EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

TO: Joshua Gotbaum, Chief Executive, September 11th Fund

FROM: Nikole Pagan, Program Director, September 11th Fund

DATE: October 25, 2001

RE: Critical Failures & Opportunities for Improvement in the Response to 9/11 Charitable Giving

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OVERVIEW

The September 11th attack has inspired in Americans an extraordinary outpouring of grief that has quickly been channeled into the desire to provide financial support for victims. Like never before, Americans have given: their blood, their time, and most of all, their money. Nearly two months after the attack, an overwhelming majority of Americans have donated more than $1.5 billion to charities for 9/11 relief. The shear magnitude of the events of 9/11 and their aftermath ensure that this event and the resulting charitable response will be a defining moment in American Philanthropy.

With this unprecedented giving comes unprecedented responsibility for nonprofit charities. It also subjects us to unprecedented public scrutiny. Woodrow Wilson (1886) believed in the sanctity of public office as a public trust and in the necessity for public administrators to prove deserving of that trust. Often, nonprofit agencies engage in philanthropy as a result of government failure or inability to do so thus we are also considered part of this covenant. (Salamon, 1987) In the wake of 9/11, confidence in public charities has been shaken as we have proven slow to release funds to victims. Our sluggish response has prompted complaints of waste, misuse of funds, and duplication of aid; of misleading claims and lack of effective coordination. We risk a permanent loss of confidence in the American philanthropic community if we cannot seriously address the concerns of 9/11 victims, the media, and the public at large. (Conway, 2003)

In light of the extra scrutiny the September 11th Fund has experienced, you asked my department to provide an analysis of some strategic and organizational missteps and to identify areas for improvement for inclusion in your report to the board. The following memorandum will discuss 5 critical issues the September

11th Fund must address as we go forward: (I) the inadequate network response; (II) balancing equity, efficiency & effectiveness; (III) developing organizational capacity; (IV) questions of ethics and accountability as related to donor intent; and (V) the use of influence in the political process. Furthermore, the in-depth discussion of each of the issues presented will provide a series of recommendations to better meet the needs of victims, manage public perception and position the September 11th Fund as a central agency driving the collaborative response.

I. Inadequate Network Response

From the moment the first plane struck the towers, it has been clear that a network of government, nonprofit & private organizations would be needed to meet the enormous challenge presented by the attack and its aftermath. The enormity of the destruction to life and property coupled with the breadth of victims and their needs makes it impossible for any one organization or agency to respond adequately. The scope of the network needed is unlike anything the country has seen before and has called for the coordination of numerous government jurisdictions and a complex and layered pool of funders and grantees. That there is no model to which we can turn that incorporates collaboration of this magnitude makes the task even more daunting.

Commendably, the New York Community Trust and United Way of New York City quickly established the collaborative September 11th Fund and the Red Cross organized the Liberty Fund just as swiftly. Almost as quickly, government agencies and nonprofits created the Family Assistance Center at Pier 94, designed to provide victims and survivors access to numerous aid organizations in a one-stop shop. However, our efforts to date have proven inadequate as we have been unable to resolve some of the conflicts inherent in coordinating a mass effort while essentially building the structure from the ground up.

The sudden, shocking attack and lack of systems in place to provide the networked service delivery demanded by the breadth and scope of victims and destruction have been exacerbated by delays in delivery of aid. Our organizations have been plagued by confusion over legitimate claims, continuously evolving systemic requirements, and disparate rules between organizations regarding victim qualification. Lack of our own internal capacity as well as that of our grantee organizations has stalled the delivery of financial assistance: almost two months after the attack, few funds have reached families requesting aid (Rosegrant, 2002).

Overall, the response of the philanthropic community has exhibited a general lack of coordination and no leaders have emerged to manage the coordinated effort. Meanwhile, the public, the media, and lawmakers in Washington D.C. are clamoring for us to "coordinate better."

