Poor Righteous Teaching:

The Story of the FBI and the Five Percenters

 

Bradley R. Gooding

 

 

O

n a personal level, the legacy of the Five Percenters is impossible for me to ignore.  Growing up in the predominantly African-American community of Richmond, California in the early 1990s, my cultural universe revolved around rap music.  Among my favorites at the time was a group known as the Poor Righteous Teachers.  Time and again, I found myself hitting rewind on the tape deck trying to dissect the potent lyrics of their debut album, “Holy Intellect,” in which the Poor Righteous Teachers repeatedly spoke of abstract principles such as the five percent, ten percent, 85 percent, and a metaphysical foundation called Supreme Mathematics and Alphabets.  Although I could recite their rhymes word for word, I often felt a sense of frustration due to my inability to decipher the meaning of these apparent code-words.  Yet at the very least, it was abundantly clear that the Poor Righteous Teachers’ message rested on some sort of deeper philosophy that encouraged a tremendous sense of self-empowerment and pride.

Ten years later, in a graduate seminar on 1960s Black Nationalism at San Francisco State University, two developments helped me begin to understand the meanings of the Poor Righteous Teachers’ music.  First, I learned that the widely popular ‘consciousness rap’ of the 1990s derived from a 1960s group called the Five Percenters.  The initial clue came from Hip Hop America, in which author Nelson George asserts, “since at least the 70’s, Five Percenters have been a strong underground force,” whose message eventually “spilled over into hip-hop.”[1]  This notion was affirmed by forays onto the Internet, where followers who comprise the direct descendants of the Five Percenters -- the Nation of Gods and Earths -- have constructed a number of promotional pages, including an official Five Percenter website.[2]  One Internet author in particular, Beloved Allah, notes the significant impact of the Five Percenters as he observes that because of their message, “there are thousands of young black men and women... Whose lives have been affected in some positive way from learning the knowledge of themselves.”[3]  In other words, the teachings of the Five Percenters, manifested in rap lyrics, were a shared experience of uplift that helped to shape a worldview for many youths immersed in African-American culture of the 1990s.

With regard to the second development, I discovered that between June 1,1965 and June 25, 1969 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) kept classified surveillance files on the activities of the Five Percenters and their leader, Clarence 13X Smith.  Now unclassified and available to the public at the FBI's Freedom of Information Act Reading Room on the Internet, these files -- #157-6-34 on the Five Percenters and #100-444636 on Clarence 13X Smith -- offer a rare opportunity to understand the formative years of a contemporary African-American cultural movement.[4]  Upon seizing the opportunity to read these documents, not only can we appreciate the present legacy of the Five Percenters, but we can also assess the FBI's ability to repress a distinct cultural movement.  Perhaps most significantly, this is a chance to draw conclusions about uncharted historical territory.  As yet, no historian has examined the FBI’s file son the Five Percenters.  Furthermore, in spite of their substantial contribution to African-American culture, the academic community has given scarcely a cursory glance to the history and impact of the Five Percenters.  Indeed, scholars have devoted almost no energy to understanding the formative years of the group or their mentor, Clarence 13X.  Secondary accounts are nonexistent and along with the FBI files, the only source of information comes from the Internet.  As a result, Beloved Allah has described the dynamic Clarence 13X Smith as a “man history has yet to remember.”[5]

Beginning to remember Clarence 13X Smith and the Five Percenters requires starting with an understanding of the context of the relationship between the Five Percenters and FBI.  On the FBI's side, the broad, contextual evidence is ample and clear.  Previous works on Black Nationalism and the FBI such as Kenneth O'Reilly's Racial Matters, Churchill and Vander Wall's Agents of Repression, and Karl Evanzz's The Judas Factor make it apparent that the modus operandi of the FBI in the 1960's was to surreptitiously foil the operations of the Black Power Movement.  As articulated by the Bureau’s own words in a 1967 interdepartmental memo, the purpose of the FBI was to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist" groups.[6]  Because this was the case, there is little question that the actions of the FBI towards the Five Percenters were unsuccessful.  As we shall see, although the Bureau tried to “neutralize the activities” of the Five Percenters, it failed to make an enduring negative impact on the group.

