[to
appear in On Descriptions: Semantic and Pragmatic Perspectives,
Anne
Bezuidenhout & Marga Reimer, eds., Oxford University Press]
Descriptions:
Points of Reference
KENT BACH
kbach@sfsu.edu
CONTENTS
Introduction
I.
Referring and Describing
Point
1. Names
and descriptions can both be used merely to indicate what we are speaking about.
Point
2. We
generally choose the least informative sort of expression whose use will still
enable the hearer to identify the individual we wish to refer to.
Point
3. In
many cases, using a description may be the only way to refer to something.
Point
4. Using
a description to refer identifies by implicitly conveying an identity.
Point
5. The distinctive quantificational character of definite descriptions helps explain how and why they can readily be used to refer, because it plays a key role in their referential use.
II.
Referring by Describing
Point
6. With
a specific use of an indefinite description, one is not referring but merely
alluding to something.
Point
7. One
can describe a (singular) proposition without being in a position to grasp it.
Point
8.
One
can describe (single out) an individual without actually referring to it.
Point
9. Descriptive
'reference' is not genuine reference.
Point
10. Various
kinds of pseudo-reference are not to be confused for the real thing.
III.
The Pragmatic Status of the Referential-Attributive Distinction
Point
11. Various
contrasts may seem to capture the referential-attributive distinction, but only
one really does.
Point
12. Incomplete
definite descriptions pose no real threat to Russell's theory.
Point
13. Definite descriptions do not have referential meanings.
Introduction
Russell
(1905) made a compelling case that descriptions, definite as well as indefinite,
are devices of quantification, not referring phrases. Strawson (1950) and
Donnellan (1966) pointed out that definite descriptions can be used to refer.
And even indefinite descriptions can be used to refer. All this is old hat. If
'On Denoting', 'On Referring', and 'Reference and Definite
Descriptions' had not provoked decades of debate, philosophers might have just
thought it obvious that the mere fact that an expression can be used to refer
does not show that it is inherently a referring expression, an expression that
itself refers. After all, there is an obvious need for a distinction between
linguistic meaning and speaker's meaning, and the distinction between
linguistic reference and speaker's reference is just a special case of that (Kripke
1977, 263). Invoking this distinction does not, of course, tell us which sorts
of expressions are inherently referring expressions and which are merely capable
of being used to refer, but it is enough to suggest that a special reason is
needed to support the claim that descriptions, which obviously can be used in
nonreferring ways and which have the syntactic earmarks of quantifier phrases,
nevertheless have referential readings.
Consider the sentence, 'The discoverer of X-rays was bald'. It is one
thing for a speaker to be able to use the sentence to convey the singular
proposition that R–ntgen was bald and quite another for the sentence itself to
express that proposition. The mere fact that descriptions can be used to refer
does not provide much support for the claim that when so used they are
semantically referential. After all, there are many things expressions can be
used to do that have non-semantic explanations. For example, so-called
rhetorical questions ('Why are you so lazy?') are statements made using interrogative
sentences. No one would seriously suggest that the interrogative form has an
additional declarative meaning. Indeed, it is because a rhetorical
question involves the utterance of an interrogative sentence whose semantics
accounts for its literal use to ask a genuine question that it has its force: it
is taken as a statement and is intended by the speaker to be taken as such,
precisely because the answer to the question is obvious. Various strong
pragmatic arguments have challenged the claim that definite and even indefinite
descriptions sometimes function semantically as referring expressions.[1]
Indeed, Jeff King (2001) has recently made a compelling case that the best
candidate for referential descriptions, namely demonstrative descriptions (of
the form 'that F'), are quantificational, even in their paradigmatic
referential use. The key points of Part I combine to provide new reason for
supposing that definite descriptions are not semantically referential. The main
point is that they can readily be used to refer precisely because they
are quantifier phrases of a certain sort.
Part II addresses the question of what it takes to use a description to
refer. One can use a description to refer to something one believes to satisfy
the description, but what if one is not in a position to think of that
individual, if, as Russell would say, one 'knows it only by
description'? Can one refer to it anyway? If descriptions are quantificational
and propositions expressed by sentences containing them are general, how can one
use such a sentence to convey a singular proposition involving whichever
individual satisfies the description in question? Also, there is the
intermediate case (between referential and merely quantificational uses) of the
so-called specific use of indefinite descriptions. It illustrates one way
to fall short of referring to an object (others will be discussed too): one
indicates that one has a certain individual in mind without indicating which
individual it is. In short, one merely alludes to it.
Part III revisits Donnellan's referential-attributive distinction in
light of the preceding points. I will review various ways in which it has been
characterized, by Donnellan himself and by others, and try to pin down what the
distinction amounts to. Also, I will take up the apparent problem for
Russell's theory posed by incomplete definite descriptions, whether used
referentially or attributively. These are descriptions, such as 'the table',
that are not uniquely satisfied. There are too many tables (more than one is
enough) for a sentence like 'the table is covered with books' to be made
true in the way that Russell's theory requires. Finally, I will rebut Michael
Devitt's new arguments (this volume) that descriptions have referential
meanings.
Addressing these many issues requires taking a position on what it
involves to refer to a particular thing (our discussion will be limited to
reference to spatio-temporal things) and on what it takes to think of one. I
will assume a certain conception of singular reference, either by a linguistic
expression or by a speaker.[2]
When reference is made by the noun phrase itself, indicative sentences in which
it occurs express singular propositions, at least when they express a
proposition at all.[3] The referent of the
expression is a constituent of that proposition. When a speaker refers, he uses
a noun phrase to indicate which thing he is trying to convey a singular
proposition about. He can use a noun phrase to refer his audience to something
even if the noun phrase does not itself refer.
I also assume a certain conception of singular thought. In my view, we
can have singular thoughts about objects we are perceiving, have perceived, or
have been informed of (Bach 1987/1994, ch. 1). We do so by means of
non-descriptive, 'de re modes of presentation', which connect us,
whether immediately or remotely, to an object. The connection is
causal-historical, but the connection involves a chain of representations
originating with a perception of the object. Which object one is thinking of is
determined relationally, not satisfactionally. That is, the object one's
thought is about is determined not by satisfying a certain description but by
being in a certain relation to that very thought (token). We cannot form a
singular thought about an individual we can 'think of' only under a
description. So, for example, we cannot think of the first child born in the
22nd century because we are not suitably connected to that individual. Strictly
speaking, we cannot think of it but merely that there will exist a unique
individual of a certain sort. Our thought 'about' that child is general in
character, not singular. Similarly, we cannot think of the first child born in
the fourth century BC either. However, we can think of Aristotle, because we are
connected to him through a long chain of communication. We can think of him even
though we could not have recognized him, just as I can think of the masked man I
recently saw rob my bank. Nor does being able to think of an individual require
being able to identify that individual by means of a uniquely characterizing
description.[4]
So on my conception of singular thought, there must be a representational
connection, however remote and many-linked, between thought and object. A more
restrictive view, though not nearly as restrictive as Russell's, would limit
this connection to personal acquaintance (via perception and perception-based
memory), and would disallow singular thoughts about unfamiliar objects. A more
liberal view, though one I would contest, would allow singular thought via
uniquely identifying descriptions. In any case, although I am assuming the above
conception of singular thought, the questions to be asked and the distinctions
to be drawn, such as the distinction between referring to something and merely
alluding to or merely singling out something, do not essentially depend on that
conception (of course, how one uses these distinctions to divide cases does
depend on one's conception). All that is required is the assumption that one
can have singular thoughts about at least some objects one has not perceived and
that only certain sorts of relations one can bear to an object put one in a
position to have singular thoughts about it. What is essential to our questions
is the above conception of singular reference: speaker's reference and the
hearer's full understanding of it can be achieved only by way of a singular
thought of the object.