Recommendations for Improving Network Collaboration

(1) Use connections and influence to take a leadership role in framing the response of charitable organizations and relief efforts from this point forward

Inherent in the networked service delivery is the concept that public problems have grown in size and scope and the boundaries between organizations seeking to address these problems have grown blurry. (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Kettl, 2002) The trend toward networked service delivery has necessitated governance adaptations. (Geuras & Garofalo, 2005; Kettl, 2002) Central to the conception of governance is leadership. For Geuras and Garofalo (2005), leadership is "an essential part of our collective capacity to develop vision and strategy, to formulate, implement and evaluate policies, to provide stability and continuity, and to deliver services to citizens." (p. 253)

In the response to 9/11 to date, no clear leader has emerged from within the philanthropic community. Rather than wait for another organization to do so, The September 11th Fund can step up and fill the dearth of leadership. We have the opportunity to act as transformational leaders in the process. Geuras & Garofalo (2005) define transformational leadership as the ability to change the status quo, to engage and empower stakeholders, and to encourage communication and growth. (p. 253) Transformational leaders guide an organization – in our case a network – through a transformative phase and possess the capacity to institutionalize changes over time. (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984)

While we can't rewrite the history of the last couple of months, we can alter our course for the immediate future as well as put systems into place to meet future needs for effective collaboration. Partnerships such as that which created the September 11th Fund are increasingly important in today's nonprofit world. (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004) In order to maximize the value of this partnership, it is critical that we draw on the resources of our founding organizations, The New York Community Trust and United Way of New York City. The Trust manages over 1,600 funds while the United Way has over 400 member agencies. (Seessel, 2002) Because of their roots in the community and indeed their funding structures, Trust and United Way staff members possess extensive knowledge of New York's social service delivery structure in both the public and private sectors.

The Trust and the United Way provide the September 11th Fund a bridge to a number of institutional funders such as large private and family foundations as well as corporate foundations. We are equally connected to the structures of city government. By utilizing our network of connections, we can take a leadership role, positioning the Fund to ensure that the needs of the more than 300 nonprofit social services agencies with whom we have met, and their clients, are being communicated to institutions and people with positions of power in the community.

Managing the collaborative process by implementing a networked approach that is more deliberate and coordinated within the community of 9/11 relief agencies not only allows the September 11th Fund to assume a leadership role, but will also be key to the successful implementation of each of the subsequent issues and recommendations presented in this memorandum.

(2) Engage In Strategic Planning

Frequently, the public sector finds itself needing to respond to unpredictable events that pre-empt planning. Yet planning is desirable because it allows the identification of goals and resources and helps us ascertain how and when to use resources to accomplish objectives. (Bowman, et al., 2004)

Strategic planning goes further, refining goals and objectives in part through an in depth analysis of organizational strengths and weakness and environmental opportunities and threats (S.W.O.T. Analysis) that leads to creation of a vision for the future. In keeping with Henry Mintzberg's (1994) discussion of strategy as a process, rather than thinking of strategic planning as the production of a document to guide us, the charitable response to the 9/11 attacks demands ongoing strategy development that adapts as the environment changes. Strategic planning will allow the September 11th Fund to clarify our mission, vision and goals which will in turn enhance our responses to the concerns of equity, efficiency and effectives as well as transparency and accountability discussed later in this memorandum.

II. Equity, Efficiency & Effectiveness

In the short time since the attack it has become clear that the philanthropic community must deal with issues of equity, efficiency and effectiveness in our response. In the philanthropic framework, equity is the idea that distribution of aid should be fair though not necessarily equal while efficiency implies lack of waste of resources and effectiveness is defined by an organization's ability to have the social impact implied by its mission. (Dees, et al, 2002; Steinemann, et al, 2005) These concepts are often at odds but organizations frequently seek to diminish their incongruence and accomplish them all at once.

In the 9/11 response, many charities have been playing it safe by providing assistance to traditionally-defined victims; those who worked in the towers or were on the planes, their families, and emergency responders and their families. By focusing their aid on the most obvious victims, organizations are creating a redundancy in aid to some victims while others have yet to receive assistance. This duplication of aid produces an economically inefficient allocation of resources, over-compensating some victims while others are left wanting. (Steinemann, et al, 2005) This gap is most notable in families of undocumented workers, gay and lesbian partners, and individuals who worked or lived nearby the World Trade Center (Rosegrant, 2002).