The notion that the effect of the FBI on the Five Percenters was negligible is best understood through a discussion of themes generated by the FBI files.  First, we must consider the FBI’s general perception of the Five Percenters, including the Bureau’s overall strategy for surveillance, which incorporated trying to establish the Five Percenters’ potential for violence, their organizational structure, and especially their connections to other Black Nationalist groups.  Second, it is important to see the ways in which the FBI misjudged or underestimated the structure and powerful message of the Five Percenters.  Then, we must assess the feasibility of the idea that the FBI deliberately railroaded Clarence 13X in order to get him “out of the picture.”  The files provide convincing evidence that Clarence 13X fell victim to an interdepartmental plot that trumped up charges against Smith, sent him to a mental hospital, and possibly killed him.  Next, we should weigh the integral role of the press in the relationship between the FBI and Five Percenters.  Finally, mention of items noticeably missing and most notable in the files will be relevant.  However, before exploring these themes, it is necessary to briefly discuss the context of the Five Percenters in the 1960s and the general theories at work in this study.

The Five Percenter organization was formed in Harlem in 1964 by Clarence 13X Smith as a splinter group of the Nation of Islam (NOI).  The Five Percenter moniker, in fact, was directly inspired by the “Lost Found Moslem Lesson #2,” an essay penned by NOI founder W.D. Fard in 1934.  In Lesson #2, Fard wrote that 85% of the earth was inhabited by "uncivilized people, poison animal eaters, slaves from mental death and power"; 10% were "slave makers: of the poor who lie by teaching that the almighty true god is a spook and cannot be seen by the physical eyes"; and the remaining 5% were "poor righteous teachers [who knew] that the living god is the Son of Man, the supreme being, the black man of Asia."[7]  Yet, despite their name being derived from Fard, the Five Percenters made it clear that they were not Muslims, nor followers of the NOI.

The Five Percenters made at least two important distinctions between themselves and the NOI.  First, there was a debate over the place and meaning of God.  "A Muslim" according to a University of North Carolina website, "by definition, submits himself to Allah" and Allah is the only God.[8]  Furthermore, in the NOI scheme of thinking, W.D. Fard represented Allah in person, Elijah Muhammad acted as Allah's messenger and thus, all followers had to submit to Muhammad's will.  Conversely, in the Five Percenter scheme, a singular God did not exist, rather, the individual black man was defined as God.  This debate over God led to the second philosophical difference between the Five Percenters and NOI.  That is, unlike the NOI, who adhered to the religion of Islam, the Five Percenters were only devoted to the “science of Islam.”

The distinctions drawn by the Five Percenters had far-reaching consequences for the application of their message.  The Five Percenter conception of a personal God translated into a focus on individual self-empowerment, not the empowerment of Elijah Muhammad.  Self-empowerment was gained through metaphysics -- the philosophy of being and knowing -- with an emphasis on “knowledge of self” and the black man's place in the universe.  By thinking in this manner, followers were educated with a strong black consciousness, enabling them, it was hoped, to survive and succeed in American society.  Thus, the Five Percenters were not a “typical street gang” as the FBI would later observe.  In fact, they did not preach or advocate aggressive violence.  Instead, the Five Percenters were “poor righteous teachers” of a specific kind of cultural movement, the roots of which were planted in the science of Islam.

The glorification of the science of Islam over the religion of Islam was perhaps the most significant reason for the Five Percenters’ subsequent growth and success into the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.  To the Five Percenters, the religious symbolism of Islam was irrelevant and as a consequence, members were not prohibited from smoking, drinking, gambling, or eating and dressing as they pleased.  In this way, it is fair to say that the Five Percenters were a more “user-friendly” form of the NOI.  Indeed, the Five Percenters did follow many teachings of the NOI, but whereas the NOI was predicated on Fard and the Qu'ran, the source of scripture for the Five Percenters was found in the “Science of Supreme Mathematics and Alphabets.”