I.
Referring and Describing
Descriptions
can be used to refer. What does that involve? Quite a bit. What does it show the
semantics of descriptions? Not much.
Point
1. Names and descriptions can both be used merely to indicate what we are
speaking about.
We
commonly talk about particular persons, places, or things.[5]
We refer to them and ascribe properties to them. In so doing, we are able to
accommodate the fact that an individual can change over time, that our
conception of it can also change over time, that we can be mistaken in our
conception of it, and that different people's conceptions of the same
individual can differ. All this is possible if in thinking of and in referring
to an individual we are not constrained to represent it as having certain
properties.
It has long been thought that proper names, along with pronouns, are the
linguistic devices best suited for doing this.[6]
As Mill wrote, the function of proper names is not to convey general information
but rather 'to enable individuals to be made the subject of discourse';
names are 'attached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on ...
any attribute of the object' (1872, 20). According to Russell, a proper name,
at least when 'used directly', serves 'merely to indicate what we are
speaking about; [the name] is no part of the fact asserted ... : it is merely
part of the symbolism by which we express our thought' (1919, 175).[7]
Russell treated definite descriptions differently, of course, since the object a
description describes 'is not part of the proposition [expressed by the
sentence] in which [the description] occurs' (170). Whereas a (genuine) name
introduces its referent into the proposition, a description introduces a certain
quantificational structure, not its denotation. The denotation of a description
is thus semantically inert -- the semantic role of a description does not
depend on what, if anything, it denotes. In contrast, a proper name 'directly
designat[es] an individual which is its meaning' (174).[8]
Nevertheless, Russell allowed that proper names can not only be 'used as
names' but also 'as descriptions', adding that 'there is nothing in the
phraseology to show whether they are being used in this way or as names'
(175).
Interestingly, Russell's distinction regarding uses of names is much
the same as Donnellan's famous distinction regarding uses of definite
descriptions (see Part III). If the property expressed by the description's
matrix (the 'F' in 'the F') enters 'essentially' into the statement
made, the description is used attributively;[9]
when a speaker uses a description referentially, the speaker uses it 'to
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states
something about that person or thing' (1966, 285). Donnellan's distinction
clearly corresponds to Russell's. Whereas an attributive use of a definite
description involves stating a general proposition, as with the use of a proper
name 'as a description', a referential use involves stating a singular
proposition, just as when a proper name is used 'as a name'. And just as
Russell comments that 'there is nothing in the phraseology' to indicate in
which way a name is being used, so Donnellan observes that 'a definite
description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions
of its use, function in either way' (281).
If Russell and Donnellan are right, respectively, about proper names and
definite descriptions, then expressions of both sorts can be used referentially
(as a name, to indicate what we are speaking about) or attributively (as a
description). This leaves open whether either sort of expression is semantically
ambiguous or whether, in each case, one use corresponds to the semantics of the
expression and the other use is accountable pragmatically from that use.[10]
For Russell a definite description, whichever way it is used, is inherently a
quantifier phrase, whereas a 'logically proper' name is a referring term.[11]
Donnellan was evidently unsure whether to regard the referential-attributive
distinction as indicating a semantic ambiguity or merely a pragmatic one.[12]
But at least this much is clear: regardless of the semantic status of the
distinction between using a description referentially (as a name) or
attributively (as a description), there is a definite difference between
asserting a singular proposition and asserting a general one.[13]
Point
2. We generally choose the least informative sort of expression whose use will
still enable the hearer to identify the individual we wish to refer to.
Suppose
you want to refer to your mother-in-law. In some circumstances, it may be enough
to use the pronoun 'she'. The only semantic constraint on what 'she' can
be used to refer to is that the referent be female (ships and countries
excepted). So its use provides only the information that the intended referent
is female. If it is to be used successfully to refer the hearer to a certain
female, there must be some female that the hearer can reasonably suppose the
speaker intends to be referring to. If out of the blue you said, 'She is
unforgettable', intending with 'she' to refer to your beloved
mother-in-law, you could not reasonably expect to be taken to be referring to
her. However, if she were already salient, by being visually present and
prominent or by having just been mentioned, or you made her salient in some way,
say by pointing to a picture of her, then using 'she' would suffice. In
other circumstances, you would have to use some more elaborate expression. For
example, to distinguish her from other women in a group you could use 'that
woman', with stress on 'that' and an accompanying demonstration. Or,
assuming the hearer knows her by name, you could refer to her by name.
Otherwise, you would have to use a definite description, say 'my beloved
mother-in-law'.
This example suggests that a speaker, in choosing an expression to use to
refer the hearer to the individual he has in mind, is in effect answering the
following question: given the circumstances of utterance, the history and
direction of the conversation, and the mutual knowledge between me and my
audience, how informative an expression do I need to use to enable them to
identify the individual I have in mind? Note that informativeness here can
depend not only the semantic information encoded by the expression but on the
information carried by the fact that it is being used.
Some linguists have suggested that which sort of expression one must use
depends on the degree of 'givenness' (or 'familiarity' or
'accessibility') of the intended referent. Giving my own gloss (in
parentheses) on the well-known scale proposed by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski
(1993), we can distinguish being:
+
in focus (being the unique item under
discussion or current center of mutual attention)
+
activated (being an item under
discussion or being an object of mutual awareness)
+
familiar (being mutually known)
+
uniquely identifiable (satisfying a
definite description)[14]
Notice
that in the first two cases the referent is already an object of mutual
awareness, that in the third case it is at least mutually known, and that only
in the last case may it be something unfamiliar to the hearer. So we should keep
in mind the distinction between keeping the hearer's attention on something he
is already attending to, calling his attention to something he is already
familiar with, and bringing to his attention something unfamiliar to him.
Gundel et al. plausibly claim that correlated with each status is a type
of expression most appropriately used to refer to items with that status:
+
in focus: unstressed pronominals (and,
in some languages, zero pronominals)
+
activated: stressed third-person
pronouns and simple demonstratives
+
familiar: demonstrative phrases
+
uniquely identifiable: definite
descriptions
For
some reason Gundel et al. do not discuss first- and second-person pronouns and
proper names. The reference of singular first- and second-person pronouns is
determined by linguistic role (the speaker, the hearer), but with 'we' and
plural 'you' there must be a contextually identifiable constraint on the
relevant group. As for proper names, generally it is appropriate to use them
only if one's audience is familiar with the name and knows its bearer by name.