Other categories of victims, such as those affected by the attack on the Pentagon and the families of Flight 93's victims feel under-compensated at best and at worst, ignored. Additionally, victims of previous terrorist attacks on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the bombing of the Trade Center in 1993 feel the amount of aid being provided New York's 9/11 victims is disproportionate compared to their own.

The equity concerns presented above also impact efficiency and effectiveness. Each agency has its own criteria for providing assistance to victims, and these criteria are not consistent in terms of eligibility or size of aid. Additionally, each agency utilizes a different in-take form creating confusion as well as frustration as victims and families are required to fill out a new form for each organization from whom they request aid. Lack of a central tracking system increases this inefficiency, as we have not been able to be mindful of which victims have received aid, and from which organizations.

At the Family Assistance Center, victims have complained that they have suffered long waits as they are shuffled between organizations never certain if they will meet the requirements for aid from these organizations. Nonprofit and government representatives often have little knowledge of support for victims beyond their own organizations. Moreover, many of the people seeking aid are unused to seeking financial assistance from any sort of charitable organization. (Rosegrant, 2002)

The emerging equity and efficiency issues impact our effective delivery of philanthropic support. The mission of the September 11 Fund is to provide aid to victims directly affected by the attacks of 9/11. In our confusion over coordination and generating new systems, we have until this moment failed to effectively execute our mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF EQUITY, EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS

(1) ESTABLISH A 9/11 TASK FORCE

Two key areas where the September 11th Fund can take a leadership role in reshaping the response of the philanthropic community are in the identification of un-met needs and the linkage of victims to agencies able to help them. We recommend the creation of a 9/11 Task Force to accomplish these tasks. By establishing a Task Force that reports to the Fund, Fund staff can focus on the managing of donations and grant making, leaving the Task Force to analyze the current state of services and make recommendations for improvements. The Task Force will also be used to monitor the political landscape and engage in lobbying activities (see Section V of this memorandum). Accordingly, the Task Force should be structured as an affiliated 501(c)4 social welfare organization to allow a greater percentage of funds to be utilized for lobbying than we are allowed as a 501(c)3 charity. (Internal Revenue Service, 2008)

The Task Force should be representative of as many voices as possible. To that end, we should ensure that the Task Force includes, at minimum:

- Key figures from the Liberty Fund and other 9/11 specific organizations;
- Representatives from large institutional funders such as any of the Haas Funds;
- Victims rights advocates;
- Organizational grantees;
- Emergency response experts.

The Task Force will initially have two primary goals. The first of these goals will be to conduct a needs assessment to identify un-met needs among victims and their families. Needs assessments allow organizations to survey the field to determine the current status and service needs of a defined population and/or area. Additionally, needs assessments are useful for obtaining information about current conditions in a defined population including problems or service needs and the resources and approaches being used to address them. (Dees, et al., 2001; McKay, et al., 1999)

In particular, the Task Force will focus on three categories of un-met needs my department has identified through our analysis:

(1) Broad categories of victims yet to receive aid, such as immigrants, LGBT partners, people who lost homes, and people who lost jobs;
(2) Specific individuals and families in need of assistance;
(3) Overall victim and family satisfaction with quality of service at the Family Assistance Center.

The second initial goal of the Task Force will be to identify all organizations providing aid to 9/11 victims. Upon identification, organizations will be grouped by category: financial aid, disaster relief, victim advocacy, etc. This information will be provided to the public through the websites of the September 11th Fund and the 9/11 Task Force and will include the listing of each of the organizations, along with contact information, type of aid available, and a brief description of criteria for receipt of aid.