Supreme Mathematics and Alphabets were the creation of Clarence 13X and they were his method of spreading the Five Percenter movement.  Essentially, it was a system wherein each letter or number (0-9) denoted a concept with an accompanying principle.  For example, the numbers 1-2-3 stood for knowledge, wisdom, and understanding respectively, while the letter “I” stood for Islam, which meant “I-self-lord-am-master.”  Each science rested on a specific premise.  Supreme Mathematics incorporated the "mental, physical, and spiritual law of cause and effect.  Once meditated upon .  .  . they basically provide a reference point and ruler to measure and weigh judgments in everyday life."  In juxtaposition, "the basic premise of Supreme Alphabets is the qualities required to manifest a righteous civilization."[9]

All of the Five Percenter frameworks were particularly appealing to urban black youth.  It is no coincidence that the Five Percenters were almost entirely comprised of teenagers.  As members, youngsters could achieve a liberating, Islamic-type consciousness without adhering to the strict discipline of the religion.  Of crucial significance is the fact that Clarence 13X targeted the youth.  His motivation, according to biographer Beloved Allah, stemmed from the desire "to teach [the science of] Islam to the masses of black youth who had not been reached by Muslims."[10]  Clarence 13X focused his message on "poor, delinquent, .  .  . hard-core street youth"[11] and often won them over with "his slow methodical cadence speaking style of stressing syllables not normally stressed, causing audiences to be held spellbound in a trance-like state."[12]  Moreover, Supreme Mathematics and Alphabets were the "key to unlock[ing] the minds of the black youth"[13] and so their message was "delivered in a staccato 'rap' that mesmerized New York City Youth.  Members were trained to deliver their rap, and the group won converts by the hundreds."[14]

The staccato rap was an integral part of the street-level organization of the Five Percenters.  Indeed, most people encountered the rap's message on the streets or in the parks of Harlem.  At the same time, the Five Percenters also developed a clear structural organization starting at the top.  Clarence 13X, or “Allah” as he was known to his followers, was the leader.  Below him were the "very powerful and dynamic" nine disciples of the “First Born.”[15]  The First Born were "each required to teach 10 children or people younger than themselves and they shall be the fruit."[16]  The fruit, in turn, would flower, teach another ten youths, and the process would repeat itself.  Taken as a whole, because teachings were conducted on the streets rather than at a fixed, arbitrary meeting place, the Five Percenters were a highly flexible organization, well equipped to convert a great number of Harlem youth.  Their membership numbers in the 1960s are not quite clear, but a 1968 article from New York Magazine estimated a "group of 800 or so followers."[17]  However, perhaps a more accurate number comes from the 1967 “Universal Parliament” at Mount Morris Park to celebrate Allah's release from incarceration, where onlookers recalled seeing thousands of Five Percenters.[18]

Having established the context of the Five Percenters and the FBI, it is prudent at this point to mention the theoretical framework employed in this study.  Predetirminately, it is a paper that takes the “linguistic turn” of historical study.[19]  This linguistic turn is the result of our focus on a singular text, which, in turn, yields one significant consequence.  That is, the conclusions and observations of this paper are almost entirely based on the language of the Five Percenter files.  In dealing with the language of the FBI files, this study has applied a simple, conglomerated linguistic theory.  First, there is the “constitutive theory of language,” which asserts hat language "constitutes rather than reflects reality."[20]  In more precise terms, language is the key to understanding history because language functions to create experience in any historical setting.  Applied to the FBI files, the language of the files did not come close to reflecting the reality of the Five Percenter situation, however, it did constitute the FBI's experience and relationship with the Five Percenters.  Because of this reliance on text and language, every effort will be made to quote statements often and in their entirety.

A secondary, yet related theory of language at play is attributed to Marxism.  The “Marxist theory of language” holds that language is an ideological tool which functions to mask the reality that is being created.[21]  Stated otherwise, language is constructed as a smokescreen in order to benefit those in power.  Again, when applied to the FBI files, because the language can have a masking effect, Marx's framework helps to uncover the FBI's hidden meanings.  In addition, we must look for ideas regarding the Five Percenters that the FBI is unable or unwilling to perceive as well as items that are noticeably absent from the text.