Otherwise an introduction is in order.
Now Gundel et al. suggest that different degrees of givenness are not
merely associated with but, as a matter of linguistic convention, are encoded by
different types of referring expressions. Perhaps they suggest this because,
taking their scale to concern the cognitive status of representations in the
mind of the hearer, they think this status has to be linguistically marked if it
is to play a cognitive role. As I see it, however, this scale concerns the
mutual (between speaker and hearer) cognitive status of the intended referent.
After all, in using an expression to refer the speaker aims to ensure that the
hearer thinks of the very object the speaker is thinking of, and what matters is
that the expression used to refer, and the fact that the speaker is using it,
provide the hearer with enough information to figure out what he is intended to
take the speaker to be thinking of, hence to think of it himself. This is why
there is a parsimonious alternative to Gundel et al.'s conventionalist view:
the different degrees of givenness associated with different types of referring
expressions are not encoded at all; rather, the correlation is a by-product of
the interaction between semantic information that is encoded by these
expressions and general facts about rational communication.[15]
On this, the null hypothesis, it is because different expressions are
more or less informative that the things they can be used to refer to are less
or more given or accessible. That is, the more accessible the referent is, the
less information needs to be carried by the expression used to refer to it to
enable the hearer to identify it.
Notice that not only is it enough to use the least informative sort of
expression needed to enable your audience to identify the individual you have in
mind, it is misleading to use a more informative one. For example, in telling a
story about a particular individual, it is always sufficient, once the
individual is introduced, to use a personal pronoun -- provided, of course,
that no other individual of the same gender has been introduced in the meantime.
There are stylistic or other literary reasons to use their name or a definite
description every so often, but unless it is obvious that this is the name or a
description of the individual in question, it would be inferred that reference
is being made to some other individual. This inference would be made on the
charitable assumption that one is not being needlessly informative (and
violating Grice's (1989, 26) second maxim of quantity).
Point
3. In many cases, using a description may be the only way to refer to something.
Suppose
you want to refer to some thing (or someone). Suppose it is not perceptually
present, has not just come up in the conversation, and is not otherwise salient.
Suppose that it does not have a name or that you are unaware of its name or
think your audience is unaware. Then you cannot use an indexical, a
demonstrative (pronoun or phrase), or a proper name to refer to it. If you want
to refer to it, what are you going to do? Unless you can find it or a picture of
it to point to, you need to use a linguistic expression, some sort of singular
noun phrase (what else?), to call it to your audience's attention. You must
choose one that will provide your audience with enough information to figure
out, partly on the supposition that you intend them to figure this out, which
object you're talking about. Your only recourse is to use a description.
This raises the question, when you use a description, how does your
audience know that you are referring to something and expressing a singular
proposition, rather than making a general statement and expressing an
existential or a uniqueness proposition? Although the presence of a description
does not signal that you are referring -- semantically, descriptions are not
referring expressions -- what you are saying might not be the sort of thing
that you could assert on general grounds, that is, as not based on knowledge of
some particular individual (see Ludlow and Neale 1991). This will certainly be
true whenever it is mutually evident which individual satisfies the description
in question and what is being said regarding the individual that satisfies the
description can only be supposed to be based on evidence about that individual.
For example, if my wife says to me, 'The DVD player is broken', I can't not take her to be talking about the actual DVD player of ours. On the other hand, if before we decided on a DVD player she said, 'The DVD player had better not cost more than $500', clearly she would be making a general statement pertaining to whichever DVD player we buy (notice that the corresponding demonstrative description, 'that DVD player', is usable only in the latter, non-referential case). Also, its
being mutually evident which individual satisfies a description will generally
be sufficient for a referential use, since there will usually be no reason for
the hearer not to be taken as making a singular statement about that individual.
This applies especially to descriptions of occupiers of social positions or
practical roles, such as 'the boss' or 'the freezer'. Moreover, if the
description is incomplete, as in these cases, and there is no mutually salient
or obviously distinctive completion in sight, then the hearer, at least if he is
mutually familiar with the boss or freezer in question, can only take the
description as being used referentially.[16]
But if 'the F' is incomplete and it is obvious that the hearer is unfamiliar
with the relevant F, then a (referential) use of 'the F' must be preceded by
an introduction of the relevant F.
Point
4. Using a description to refer identifies by implicitly conveying an identity.
In
using a noun phrase to refer to a certain individual, you aim to do two things:
to get your audience to think of that individual and to take that individual to
be the one you are thinking of, hence the one you are referring to. As per Point
3, if you do not have a name at your disposal for what you wish to refer to, and
an indexical or a demonstrative pronoun or phrase won't do the trick, the only
available sort of noun phrase left is a description. You must describe what you
have in mind if you are to get your audience to think of it too and to take you
to be referring to it. You do this by exploiting a presumed identity between the
individual you wish to refer to (thought of by means of the mental counterpart
of a singular term) and that which satisfies the description (perhaps as contextually restricted -- see Point 12). To appreciate how
this works, let's take the perspective of the audience and ask what is
involved in recognizing the intention behind a referential use. We should keep
in mind that recognizing a referential intention is part of recognizing a
communicative intention and that this involves looking for a plausible
explanation for the fact that speaker said what he said, partly on the Gricean
basis that he intends one to do so (see Bach & Harnish 1979, esp. 4-8,
12-15, and 89-93).
According to Russell's theory, a sentence of the form 'The F is G'
expresses a general (uniqueness) proposition. Then if you utter such a sentence
but use the description referentially, what you say is a general
proposition but what you mean is a singular one.[17]
But how and why does the hearer takes you to be doing that? So, for example, if you uttered, 'The mailman is dangerous', I would take you to be asserting not a general proposition but a singular one (about the mailman, i.e., the neighborhood mailman, our mailman). Why would I do that? Well, I am acquainted with the mailman and presumably so are you. Besides, that a certain individual is the mailman has nothing to do with his being dangerous. To suppose that it does would be to take you to be stating something for which you have no evidence (you would be violating Grice's (1989, 27) second maxim of quality). So I have no reason to suppose, as if you were unfamiliar with the mailman, that you are making a general statement, the content of which is independent of which man is the mailman. It is unreasonable for me to suppose that you do not have in mind the particular man who delivers mail in our area and that you are not basing the belief you are expressing on information or evidence derived from him. So I have positive reason to think that you have in mind, and intend me to think you have in mind, a certain individual who satisfies the description you are using. Now for me to think you intend this requires my understanding what you are saying, namely, that the mailman is dangerous, but that is a general proposition. So in attributing to you the intention to be making a singular statement, I am in effect explaining why you said what you said, and thereby able to infer what you meant.
