anti-redress factions tried again to block the floor vote and appealed for removal of the monetary compensation piece of the legislation, but they were unsuccessful. The JACL, their lobbyists, and the Japanese American Members of Congress had successfully utilized their powers and influence to sway enough members of Congress to easily pass the bills in each house. Using the same tactic, Redress proponents successfully neutralized Executive Branch opposition and gained the support of Reagan through similar means. Finally, in 1988, Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1987 into law, officially apologizing for internment and awarding \$20,000.00 to former Internees.

## Works Cited

- Cahn, M. (1995). The Players: Institutional and Noninstitutional Actors in the Policy Process. In Theodoulou, S. & Cahn, M (Ed.) *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*. (pp. 201-211). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Light, P. (1984). The Presidential Policy Stream. In Theodoulou, S. & Cahn, M (Ed.) *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*. (pp. 224-237). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Lowi, T.J. (1964). Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government. In Theodoulou, S. & Cahn, M (Ed.) *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*. (pp. 15-25). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Naito, C., and Scott, E. (1990) *Against All Odds: The Campaign for Japanese American Redress*. C16-90-1006.0. Massachusetts: President and Fellows of Harvard College.
- Theodoulou, S. and Kofinis, C. *The Art of the Game*. (2004) California: Thomson Wadsworth.