Lastly, regardless of a text's masking or overt character, because language constitutes reality, it can be said that text is a cultural representation.  As a result, a historian can extract cultural meaning from a text by simply asking “What is the purpose of this text?”, or more succinctly, “What does this text do?”  Meaning, of course, is the motivation for this study.  We want to make meaning out of the relationship between the Bureau and the Five Percenters.  To do so, we must first appreciate the context of the relationship and then make an interpretation of the language in the FBI files.  Undoubtedly, each organization perceived the other as an antagonist, and thus, a full comprehension of their adversarial relationship can reveal the historical consciousness of both the Five Percenters and the FBI.  Accordingly, this study will work to that end, in an effort to understand the exact nature of the FBI's surveillance of the Five Percenters.  With respect to the “nature of surveillance,” the goal of my investigation into the FBI files is to answer specific questions that reflect upon the cultural representation created by the Bureau’s repressive relationship with the Five Percenters. Among these are:  How did the FBI perceive the Five Percenters and what actions did the Bureau take against them?  Also, what were the characteristics of the Five Percenters in the 1960s and how did they react to the FBI's treatment of them?  Finally, what was the source of the Bureau's fear of the Five Percenters?

The thematic and linguistic construction of this study does not mean to indicate that the chronology of the files is not important.  To be sure, every effort will be made to appreciate the process of time in this case.  To that end, a brief chronological overview of the FBI files has been included.

The bulk of the Five Percenter files consists of events from Clarence 13X Smith’s arrest on May 31, 1965 until his release from confinement in the Spring of 1967.  Within that period, the files generally concentrate on disturbances by Five Percenter members in the summer of 1965, publicity produced by the group in October of the same year, and the concurrent incarceration of Clarence 13X.  Afterwards, the files are dominated by potential threats of violence by the Five Percenters in the subsequent winter and disturbances by alleged members in the summer of 1966.  In both files, there is almost no documentation of the time from Smith's release up to his death in 1969.  The Smith file, which opens September 17, 1965 and culminates on June 25, 1969 after his death, contains sixteen Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Memos, one thirty-page synopsis report, two attached Letter Head Memos, newspaper clippings of Smith's murder, and one memo from Director Hoover on March 3, 1967.  The larger Five Percenter file, which runs from June 1, 1965 until October 4, 1967, contains twenty-two SAC Memos, twelve of which have attached Letter Head Memos, various appendices and newspaper clippings, and two memos from Hoover on October 22, 1965, and August 24, 1966.  Together, these files consist of nearly 400 pages.  Despite their combined size, however, the files present a condensed form of information.  Descriptions are often uncreatively repeated and many of the documents are rough drafts of the duplicated final product.  That notwithstanding, the files do provide a wealth of meaning and their condensed format clarifies that almost every page is related to the FBI's general understanding, or misunderstanding, of the Five Percenters, the incarceration of Clarence 13X Smith, or the role of the press.

Based on the language of the files, it is apparent that the FBI related to the Five Percenters in four basic ways.  First, there was a general strategy, wherein the FBI identified its target and established the goals and methods of its surveillance.  Second, the FBI had concerns with the Five Percenters early penchant for violence.  Third, the Bureau made a concerted effort to link the Five Percenters with a larger, more sinister organization.  In this effort, the FBI failed to associate the Five Percenters with any known Muslim groups, but the Bureau did uncover evidence that tied them to prominent activist LeRoi Jones and his pro-Communist organization.  Finally, the FBI sought to evaluate the fundamental structure of the Five Percenters.  Taken as a whole, it is also clear that the FBI conceived of its relationship to the Five Percenters as one that was based on race.  Every document was filed under the heading of “Racial Matters.”

On June 2, 1965, two days after the arrest of Clarence 13X Smith and after recognizing the Bureau had no information on the Five Percenters, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover immediately established a plan of action for the new Five Percenter threat.  In a brief “Informative Note,'” Hoover stated, "New York office [is] instructed to conduct investigation to completely identify leaders and to determine policy of this group."[22]  Thus, the FBI had a dual goal with its surveillance of the Five Percenters.  They wanted to understand the Five Percenter message and who was distributing it.  By June 9, the New York Office of the Bureau included an additional goal.  In his memo to Hoover, the New York SAC wrote that his office would try "to determine the extent of influence or infiltration by subversive type black nationalist groups into the 'Five Percenters.'"[23]