To accomplish these first two goals, the Task Force must use a variety of research tools. To date, the City of New York has failed to provide charities with a comprehensive list of victims. (Rosegrant, 2002) Accordingly, we must work to create this list. Victim and family data collection should include at minimum the examination of public records, requests to families and employers affected by 9/11, surveys of key stakeholders, and focus groups of victims and families who have utilized the Family Assistance Center. Data collection and survey methodology will be useful in determining categories of victims missing aid as well as provide lists of specific individuals still in need of aid. Surveys will also be useful to determine service improvements at the Family Assistance Center, but focus groups will provide participants a dynamic interaction with other members facilitating a "synergistic group effort" that allows participants to draw upon each other's experiences, essentially brainstorming topics, issues and solutions. (Berg, 2007)

(2) Create a universal in-take form

Utilizing a common form provides us an avenue to respond to the needs of victims and families and is perhaps the first and most important step to ensuring an efficient and effective response to the challenges of coordinating such a vast network of responders. One way to measure efficiency is to examine the relationship between inputs and outputs: the ratio of effort needed to develop a process to the results of that process. (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2005) In the case of a universal in-take form, the resources expended by the Fund and our collaborative network are minimal in relation to the time, effort and stress we save victims and families in need of aid.

In terms of efficiency, the universal in-take form should ask for basic information needed by each of the relief agencies. At minimum, this should include contact information, relationship to victim (self, relative, dependent or partner), type of assistance sought, and other agencies to which the applicant has applied and/or received aid. If relief agencies need additional information, it will be their responsibility to collect such information when it is clear an applicant is eligible for aid from that agency. To ensure equity, the form should be in available multiple languages to serve those categories of applicants who are not proficient in English.

(3) PROVIDE FAMILY ASSISTANCE CENTER STAFF WITH THE INFORMATION AND TRAINING NECESSARY TO PROVIDE BETTER SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC

In *Personnel Management in Government: Politics and Process*, Shafritz et al., (2001) suggest that investment in human capital by training and developing staff in line with program and organizational goals is one of the major developments in management in the last century. Bowman, et al., (2004) note that in order for people to do their jobs well, they must possess the necessary information. “The need for effective information management is especially pronounced when multiple agencies and jurisdictions work together.” (Bowman, et al, 2004, p. 55) Given the vast network of 9/11 aid organizations, the need for effective information management and communication is particularly significant.

To address one of the major criticisms of nonprofit and government agencies at the Family Assistance Center, it is necessary to educate FAC staff on the type of aid available from other organizations so they can make effective referrals. This will reduce stress on workers by providing them the tools with which to accomplish their jobs because as noted by Guy, Newman & Mastracci (2008) “for people in human service professions, helping others gives a sense of meaning to life, but not being able to help is stressful”. (p. 32) Workers at the FAC want to help, but have thus far suffered from lack of information. When the Task Force has completed its needs assessments and has identified the various 9/11 aid organizations, these lists must be provided to the various nonprofits and government agencies housed a Pier 94.

To maximize effectiveness of referrals made, the lists provided to agencies at the Family Assistance Center should be accompanied by informational workshops that include question and answer sessions with September 11th and Task Force staff. Further workshops should include sensitivity training, to help FAC staff learn to cope with the large number of 9/11 aid recipients who are not used to seeking financial assistance from charities. We have an ally in the organization Safe Horizons, the New York City-based victim assistance and advocacy organization which very early on received a sizeable grant from the September 11th Fund. As one of the notable service providers at the Family Assistance Center, Safe Horizons has relationships in place with other providers at the FAC and can help facilitate these recommended trainings.

III. Organizational Capacity

Unused to philanthropic need of this magnitude, the charitable community finds itself wholly unprepared to deal with the logistical demands of distributing so much aid to so many victims and families in such a protracted period of time. "When the founders of the September 11th Fund met with non-profit service providers immediately after the attacks, only a few were set up to disburse cash quickly, and newly established charities had to start from scratch in creating such mechanisms." (Rosegrant, 2002) Simply stated, many of our organizations lack the capacity to generate the number of checks needed.

To date, no central tracking mechanism has been developed to keep track of which victims received what aid from which organizations; nor have efforts been made to provide a centralized list of the varieties of aid available from the hundreds of organizations responding to the attack of September 11. Efforts to create the database called for by Attorney General Spizter have floundered as some organizations quibble over proprietary data.