If you are using the description to refer and I am taking you to be doing
so, we must have ways of thinking of the individual in question, the mailman, in some other way than as the mailman. Presumably we both remember him by way of a memory image derived from seeing him. In thinking of him via that image, you take him to be the mailman and use the description 'the mailman' to identify him for me, which triggers my memory of him. We both think of him, via our respective memories of him, as being the mailman. This fits with how Mill describes the functioning of a proper name in thought as an
'unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in
order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may
think of that individual object' (1972, 22). Though not 'unmeaning', a
definite description can play a similar role.
In using a description referentially, you are using it in lieu of a sign
for the object. You are not making a general statement about whatever satisfies
the description but a singular statement about some unnamed, undemonstrated, and
otherwise unsalient individual. You are thinking of a certain individual by
means of the mental counterpart of a singular term but there is no suitable
linguistic singular term for you to use. In using 'the F' (in 'the F is
G') you are implicitly indicating that this individual is the F and that it is
this individual that you are stating to be G. What matters to your assertion is
that this individual is G, not that it is (the) F. So the content of the
description is inessential to what you are stating (though not to what you are saying).
In effect, you are using 'the F' to instruct the
hearer to think of, and take you to be talking about the individual that is the
F.
Point
5. The distinctive quantificational character of definite descriptions helps explain how and why they can readily be used to refer, because it plays a key role in their referential use.
So
far as I know, no one has ever argued that the mere fact that a quantifier
phrase can be used to refer shows that it semantically refers, hence that it has
a referential as well as a quantificational meaning. No one has ever argued that
because, say, 'three thugs' might to used (say in 'Three thugs are
outside') to refer to the three thugs that the speaker knows the hearer is
expecting, this phrase has a referential reading. So why suppose that
descriptions have such readings? Why isn't it enough simply to appeal the
distinction between what a speaker says and what a speaker means and, in
particular, that between linguistic reference and speaker's reference are
taken into account? For one thing, as Devitt (this volume) points out, unlike
other sorts of quantifier phrases that can be used to refer, definite
descriptions are regularly are so used. This is one of his reasons, to be
rebutted in Point 13, for attributing referential meanings to definite
descriptions. However, as I will now suggest, the distinctive quantificational
character of singular definite descriptions actually helps account for the fact
that, despite being quantifier phrases, they can readily be used to refer. They
are quantifier phrases of a distinctive kind and, moreover, they imply
uniqueness (besides, as Point 3 indicated, sometimes there is no singular noun
phrase of any other sort suitable or even available to use to refer to the
intended object).
Definite descriptions are quantifier phrases of
a special sort. In general, sentences of the form 'Q F is G' or 'Q Fs are
G' say how many Fs are G. That is, they express propositions whose truth
requires that the set of Gs include a set of Fs of the size specified (precisely
or vaguely), by 'Q' ('one F', 'ten Fs', 'a few Fs'), and in some
cases a set of no greater size ('exactly one F', 'exactly ten Fs,'
'few Fs'). Any set of Fs of the right size will do (universal quantifiers
are a degenerate case, because there is only one such set). The quantifier
phrase 'Q F(s)' indicates how many Fs have to be G for the sentence to be
true. Definite quantifier phrases do more than that: they indicate how
many Fs there are. In 'The nine planets have elliptical orbits', 'the nine
planets' indicates how many planets there are (nine) as well as how many must
have elliptical orbits for the sentence to be true. In 'Both authors of Principia
Mathematica were English', 'both authors of Principia Mathematica'
indicates how many authors of Principia Mathematica there were (two), in
'the inventor of television died in poverty', 'the inventor of
television' indicates how many inventors of television there were (one), etc.
Even the vague 'the few surviving condors' and 'the many Enron
employees' fall, in a vague way, into this category.[18]
When using a definite quantifier phrase, one is not just saying how many
Fs are G, one is effectively saying (or at least implying) how many Fs there
are. When a sentence of the form 'Q F is G' or
'Q Fs are G' contains such a quantifier phrase, there is one
particular individual or set of individuals to which the predicate ascribes a
property. This individual or set of individuals does not enter into the
proposition expressed by the sentence -- the proposition is general, not
singular -- but this proposition is made true or false by facts involving this
individual or set of individuals. Accordingly, the question can arise of which
individual(s) this is. The speaker may or may not have any idea which one(s)
this is, but there is a determinate one (or set) to be thought of. In this way
the possibility of referring can arise without any special stage setting.
Now singular definite descriptions are a special case, for they imply
uniqueness.[19]
Notice, however, that this uniqueness is not encoded in the meaning of
'the'. As Richard Sharvy observed, recognizing that singular definite
descriptions have something in common with plural ones, 'the primary use of
'the' is ... to indicate totality, implication of uniqueness is a side
effect' (1980, 623). That is, it is a kind of universal quantifier, and the
side effect is the result of combining 'the' with a nominal in the singular.
Sometimes the nominal itself implies uniqueness, as with descriptions containing
superlatives ('the shortest spy') or indicative of unique positions ('the
queen of England') or accomplishments ('the inventor of the Segway'). When
it does not, you may need to use 'the one F', 'the only F', or even, to
forestall any suspicion that there is more than one F, 'the one and only F'.
Nevertheless, 'one' and 'only' are redundant in these phrases, since
uniqueness is already implied by the combination of singularity and totality.
Just as 'both Fs' is equivalent to (the ungrammatical) 'all two Fs', so
'the F' is equivalent to (the ungrammatical) 'all one F'.[20]
Uniqueness is implied even if 'the F' is incomplete, that is, even if
there is more than one F. This does not show that the description contains some
hidden modifier that would make it complete or some phantom variable of domain
restriction. The situation is much simpler. As Point 12 explains, in using an
incomplete definite description, one is not using the description is a strictly
literal way, even though one is using 'F' literally. What one means is
distinct from what one says -- it goes beyond the semantic content of the
sentence one is uttering -- since one is not making fully explicit what one
means. If one is using the description attributively, what one means is
expressible by some more elaborate description, e.g., of the form 'the F that
is G'. If one is using it referentially, one is referring to a certain F, an F
that is salient or contextually relevant. One is not using 'the F' to mean
'the salient F', 'the contextually relevant F', 'the F I have in
mind', or anything of the sort. Rather, it is as if there is only one F, at
least for the present purposes of the conversation. In effect, one is pretending
that there is only one F, namely the F one intends the listener to think of and
to take one to have in mind.
That an object is the unique F (or the only salient or contextually
relevant F) does not alone explain how 'the F' can be used to refer to it.
There is also the fact that any connection between the properties being the
unique F and being G is irrelevant to what you are trying to convey. Consider
cases in which there is a connection, e.g., 'The next pet I get will be a
cat', said long before you have decided on a pet, or 'The next president
will be a Democrat', said before anyone has any idea which Democrats will even
be running. In cases like these you could also have included 'whatever it
is' or 'whoever he is' to indicate that you don't know which
individual satisfies the description. In such cases, your audience does not have
to identify some individual as the F. In using a description referentially,
however, you intend your audience to rely on the fact that you uttered the
description as a basis for figuring out which thing you are talking about, by
way of identifying what satisfies that description. To recognize that you are
doing this, the audience has to realize that the property of being F has in
itself no direct bearing on what you are trying to convey. They have to
recognize that you are using 'the F' to enable them to think of a certain
individual and to instruct them to take you to be talking about a certain
individual that is the F.