The New York Office was quick to identify Clarence 13X Smith, yet, at the same time, it had trouble gathering a definition of the Five Percenter philosophy.  In a June 2, 1965 SAC Memo, Clarence 13X Smith, also described as “Allah,” was identified as the ringleader of the Five Percenters.  Apparently, the Bureau had some previous information that linked Clarence 13X to the NOI and Muslim Mosque Incorporated (MMI), but neither allegation could be verified and the SAC concluded, "The NYO [New York Office] does not feel that the Bureau should become involved with every ordinary Harlem rowdy and street fighter who shouts invectives."[24]  There was a similar type of downplaying effect in regard to the Five Percenters’ philosophy.  After a month of investigation, the New York Office could only deduce that the Five Percenters were "a loosely knit group of Negro youth gangs" from Harlem.  Additionally, the SAC wrote, "these youths are typical of the numerous street type gangs .  .  . except that they have been influenced by an individual who refers to himself as 'Allah' and has indoctrinated them in the distorted teachings of .  .  . Elijah Muhammad."[25]  To the FBI then, the Five Percenters represented little more than a common gang.  A year later, the Bureau still had little more to say than that the Five Percenters were "young Negro teenagers who have no respect for law and order."[26]

In spite of their “gang” status, the Five Percenters were subject to an established surveillance method by the FBI.  Six months into the file, the New York SAC wrote of the operative method,

The NYCPD [New York City Police Department] is continuing to conduct a full-time, extensive investigation of the 'Five Percenters', which includes interrogation of gang members and nightly surveillance of them.  .  .  The NYCPD feels that this extensive coverage has succeeded in deterring the activity of the gang and has opened the way for numerous arrests for assaults, mugging and marijuana smoking charges.[27]

 

The statement suggests both an around-the-clock operation and a measure of success.  While it is hard to question the tenacity of the surveillance (unless we consider the relative paucity of information yielded from the ‘nightly surveillance”), the success of the operation is subject to debate and will be discussed further at the conclusion of this paper.

One result of the full-time investigation of the Five Percenters was the FBI's decision to place Clarence 13X Smith on the Security Index.  Dating back to 1939, the Security Index operated as Hoover's personal card catalog intended to hasten the mass arrest of radical subversives in the event of wartime.[28]  By the 1960s, however, the Index's real purpose was to keep track of "racial agitators."[29]  What began as a communist measuring stick had evolved into a black measuring stick, and in the 1960s, the index contained the names of 1,497 African-Americans.  One of them was Clarence 13X Smith, whose January 17, 1966, thirty page “Synopsis Report” concluded that the "subject be included on the Security Index."[30]  The Director summarily granted the request and even though Clarence 13X was imprisoned for most of the time subsequent to the request, his name remained on the Index for close to eighteen months.[31]

Although it was a common practice in the 1960s, the evidence does not suggest a strategy of intrusion by the FBI.  For instance, the Bureau's strategy did not include the practice of sending anonymous and deliberately divisive letters, though the file does mention one such letter being sent to the NOI in 1963.  Furthermore, there was no documentation of police raids designed to disrupt the operations of the Five Percenters.  Be that as it may, we know the FBI at least considered the option of police raids.  On September 18, 1967, a police department source told the New York SAC that "the NYCPD is planning a secret raid on the Five Percenters .  .  . during the midnight to 8:00 AM shift .  .  . on Clay Avenue .  .  .  It is expected this raid will result in the discovery of numerous weapons."[32]  By the next day, however, the New York SAC had learned the raid was either called off or a fabrication.

Though today we know the Five Percent Nation has never condoned or endorsed violence, it is not ironic that the aim of the proposed police raid in 1967 was to discover weapons.  From the beginning, a major concentration of the FBI focused on understanding the extent of violence associated with the Five Percenters.  In their early stages, the files suggest that the FBI was on-target with their focus on the group’s violent acts.  However, as the files progressed, incidents of Five Percenter aggression became less and less frequent.