When not concerned about opening their processes to scrutiny by funders such as the September 11th Fund, nonprofit leaders have worried over privacy concerns of their clients and service-recipients. The Red Cross' Bernardine Healy made it clear, "People will not come to us if they think we are going to put their name into some big database." (Rosegrant, 2002; p 9) The challenge, then, is to create a database that captures enough information to help us determine where aid is needed and where it is being duplicated, but also respects the privacy rights of concerned seekers of aid who may be worried about outing themselves as homosexual, admitting to illegal alien status or acknowledging need for psychiatric treatment.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

(1) UTILIZE ESTABLISHED ONLINE GIVING PLATFORMS TO CREATE AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM TO DISBURSE FUNDS

The September 11th Fund and our network of grantees providing direct financial assistance to 9/11 victims need to work together to build a system that efficiently and effectively disburses aid to victims. Many foundations who host Donor Advised Fund programs find themselves overwhelmed with the number of checks going out. To facilitate faster check processing, some foundations utilize online financial partners to assist them with the cutting and disbursing of consistently large numbers of checks. These organizations take advantage of economies of scale that result from labor specialization, the efficient use of capital and declining per-unit costs associated with entry into a market. (Steinemann, et al., 2005) In other words, these online organizations have the systems in place to process large numbers of checks and by turning to them, we avoid the start-up costs and headaches associated with implementing new systems.

One such online organization is Kintera, Inc. Kintera offers “a community of nonprofit and governmental financial management knowledge shared amongst clients to help each organization demonstrate accountability and gain maximum efficiency.” (Kinterainc.com). While providing access to such resources as their Online Charity Database, a list of organizations verified through due-diligence processes as being 501(c)(3) charitable organizations able to receive tax-exempt donations, Kintera works with each organization to build a specialized interface to Kintera’s services and a fund-delivery process that meets the needs of the organization.

Contracting with an organization like Kintera will allow the September 11th Fund to focus on fund raising and grant making without the added problem of producing large numbers of checks. In order to facilitate an even faster disbursement of aid, the Fund should work with the online partner to provide direct deposit options for victims and grantee organizations.

(2) ADVOCATE FOR A DATABASE STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS WHO ARE BOTH FUND RAISERS AND GRANT MAKERS WITH DONOR ADVISED FUND AND DONOR DESIGNATED PROGRAM.

While we have agreed that as a funder we should not be part of that database discussion regarding the use of confidential data, we still have a prominent role to play in the construction of such a database. This is another key area where reliance on our founding organizations The New York Community Trust and the United Way of New York City, can help. As fund raising and grant making organizations with a variety of programs available to donors for targeting aid to specific organizations, the Trust and the United Way are familiar with complex databases that track the information of donors and donations, grantee organizations, donor advised fund programs, and everything related to grant making. Once it is determined what private and/or proprietary information will be accessible through the database, the September 11th Fund will work with other 9/11 organizations to design and construct an effective and efficient database.

In order to maximize effectiveness of a central tracking system, we need to ensure the linkage of 3 specific types of databases:

(1) Donor Database to reflect donor and grantee information;
(2) Client Database to track client information and receipt of aid;
(3) Agency & Provider Database to centralize information.

The challenging aspect of creating this database is the necessity for it to exist in the netherworld of cyberspace, accessible to each of the organizations but secure enough to make agencies and clients comfortable that the system is not going to be hacked, allowing sensitive information to become public fodder. We can accomplish this by working with major computer software, hardware and internet companies, as well as seeking the guidance of government entities familiar with building secure online servers to share information.

IV. Ethics, Accountability & Donor Intent

The relationship between the public and government and nonprofit agencies is sometimes tenuous at best. (Brody, 2002) Transparency is one key method public agencies employ to earn and maintain the public's trust. (Kettl, 2002) The New York Community Trust's Lorie Slutsky recognized from the beginning that the September 11th Fund would be operating in a fishbowl of intense public, media & governmental scrutiny. Indeed, that all 9/11 charities would be scrutinized. (Rosegrant, 2002) The criticisms leveled at the philanthropic community post- 9/11 find their roots in the public's perception that charitable organizations are not being responsive to the needs of victims and therefore not responsive to the intent of donors who have contributed in record numbers to assist those victims. The perception that we have not been as responsive as we should be has quickly become a question of accountability. This is true of the 9/11 charity response as a whole and also characterizes the public's perception of the September 11th Fund.