In sum, the quantificational character of a definite description plays a
role in its referential use. The speaker thinks of a certain object, takes that
object to be the F, and uses 'the F' to refer to it. The speaker, on hearing
'the F', thinks of a certain object that he takes to be the F, and takes
that to be what the speaker is referring him to. His thinking of that object may
depend in part on the fact that it is the only plausible candidate for what the
speaker has in mind in using 'the F'. Moreover, the property of being F
plays an essential role in this process. Indeed, if the speaker uses 'the F'
refers to a certain object that isn't F, he is speaking falsely or not
literally. Or he could be exploiting the hearer's false belief that the object
is F. In any case, if he uses 'the F' to refer to an object that isn't F,
then even if what he means is true, what he says is false -- unless the actual
F has the ascribed property. So consider this dialogue between two people who
watched TV one morning in May of 2002, one of whom has confused two different
gesticulating curly-haired guests:
A: The inventor the Segway, that young guy we
saw on the
Today Show this morning, is very clever.
B: No, that was Jason Stanley. Dean Kamen
is the inventor the
Segway, he's older, and
he was on Good Morning America.
A: Oh yeah, Dean Kamen. Well, like I said,
the inventor the Segway
is very clever.
Both
of A's uses of 'the inventor of the Segway' are referential, first to
Stanley and then to Kamen. He meant two different things, even if both are true,
but what he said was the same each time, a general proposition made true or
false, but not about, Dean Kamen. In both cases he conveyed an identity (Point
4), first a false one, which B recognized as such, and then a true one. In both
cases the quantificational character of the description was operative.
II.
Referring by Describing
So
far I have just assumed that to refer to something one must be in a position to
have singular thoughts about it and that the propositions one attempts to
communicate in the course of referring to it are singular with respect to it (I
have assumed also that being in a position to have a thought about a particular
(spatio-temporal) thing requires being connected to that thing, via perception,
memory, or communication). The question to be taken up now concerns whether it
is necessary to be in such a position in order to refer to something. Put it
this way: can one communicate a singular proposition about something one is not
in a position to have singular thoughts about?
The following points address different aspects of this question and
certain issues underlying it. They illustrate various ways in which uses of
descriptions, indefinite as well as definite, can come close to being
referential but fall short. As we have seen, in using a description 'the F'
referentially (in uttering a sentence of the form 'The F is G'), one is
trying to convey that a certain thing, to be identified as the F, is G. One is
communicating the singular proposition that this thing is G, so that
understanding one's utterance requires grasping that proposition. In order to
appreciate how seemingly referential uses of definite descriptions can fall
short of actually being referential, we will first take up the case of specific
uses of indefinite descriptions, a phenomenon of interest in its own right.
Point
6. With a specific use of an indefinite description, one is not referring but
merely alluding to something.
Indefinite
descriptions can be used nonspecifically, referentially, or specifically.[21]
In the very common nonspecific (or purely quantificational) use, there is no
indication that the speaker has any particular thing in mind, as with a likely
utterance of (1),
(1) A martini will cheer you up.
This
is a clearly quantificational use of an indefinite description. No singular
proposition is being conveyed or even in the offing.
As for the referential use, it is relatively rare, as it is with
quantificational phrases generally. Consider an utterance of (2), for example,
made while watching a well-known philosopher on TV discussing how the Fed should
control inflation.
(2) A philosopher thinks he's an economist.
It
is obvious that the speaker is not making a general statement, about no
philosopher in particular. He is clearly talking about the philosopher he is
seeing on TV. Perhaps he is implicating that there is something incongruous
about a philosopher pontificating on the economy, but it is clear that he is
talking about this particular philosopher.
What is distinctive about the specific use of an indefinite
description is that the speaker communicates that he has a certain individual in
mind, but he is not communicating which individual that is -- he doesn't
intend you to identify it. Suppose someone says,
(3) A famous actress will be visiting us today.
Unless
he thinks this is the sort of day for a visit by a famous actress, presumably he
has a particular one in mind (he could have made this clear by including the
word 'certain' (or 'particular'), as in:
(3') A certain famous actress will be visiting us
today.
He
could even explain why he is not specifying which actress it is:
(3a) A famous actress will be visiting us
today, but I won't tell you who.
(3b) A famous actress will be visiting us today, but I want her to be a surprise.
In
a specific use, the speaker indicates that he is in a position to refer to a
certain individual, but is not actually doing so. He is not identifying or
trying to enable the hearer to identify that individual -- he is merely alluding
to her. He has a certain a singular proposition in mind but is not trying to
convey it. So what must the hearer do in order to understand the utterance? It
would seem that she must merely recognize that the speaker has some singular
proposition in mind, about a certain individual of the mentioned sort, in this
case a famous actress.[22]
It might be objected that a specific use of an indefinite description is
a limiting case of a referential use, not mere allusion but what might be called
'unspecified' reference. After all, can't the hearer, recognizing that the
speaker has some individual in mind, at least think of that individual under the
description 'the individual the speaker has in mind'? But, as Point 9 will
say, descriptive 'reference' is not genuine reference. Besides, the speaker
is not really referring the hearer to that individual and, in particular, does
not intend her to think of the individual he has in mind under the description
'the individual you (the speaker) have in mind' or in any similar way. He is
merely indicating that he has a certain unspecified individual in mind. That is,
he is not referring but merely alluding to that individual.
To appreciate why this is, consider a situation in which the speaker has one F in mind among many and proceeds to say something not true of that individual. Suppose a teacher has a particular student in mind when she utters (4),
(4) A student in my ethics class threatened me yesterday.
but does not specify which student (and does not expect that to be evident). Obviously the words 'a student in my ethics class' do not refer to the student she had in mind, for if some student threatened her but she is mistaken about which one, (4) would still be true. So (4) expresses a general proposition. Even so, since she does have a certain student in mind, could she be using this indefinite description be refer to that student? Even if what she said is a general proposition, is what she meant a singular proposition, about the student she had in mind? No, because the audience could understand her perfectly well without having any idea which student she has in mind. They understand merely that she has a certain student in mind, the one she is alluding to. Indicating that one has a certain unspecified individual in mind does not suffice for referring to that individual. If it did, then any way of coming to know that someone else has some individual in mind would be enough to put one in a position to think of and to refer to that individual oneself.
Point
7. One can describe a (singular) proposition without being in a position to
grasp it.