The high point of violence by the Five Percenters came in the Summer of 1965.  First, there was the May 31 arrest of Clarence 13X where "a mob of Negroes had two patrolmen pinned up in Hotel Theresa .  .  . and were threatening them."[33]  When the group was told to move along, they responded by calling "on bystanders to attack the officers."[34]  As a result, additional police were brought in and during the forced removal "two of the officers were bitten."[35]  Then, in late June, eight youths were arrested for "unlawful possession combustible material, namely a gallon can of gasoline, four empty bottles, cloth, a funnel, and a piece of hose.  .  .  They all gave 'Muslim-type' aliases and appear to be members .  .  . of the .  .  . 'Five Percenters', however, they denied this affiliation during questioning."[36]  Finally, on July 30, while trying to make an arrest, an unidentified officer "was set upon by sixteen .  .  . Negro youths, who threw garbage cans and bottles at him.  These disorderly youths were described by police as belonging to the 'Five Percenters.'"[37]

After this short, two-month period, the violence stopped.  In October of 1965, the New York SAC admitted, "the investigation has developed nothing to indicate that this gang is armed or has a cache of arms and weapons stored in Harlem."[38]  Nevertheless, the FBI persisted in their approach, hoping to connect the Five Percenters with violence.  In late November, confidential sources advised the SAC "that on January 15, 1966, the Harlem area of New York City will experience an unknown event which will make 'Watts appear to be a minor accident.'"[39]  Apparently, on at least four occasions around January 15, the source claimed "reference was always made to Harlem youth gangs, such as the 'Five Percenters.'"[40]  Ultimately, however, the sources’ information turned out to be false.  Lastly, late in the summer of 1966, the FBI tried to link the Five Percenters to a string of violent outbursts.  Between August 21 and 23, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York, there were separate reports of "clashes between ethnic groups,"[41] an officer being "jumped" by black youths,[42] and an incident in which a "rowdy band of approximately 200 Negro youths .  .  . created incidents in the area involving clashes with patrolman, bottle throwing and breaking windows."[43]  Subsequently, even though hundreds of arrests were made, only two youths were identified as members of the Five Percenters.[44] 

It is interesting to note how violence directly connected to the Five Percenters ceased after the Summer of 1965.  This can only mean that at some point, Clarence 13X sent out the call to end the violence.  The likelihood of this happening is plausible, for "while at Bellevue he [Smith] continued to teach the youth," and after their leader’s transfer, his "Five Percent disciples traveled to see him in Matteawan Hospital in Beacon, N.Y."[45]  According to Beloved Allah, Smith's essential message was simple: "He told them that they did not need guns .  .  . because their tongue was their sword and .  .  . they could take more heads with the word than any army with machine guns could ever do."[46]

By all accounts, Clarence 13X Smith was an extremely pragmatic man and from his experience with the justice system he probably knew the authorities were trying to subdue his organization.  Furthermore, he likely recognized that acts of violence were an open invitation for the destruction of the Five Percenters by law enforcement agencies like the FBI, hence the command to stop the violence and stymie at least part of the FBI's strategy.  Indeed, it is not a stretch to suggest that the Bureau's operatives led themselves astray by focusing much of their energy on violence, for it limited their ability to see the broader picture of the Five Percenters.

Without question, a foremost goal of the FBI revolved around discovering if there was any relationship between the Five Percenters and any other established group which the Bureau perceived as threatening.  As mentioned in a previous section, an initial goal of the FBI was to understand the degree “of infiltration by black nationalist groups into the Five Percenters.”[47]  Subsequently, the Bureau could not link the Five Percenters to any established Muslim organization, but it did recover evidence that connected the Five Percenters to a significant faction of the anti-government movement.