Recognizing that government aid and insurance claims will take some time, donors to 9/11 charities expected much-needed aid would reach victims almost immediately. As we have proven slow in providing victims with aid, the media and the public have begun to speculate about our use of donated funds. Specifically, we have been called to task for earmarking funds for people who lost homes or jobs due to the 9/11 attack and for setting aside funds for future needs of victims. Opponents of this strategy believe the funds we have collected should be reserved solely for people killed or injured in the attacks, and for their families. (Rosegrant, 2002)

The media has contributed to our public relations problem. Indeed, the first murmurs of discontent were printed just weeks after the attack, and prominent media personalities have since begun clamoring for our agencies to "honor donor intent". (Rosegrant, 2002) Honoring donor intent has tuned into an examination of the ethics of our organizations as conservative commentator Bill O'Reilly and other members of the media have questioned support given to agencies who provide aid to collateral victims rather than adhere to the strict interpretation that aid should be reserved for families of those killed, and the injured.

As public outcry has grown more intense, government officials have responded by turning their critical eye our way. New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer has called for us to honor donor intent. Additionally, our organizations have been called to Washington to testify in Congressional hearings criticizing the timeliness, effectiveness, and morality of our response. In agreement with Spitzer, Congressional committee members have strongly urged 9/11 organizations to honor donor intent.

Recommendations to Resolve Issues of Ethics, Accountability and Donor Intent

(1) Educate donors, the media, and the public regarding victim need

Donors expect the organizations they fund to demonstrate good stewardship; increasingly, this means donors restrict gifts to specific purposes and expect organizations to use funds in a manner consistent with donor intent. (Conway, 2003; Tempel, 2003) This is especially true of the September 11th Fund because we are the collaborative agency of the United Way of New York City & the New York Community Trust. As organizations with Donor designated programs that allow donors to provide strategic, targeted giving for the community by community members, United Way and the Trust are expected to be more responsive to donor intent. (Maxwell, 2003; Perry, 2003)

Honoring donor intent has proven difficult with 9/11 funds because of the unrealistic expectation that the more than $1.5 billion donated to date should be used solely on those directly affected by death or injury: including the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon as well Flight 93, there are more than 2,500 civilian deaths and 215 civilian injuries while emergency responders account for another 416 deaths and serious injuries. (Dixon & Stern, 2005) Divided equally, funds from nonprofits alone would average over $470,000 per victim.

One way philanthropic organizations can exhibit good stewardship is through donor education. (Kaminski, 2003) Given victims directly injured or impacted by death of a family member will also have access to billions in government aid and insurance pay-outs; it is incumbent upon us to reconcile the tension between donor intent and the needs of tens of thousands of collateral victims who lost their homes or jobs and/or those who have yet to seek aid.

We can reconcile this tension by implementing a Donor Education campaign to enlighten donors while solidifying their connection to the Fund and our grantees. (Kaminski, 2003) Accordingly, we recommend the Fund host a number of events entitled “Philanthropy Series” designed to educate both the public at large and our donors specifically, to help them understand why it is important to ensure an equitable distribution of funds to categories of victims not initially intended for aid, as well as to safe-guard some funds for future needs. We have already conducted surveys that indicate the average person has a “better, broader, more humane, more charitable definition of how to help victims of September 11th.” (Rosegrant, 2002, p. 10) Through the Philanthropy Series we can build upon this understanding as well as broaden the audience who receives this message.

The challenges that remain are the need to convince members of the press, and to ensure we do not squander the good-will of the public.

(2) LAUNCH A COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN TO COUNTER NEGATIVE MEDIA COVERAGE

In order to reverse the tide of negative public opinion and restore a sense that we are accountable to the public, it is necessary for the September 11th Fund to launch its own public relations campaign. To do so, we must hire a Public Relations firm to work with us to design and implement an effective campaign. Given the intense scrutiny we are under involving use of our funds and honoring donor intent, it is disingenuous for us to use donations already received by the September 11th Fund to execute the donor education strategy recommended above as well as the media strategy recommended here.