Our
discussion of understanding a specific use of an indefinite description
illustrates that it is one thing to entertain a singular proposition and another
thing merely to know that there exists a certain such proposition. Russell's
famous discussion of Bismarck illustrates how this can be. He operates with a
notoriously restrictive notion of acquaintance, but this is not really essential
to the distinction he is drawing. I agree with Russell that we cannot have
singular thoughts about individuals we 'know' only 'by description', but
I will not assume that these individuals are limited to those with which we are
acquainted in Russell's highly restrictive sense. They include individuals we
are perceiving, have perceived, or have been informed of and remember. So
although Russell's choice of example (Bismarck) would have to be changed to be
made consistent with a much more liberal notion of acquaintance, I will use it
to illustrate his distinction.
Russell contrasts the situation of Bismarck himself, who 'might have
used the name ['Bismarck'] directly to designate [himself] ... to ma[k]e a
judgment about himself' having himself as a constituent (1917, 209), with our
situation in respect to him:
when we make a statement about
something known only by description, we often intend to make our statement, not
in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described.
That is, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to
make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which
he himself is a constituent. [But] in this we are necessarily defeated. ...What
enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that
we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck and that,
however we may vary the description (as long as the description is correct), the
proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is described
and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not acquainted with
the proposition itself, and do not know it, though we know it is true. (1917,
210-11)
The
proposition that 'interests us' is a singular proposition, but we cannot
actually entertain it -- we can know it only by description, that is, by
entertaining a general (uniqueness) proposition which, if true, is made true by
a fact involving Bismarck. But this general proposition does not itself involve
Bismarck, and would be thinkable even if Bismarck never existed.
The difference in type of proposition is clear from Russell's
observations about the statement 'I met a man':
What do I really assert when I
assert 'I met a man'? Let us assume, for the moment, that my assertion is
true, and that in fact I met Jones. It is clear that what I assert is not
'I met Jones'. I may say 'I met a man, but it was not Jones'; in that
case, though I lie, I do not contradict myself, as I should do if when I say I
met a man I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that the person to
whom I am speaking can understand what I say, even if he is a foreigner and has
never heard of Jones.
But we may go further: not only Jones, but no actual man, enters into my
statement. This becomes obvious when the statement is false, since there is no
more reason why Jones should be supposed to enter into the statement than why
anyone else should. Indeed, the statement would remain significant, though it
could not possibly be true, even if there were no man at all. (Russell, 1918,
167-8)
The
same points apply when a definite description is being used. Imagine that
Russell met Whitcomb Judson, the man who invented the zipper. Then if Russell
had said, 'I met the inventor of the zipper, but it was not Whitcomb
Judson', he would have spoken falsely but would not have contradicted himself.
And, although what Russell said in uttering 'I met the inventor of the
zipper' would have been made true only in the event that he had met Judson,
someone could have understood what Russell said without ever having heard of
Judson. For no actual man, Whitcomb Judson or anyone else, entered into
Russell's statement. His statement would have been the same even if Sigismond
Zipschitz had instead invented the zipper.
Point
8. One can describe (single out) an individual without actually referring to it.
Kaplan
suggests that one can use a description to refer to something even if one is not
in a position to have a singular thought about it or, as he would say, even if
one is not 'en rapport' with it. He asks rhetorically, 'If pointing can be
taken as a form of describing, why not take describing as a form of pointing?'
(1979, 392). I will explain why not.
First consider the following example of Kaplan's 'liberality with
respect to the introduction of directly referring terms by means of "dthat",'
which 'allow[s] an arbitrary definite description to give us the object'
(1989a, 560).[23]
(5) Dthat [the first child to be born in the 22nd
century] will be bald.
'Dthat'
is a directly referential term and, as Kaplan explains in his
'Afterthoughts', 'the content of the associated description is no part of
the content of the dthat-term' (1989b, 579); it is 'off the record (i.e.,
off the content record)' (1989b, 581). So 'dthat' is not merely a
rigidifier (like 'actual') but a device of direct reference.[24]
It is the actual object (if there is one) uniquely satisfying the description,
and not the description itself (i.e., the property expressed by its matrix),
that gets into the proposition.[25]
Not only does Kaplan's 'liberality' impose no constraint on the
definite description to which 'dthat' can be applied to yield a directly
referring term, it imposes no epistemological constraint on what one can
'directly refer' to.[26]
However, even if we concede that any definite description can be turned into a
directly referring term, so that a sentence containing the 'dthat' phrase
expresses a singular proposition about the actual object (if there is one) that
uniquely satisfies the description, it is far from obvious that the user of such
a phrase can thereby refer to, and form singular thoughts about, that object.
Kaplan seems to think this ability can be created with the stroke of a pen.
Consider, for example, whether one can refer to the first child born in
the 22nd century. Assume that nearly one hundred years from now, this
description will be satisfied (uniquely). Then there is a singular proposition
involving that individual, as expressed by (5).[27]
Without 'dthat' (and the brackets), (5) would express a general (uniqueness)
proposition, the one expressed by (5'),
(5') The first child to be born in the 22nd
century will be bald.
Now
can one use the description 'the first child to be born in the 22nd century'
referentially, to refer to that child? Kaplan thinks there is nothing to prevent
this, that it is a perfectly good example of pointing by means of describing.
However, what enables one to form an intention to refer to the individual who
happens to satisfy that description? If one is prepared to utter (5')
assertively, surely one is prepared to do so without regard to who the actual
such child will be -- one's grounds are general, not singular. For example,
one might believe that the first child born in the 22nd century is likely to be
born in China and that Chinese children born around then will all be bald,
thanks to China's unrestrained use of nuclear power. But this only goes to
show that one's use of the description is likely to be taken to be
attributive. Unless one were known to be a powerful clairvoyant, one could not
plausibly be supposed to have singular grounds for making the statement.
Nevertheless, Kaplan thinks that one could intend to use the description
referentially anyway, as if putting the description in brackets and preceding it
with 'dthat' could not only yield a term that refers to whoever actually
will be the first child born in the 22nd century but could enable a speaker to
refer to that child. However, it seems that one is in the same predicament as
the one Russell thought anyone other than Bismarck would be in if he wanted to
refer to Bismarck.
Would it help to have the tacit modal intention of using the description
rigidly, or even to insert the word 'actual' in the description?[28]
Referring to something involves expressing a singular proposition about it, but
rigidifying the description or including the word 'actual' would not make
its use referential. Even though the only individual whose properties are
relevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition being expressed (even if
that proposition is modal) is the actual F (if it exists), still that
proposition is general, not singular. This proposition may in some sense be
object-dependent, but it is not object-involving. The property of being the
actual may enter into the proposition, but the actual F does not.
The upshot of these observations is that one can use a description to
describe or, as I will say, single out something without actually referring
to it. The fact that there is something that satisfies a certain definite
description does not mean that one can refer to it. If a different individual
satisfied the description or you are describing a hypothetical situation in
which that would be the case, you would have singled out that individual instead
(see Point 9). Nevertheless, you can use the description just as though you were
introducing the thing that satisfies it into the discourse. You could, for
example, use pronouns to 'refer' back to it. You could say, 'The first
child to be born in the 22nd century will be bald. It will be too poor to use
Rogaine'. Giving it a name won't help. You could dub this child 'Newman
2' (just as Kaplan dubbed the first child to be born in the twenty-first
century 'Newman 1'), but this would not enable you to refer to it or to
entertain singular propositions involving it. In this, as Russell might have
said, 'we are necessarily defeated'. Even though (5') does not express a
singular proposition, the proposition which 'interests us' but which we
cannot entertain, one can still use the sentence to describe that proposition.
It might be
objected that in calling this 'singling out' rather than 'referring' to
an object, I am not making a substantive claim but am merely engaging in
terminological legislation. I would reply that anyone who insists on calling
this 'reference' should either show that a singular proposition is expressed
or explain why expressing a general, object-independent proposition should be
thought to involve reference. One possible reason is taxonomic: if we are to
maintain that indexicals and demonstratives are inherently referring expressions
and not merely expressions that are often used to refer, allowances must be made
for the fact that we sometimes use them to do what I would describe as merely
singling out an object, that is, an object that the speaker is not in a position
to have singular thoughts about. For example, one could use 'he' or 'that
child' to single out the first child born in the 22nd century. But the
question is whether this counts as genuine reference. Indeed, one can use such
expressions without even singling out an individual, as in, 'If a child eats a
radioactive Mars bar, he/that child will be bald'. The mere fact that
philosophers are in the habit of calling indexicals and demonstratives
'referring expressions' does not justify doing this.
Point
9. Descriptive 'reference', or singling out, is not genuine reference.
In
summing up his account of the referential-attributive distinction, Donnellan
concedes that there is a kind of reference, reference in a 'very weak
sense', associated with the attributive use of a definite description (1966,
304). Since he is contrasting that use with the referential use, this is
something of a token concession. Reference in this very weak sense is too weak
to count as genuine reference, for one is 'referring' to whatever happens to
satisfy the description, and one would be 'referring' to something else were
it to have satisfied the description instead. This is clear in modal contexts,
such as in (6):
(6) The next
president, though probably a man, could be a woman.
The
speaker is not asserting of some one possible president that he or she will
probably be a man but could be a woman, say if he had a sex-change operation
before her inauguration. In this context, the description is understood to fall
within the scope of 'could'. The speaker is allowing for different possible
presidents, some male, some female, only one of whom will actually be the next
president. Surely this is not reference, not even in a very weak sense. Even so,
we might wonder whether there is a weak sort of reference that still counts as
genuine reference.
Let's call this 'reference under a description' or simply
'descriptive reference'. Can one use a description to refer to an individual
without having some independent, non-descriptional way of thinking of and
intending to refer to a certain object? That is, can one intend to convey a
singular proposition about a certain individual that one is not in a position to
have singular thoughts about? As we saw in Point 8, it won't help to use a
rigidified description, say of the form 'the actual F'. This guarantees that
no object other than the actual F could be the one on whose properties the truth
or falsity of one's statement depends, but it does not yield reference. One
may be singling out the object that satisfies the description, hence describing
the relevant singular proposition about that object, but one is not referring to
that object or expressing that proposition.
Here is a possible but dubious route toward counting descriptive
reference as genuine reference. Philosophers have often referred to singular
thoughts as de re thoughts or attitudes. However, they have also used the
term 'de re' for a type of attitude ascription (contrasted with 'de
dicto' ascriptions). Moreover, de re attitude ascriptions can be
true even when no de re (i.e. singular) attitude is being ascribed. So,
for example, suppose that even though there is no suspect in the case, the mayor
has claimed that Smith's murderer is insane. Smith's murderer, on hearing
this, could say, 'The mayor that I am insane', without imputing to the mayor
any de re attitudes about him. It is easy to overlook the fact that not
all de re attitude ascriptions are ascriptions of de re attitudes
because of the structural ambiguity of the phrase 'de re attitude
ascription', in which 'de re' can modify either 'attitude' or
'ascription'. Just as there is a difference between 'Tibetan
history-teacher' and 'Tibetan-history teacher', so there is a difference
between 'de re-attitude ascription' and 'de re attitude-ascription'.[29]
A de re attitude-ascription can refer to a certain object without
implying that there is a certain object the ascribee has an attitude about. The
point carries over to indirect quotation. Having read that the police have said,
'Smith's murderer is insane', Smith's murderer could say to a
confidante, 'The police say that I am insane'. In reporting this, Smith is
referring to himself. It may seem that he is reporting that the police are
referring to him too (with their use of 'Smith's murderer'), but they are
not.
It is sometimes suggested that giving a 'descriptive name' (Evans
1982, 31) to an individual whose identity is in question enables one to refer to
that individual. Suppose that Smith's murderer left some vitriolic hip-hop
lyrics under a rock at the scene of the crime and the media came to call him
'Rock the Rapper'. Would using this name put people in a better position to
refer to Smith's murderer? It would not, not even if sentences containing that
name expressed singular propositions. Using such sentences would not enable one
to have singular thoughts about Smith's murderer and thereby be in a position
to refer to him. Again, propositions cannot be put within one's grasp with
just the stroke of a pen.[30]
Point
10. Various kinds of pseudo-reference can be confused for the real thing.
We
have already seen several examples of this. Point 6 denied that specific uses of
indefinite descriptions are referential. And Points 9 and 10 denied that
singling out (descriptively 'referring' to) something count as genuine
reference. Singling out whatever uniquely satisfies a certain definite
description is not to refer to it. Here I will discuss discourse reference and
briefly comment on fictional reference and failed reference, recognizing that
each deserves much more extensive discussion.
Reference
and discourse 'referents'
It
is well-known that unbound pronouns, as well as definite descriptions, can be
used anaphorically on indefinite descriptions, as in these examples:
(7) Mary met a man today. He/The man was bald.
(8) A girl went to yesterday's Giants game, and
she/the girl caught a foul ball.
(9) If there were a unicorn there, Macdonald
would have seen it/the unicorn.
(10) Every farmer owns a donkey. He rides it on
Sundays.
In
(7) and (8), the pronoun (and the definite description) can be used to refer. If
the speaker is using 'a man' specifically in uttering (7), he could use
'he' (or 'the man') to refer to the man he thinks Mary met that day. If,
on the other hand, the speaker is not in a position to refer to such a man, he
could only use 'a man' nonspecifically and could not use 'he' (or 'the
man') referringly; the most he could intend to convey is the general
proposition that Mary met a man that day who was bald. Similarly, if the speaker
of (8) is using 'a girl' specifically, he could use the pronoun 'she'
(or 'the girl') to refer to the girl he thought went to the game, but not if
he were using 'a girl' nonspecifically. However, it seems that the pronouns
(and the definite descriptions) in (9) and (10) cannot be used to refer at all.
In (9) 'it' is not being used to refer to an unspecified (and presumably
nonexistent) unicorn, and in (10) 'it' functions quantificationally, ranging
over the different donkeys owned by the different farmers.