Rather than use contested funds, we should apply for grants from the general funds of The New York Community Trust and United Way of New York City. As the organizations that came together to found us, the Trust and United Way have a vested interest in our success: any negative perception of the

September 11th Fund will also reflect on their organizations. Additionally, the Fund can seek new donations to support these activities from the public, and from large major foundations and corporations.

To execute our new media strategy we must first and foremost work to utilize the media as a partner, not simply an antagonistic opponent. Theodoulou & Kofinis (2004) suggest that an aggressive media campaign exploits traditional as well as new forms of media. To that end, the Fund must utilize internet forums, blogs and social networking sites in addition to traditional media outlets to reach a broader range of the public.

Agencies are more effective when they have broad public support, the key to which is favorable media coverage. (Rainey & Steinbauer, 2002) The media is a conduit between the public and government and nonprofit organizations and has the ability to shape and define an issue affects the policy making process. (Theodolou & Kofinis, 2004) The ideological biases of media personalities like O'Reilly are used to shape the policy agenda as well as the public's evaluation of policy. (Kettl, 2002; Theodolou & Kofinis, 2004)

We can utilize the media as a partner to increase ethical accountability and transparency by:

- Conducting regular press conferences to update the public on Fund policies;
- Publishing the results of program evaluations to facilitate better understanding of the financial decisions made by the September 11th (Greenfield, 2003);
- Increase transparency by timely reporting financial information, including budgets, cash flow projections and statements of position (Lee, et al, 2008);
- Sourcing sympathetic talk-radio and television programs to give interviews.

The second prong of our new PR strategy involves retooling our website to utilize information collected and reports issued by the 9/11 Task Force. To present the appearance of complete transparency, our website should convey comprehensive information on all Fund operations. Additionally, the website should include the following pages or information:

- A downloadable PDF file of the In-Take form for use by people seeking assistance;
- Lists of all government and nonprofit agencies providing 9/11 aid and victim assistance, listed by category. This page should contain a brief description of the type of aid provided by

each organization, a short list of criteria for determining eligibility, and links to external websites where appropriate;

- A Grants Announcement page, to be updated monthly, including the name of recipients, grant amounts, and purpose of each grant;
- A Contributions page, to be updated monthly, listing contributors' names by the size category of their gifts. In cases where donors wish to remain anonymous, only the size and category of the gift should be listed;
- A detailed FAQ page with topics relating to the Fund's governance, information on where to find help, get help; what categories of cash and services are available, and other important topics discovered during the needs assessment.

Both prongs of the media strategy feature financial reporting and budget implications. Public reporting of budget and financial information allows a transparent look into an organization's finances that furthers accountability for results. (Lee, et al, 2008) With reporting, program evaluations can be linked to the budgeting process and overall financial management of the September 11th Fund. Making current financial information available will provide the public a better framework with which to evaluate our results to date.

As the end of fiscal year 2001 approaches, we must begin creating a budget for 2002. Budget preparation serves both a management and planning function. (Greenfield, 2003) Because budget reporting also serves a transparency function, the type of budget we choose is critical to public understanding of our use of donated monies. (Greenfield, 2003; Lee, et al., 2008) A line-item budget is easy to read and simple to understand in that it groups income and expenditures by cost center or department and provides a detailed look at each. A performance budget instead groups budget items by programmatic activity and incorporates outcomes measurements into budgetary resource allocations. (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006; Lee, et al, 2008) The September 11th Fund should utilize a hybrid of line-item budgeting and performance budgeting, grouping income and resources by program activities and utilizing outcomes measurements, but also providing the financial detail that makes a line-item budget so easy to read. These documents should be publicly reported and also made available on the Fund website.

V. Influence & the Political Process

In the aftermath of 9/11, the political process engaged the philanthropic community in unique ways. For example, IRS regulations as well as rules surrounding the duplication of aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were relaxed or suspended so that charitable giving to individuals would not affect the level of federal support to victims or disenfranchise new categories of victims. (Rosegrant, 2002) The ease with which these rules and regulations were passed is consistent with two of the policymaking theories regarding agenda setting in the political process: Punctuated Equilibrium and the Multiple Streams Theory.