Despite the fact that the pronouns and the definite descriptions in cases
like (7) and (8) need not, and in cases like (9) and (10) cannot, be used to
refer, many semanticists have attributed 'discourse referents' to them. I am
not suggesting that they seriously believe that discourse referents are real
referents, but this only makes it puzzling why they use this locution. Here is
how Karttunen (1976) introduced the phrase:
Let us say that the
appearance of an indefinite noun phrase establishes a discourse referent
just in case it justifies the occurrence of a coreferential pronoun or a
definite noun phrase later in the text. ... We maintain that the problem of
coreference within a discourse is a linguistic problem and can be studied
independently of any general theory of extra-linguistic reference. (Karttunen
1976, 366; my emphasis)
He explains further,
In simple sentences
that do not contain certain quantifier-like expressions,[31]
an indefinite NP establishes a discourse referent just in case the sentence is
an affirmative assertion. By 'establishes a discourse referent' we meant that
there may be a coreferential pronoun or definite noun phrase later in the
discourse.[32] Indefinite NPs in
Yes-No questions and commands do not establish referents. (383)
So the 'coreferential pronoun or definite noun phrase later in
the discourse' can, thanks to the discourse referent 'established' by the
indefinite NP, have a discourse referent even if, as in our examples, it is not
used to refer.
The notion of discourse referent has inspired a great deal of theorizing
in semantics, including discourse representation theory (DRT), dynamic
semantics, and the study of reference accessibility. However, as is implicitly
conceded by Karttunen's definition ('[it] can be studied independently of
any general theory of extra-linguistic reference'), discourse reference is no
more reference than our relation to our perceptual experiences (as opposed to
objects perceived) is perception. The basic problem is simply this: a
chain of 'reference' isn't a chain of reference unless it is
anchored in an actual ('extra-linguistic')
referent.
Despite the widespread use of the phrase 'discourse referent' in some
semantic circles, so-called discourse referents are not literally referents. The
pronouns in the examples like those we've just considered are not used
referringly and, as King (1987) suggested, must be viewed quantificationally.
They are used as surrogates for definite descriptions, descriptions which if
present in place of the pronouns would not be referential. These pronouns are
what Neale (1990, ch. 5) calls 'D-type pronouns'. The basic idea is that the
pronoun is used elliptically for a definite description recoverable from the
matrix of the antecedent indefinite description (Bach 1987/1994, 258-61). Neale
develops a detailed account of how D-type pronouns work in a wide variety of
cases. It is essential to this account that the descriptions implicit in the use
of D-type pronouns are not construed as referential, even when they are used
referentially.
To see the significance of looking at such pronouns in this way, let us
return to two of our examples. Consider (8) again:
(8) A girl went to yesterday's Giants game, and
she caught a foul ball.
Suppose
that the speaker merely heard that a girl had caught a foul ball at
yesterday's game. Then he does not have any particular girl in mind and is not
using 'a girl' specifically. Even so, it might be thought that 'she'
refers to a certain unspecified girl (the 'discourse referent') who went to
the Giants game the day before. But how could this be? The first clause of (8)
expresses a general proposition, but what about the second clause? Does it
express a singular proposition about a certain girl who went to yesterday's
Giants game? Suppose this clause is not true, hence that no girl who went to
yesterday's Giants game caught a foul ball. Then which girl would the second
clause of (8) be about, and what singular proposition would it express? Answer:
no girl, and no proposition. On the view that 'she' is referential in the
second sentence of (8), that sentence would express a singular proposition if
and only if it is true! Surely which proposition a sentence expresses, or that
it expresses any, cannot depend on whether or not it is true.
The situation is similar with a quantified sentence, as in (10),
(10) Every farmer owns a donkey. He rides it on
Sundays.
Suppose
there are farmers who own more than one donkey. In that case, what does it take
for the second sentence in (10) to be true? Its truth does not require every
farmer to ride on Sundays every donkey that he owns, but also it doesn't
require merely that every farmer ride on Sundays one donkey that he owns. So it
is not clear what it would take for the second sentence in (10) to be true when
there are farmers who own more than one donkey. However, DRT and dynamic
semantics have been motivated by the thought that this is clear, and they have
tried to make sense of sentences like the second one in (10) in terms of the
notion of discourse referent.
Fictional
reference
This
is far too big a topic to take up in any detail here. Any serious discussion has
to distinguish fictional reference (reference in a fiction) and reference
(outside the fiction) to fictional entities. Reference in a fiction does not
count as genuine reference, at least if it is to fictional persons, places, and
things (in a fiction, there can be genuine reference to real persons, places,
and things). If Salmon (1998) is right in claiming that fictional entities are
real, albeit abstract entities, then we can genuinely refer to them.
Otherwise, we can only pretend to. In my view, both fictional reference and
reference to fictional entities involve special sorts of speech acts, but there
is nothing special about fictional language itself (Bach 1987/1994, 214-18).
Failed
reference
A
speaker can intend to refer but fail in the (communicative) sense that his
listener does not identify the individual he intends her to identify. This is of
no special interest here. More interesting is the case in which the speaker
intends to refer to a certain individual but there is no such individual. This
does not affect any claim being made here, so long as it is understood that in
this case there is no singular proposition about that individual and no such
proposition for the speaker to convey.
In such a case the speaker can use an expression to refer but not
successfully, since there is no individual being referred to. In such a
situation, even if the speaker sincerely utters 'a is F' and means it
literally, there is nothing he believes to be the F. Similarly, if he sincerely
utters 'the F is G' and is using 'the F' referentially but he fails to
have anything in mind, there is nothing he is referring to. In this case, his
referential intention cannot be fulfilled, and full communication cannot be
achieved. There is nothing for the hearer to identify, and no singular
proposition for her to entertain. The best the hearer can do is recognize that
the speaker intends to convey a singular proposition of a certain sort. The
speaker has the right sort of intention, to be speaking of some particular
thing, but there is no thing for him to succeed in referring to.
A different situation would arise if the speaker merely made as if to
refer to something, perhaps to deceive the hearer or perhaps to play along with
the hearer's mistaken belief in the existence of something. In this case,
although the speaker does not intend to refer to something, he does intend to be
taken to be. He can succeed in communicating if he is taken to be referring to
the individual the hearer mistakenly believes in. But since there is no such
thing, there is no singular proposition to be grasped.
III.
The Pragmatic Status of the Referential-Attributive Distinction
We have seen that descriptions can be used to refer not in spite of but partly because they are devices of quantification (of a certain sort) and that there are restrictions on what counts as using them to refer. Various uses of descriptions that may seem to pass as referential fall short of that. Now I will apply certain of the observations made so far in order to clarify the referential-attributive distinction and bolster the case for the pragmatic status of referential uses. In what follows, we should keep in mind Point 3, that frequently one uses a description to refer because no other sort of expression is suitable to refer to what one wishes to talk about. And, as Points 4 and 5 suggested, in using a description to refer one expects the hearer to take one to be relying on information derived from and specific to the particular object that in fact satisfies the description. On the other hand, in using a definite description attributively, one does not purport to have (or at least to be relying on) any information specific to the actual satisfier of the description One is in the same epistemic position that one