The theory of punctuated equilibrium suggests that the political process is generally incremental and policy changes are gradual, however some changes happen quickly resulting in swift and rigorous policy alterations. (True, et al., 2007) Punctuated equilibrium dovetails conceptually with John Kingdon's Streams Metaphor. The streams theory suggests that windows for significant policy change open when the problems, solutions and political steams present in all problems come together at a specific point in time. (Kingdon, 1984) These policy windows can be opened by a significant change in any one of the streams; or a focusing event that draws attention to a problem and helps open a window of opportunity. (Kingdon, 1984) The 9/11 attack is such a focusing event.

Recommendations to Make Use of Influence in the Political Process

(1) Utilize the 9/11 Task Force to monitor the political process for open policy windows to allow the Fund to lobby for policies and regulations favorable to 9/11 victims and the philanthropic community

Given the speed with which policy makers have responded to 9/11 to date, it is clear there will be more rules and regulations enacted in the coming months and years. Much of the legislation passed during this time period will have a direct impact on the philanthropic community. As good stewards, it is therefore imperative that we, and indeed the charitable community as a whole, play a part in the agenda setting and policy formation phases of the policy process.

Monitoring the political process is an excellent third goal for the 9/11 Task Force. The unique nature of the September 11th attack has revealed a number of places where federal policies impede nonprofit support. The Task Force should look for policy windows that provide avenues to lobby policy makers. When avenues to policy making are available, the Task Force will work with the September 11th Fund to formulate policy positions that advocate for policies favorable to the September 11th Fund, our network of partners and grantee organizations, and above all, the victims of 9/11 whom we serve.

In addition, the Task Force should engage in grassroots advocacy, which differs from lobbying in that it seeks to change policy from the ground up, by changing public perception of an issue in support of legislation favorable to the position of the lobbying organization. (Reilly & Braig Allen, 2003) The Task force can accomplish this via the media campaign laid out in Section IV of this memorandum, and also by implementing the following recommendation.

(2) Utilize the 9/11 Task Force to Work to Align the Interests & Values of the September 11th Fund with Those of Victims' Advocacy Groups

Victims' rights advocacy organizations are emerging as a powerful interest group player in the September 11th policy making process. In his discussion of Issue Networks, or shared knowledge groups focused on some aspect or problem in public policy, Hugh Heclo (1978) suggests that networks coalesce around intellectual or emotional commitments to issues that reflect their interests. This is true of the various Victims' rights and family advocacy groups that have become focused on the delivery of aid and services by 9/11 charities and have therefore been some of our harshest critics. (Rosegrant, 2002)

Powerful interest groups are major actors in the policy cycle who have the ability to focus policy makers on policies that reflect their interests. (Theodoulou & Kofinis, 2004) To the extent that the media have given voice to Victims' Rights advocacy organizations and legislators in Washington, D.C., have passed legislation favorable to these groups, it behooves the Fund to work with these organizations to find mutually beneficial policy positions that favor both victims and philanthropic organizations addressing victim needs. A coalition that combines both our voices is stronger, broader, and therefore has the ability to exert more pressure on policy makers.

CONCLUSION

The attacks of 9/11 forced the philanthropic community to confront a number of today's public administration challenges. We at the September 11th Fund are only too aware of these challenges. In our initial response, we came face to face with issues of lack of preparation, insufficient capacity, collaborative inadequacies and poor management. The breadth of destruction of the attack and scope of the public's response put the September 11th Fund and the charitable community as a whole under a microscope of unprecedented scrutiny that highlighted key organizational weakness and numerous strategic challenges.

The foregoing memorandum examined issues of collaboration and capacity; of the tensions between equity, efficiency, and effectiveness; of donor intent and organizational ethics and accountability, and finally of political influence on policy making. A number of recommendations to better manage the collaborative response, ensure equity and efficiency in service delivery, and strengthen 9/11 organizations have been made. If implemented by the September 11th Fund, these recommendations will go a long way to repair the damaged faith in the American charitable community and position the Fund as a leader in the philanthropic response to 9/11, allowing us to successfully implement our mission to "meet the immediate and long-term needs of victims, families, and communities affected by the tragedy".

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