Gradually, the FBI came to appreciate that the Five Percenters were not affiliated with the NOI, MMI, or Organization for Afro-American Unity (OAAU).  On June 31, 1965, the Bureau verified that although Smith "denied being an NOI member at present, he is known to have been a member in the past where he received his 'X name.'"[48]  On July 9 they learned that Smith "definitely was never a member of the MMI or OAAU," and that "he has not been observed at NOI meetings in New York City for several months."[49]  Then, in the January 1966, thirty-page synopsis report, the FBI made a concerted effort to nail down Smith's Muslim affiliations.  Part II of the outlined report was entitled "Affiliation With the Nation of Islam."  The section subheadings read:  "A.  Attendance at NOI Meetings"; "B.  Attendance at FOI Meetings"; "C.  Attendance at NOI Rallies"; "D.  Attendance at NOI Unity Meetings"; "E.  Attendance at NOI African Asian Bazaars"; "F.  NOI Miscellaneous"; and "G.  MMI Miscellaneous."[50]  In each section, the report chronicled every instance where Clarence 13X appeared at a function of the Black Muslims from 1960-64 and oftentimes documented speech highlights from the various meetings.  However, it was all a wasted effort, for the FBI had no concrete evidence with which they could connect the Five Percenters to the Black Muslim operations.  By August of 1966, the Bureau acquiesced; it had "no information to the effect that the 'Five Percenters' are tied in with any subversive organization."[51]  Clearly, the FBI recognized it had to deal with a new breed of movement.

Interestingly, rather than appreciating the precedence of the Five Percenters, the FBI instead decided to ignore the group.  As a result, following the August 1966 acquiescence, the Five Percenter files are almost empty.  For a week in late August, agents were sent to the streets to ascertain what they could about the Five Percenters; however, these forays failed to divulge any new information.  In addition, during the winter, there was a rumor of violence that was quickly dispelled and then, there were no correspondences until the time of Smith's release in April of 1967.  It was as if the FBI was breathing a sigh of relief after it had established the independence of the Five Percenters.  Apparently, the Bureau believed that because the Five Percenters were not affiliated with the Black Muslims, they were not a threat.  In this way, it can be said that the success of the NOI, MMI, and OAAU had an effect of masking the abilities of the Five Percenters.  Consequently, the FBI downplayed the threat posed by the Five Percenters.  This disrespect can be inferred by the Bureau's common practice of writing the words Five Percenters in quotation marks throughout the files.

On November 4, 1965, the FBI expanded the scope of the Five Percenters investigation beyond the Muslim organizations.  Two months later, the Bureau uncovered evidence which suggested the Five Percenters had a connection to the larger anti-government movement.  In a memo to Hoover, the New York SAC wrote that his office would "canvass NY sources in Black Nationalist, Cuban, and Chinese Communist activity to determine if these subversive and racist elements are linked in any way to the 'Five Percenters.'"[52]  In late November, the Bureau learned that the Five Percenters were allegedly "making efforts to infiltrate and subvert" the Youth Cadet Corps, a federally funded anti-poverty program in Harlem; however, the rumor could not be subsequently verified.

Then came a breakthrough.  In a December 29 Letter Head Memo, FBI sources revealed that "a number of Negro youths .  .  . who claim to be Five Percenters, are affiliating and hanging around with Negro playwright LeRoi Jones and his Black Arts Repertory Theater, a black nationalist anti-white type theater group in Harlem operated by Jones."[53]  To add weight to the danger posed by Jones, the memo included a few items of relevant background information.  For instance, the memo cited a 1964 speech by Jones at a Workers World Party meeting, where he "urged Negroes to disassociate themselves from 'the American way of life'" and told "children to despise everything this country stands for."[54]  Additionally, the memo highlighted that "as of August, 1962, LeRoi Jones was President of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee."[55]

Indeed, the evidence about LeRoi Jones, who later became nationally known as Amiri Baraka, represented a breakthrough in terms of connecting the Five Percenters to a larger movement.  LeRoi Jones was a prominent poet/activist who expressed and promoted his political views through his art.  To him, "art was politics and politics art."[56]  In 1965, he moved to Harlem after the death of Malcolm X had convinced him "of the absolute evil of white society" and publicly announced himself as a cultural nationalist.[57]  While in Harlem, he opened the Black Arts Repertory Theater for the "education and cultural awakening of the Black People in America."[58]  Though short-lived, Jones's theater served as a model for other black nationalist theaters that began to spring up across the country.  Also while in Harlem, Jones began to associate with other powerful black intellectuals like Larry Neal and Ron Karenga.[59]

As indicated by the FBI files, LeRoi Jones was also directly connected to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC).  Throughout the 1960s, the FPCC was the target of repressive measures by the American government.  The FBI had a surveillance file on the FPCC dating back to 1960, wherein the Bureau claimed the FPCC operated as the "chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States" and garnered its funding directly from the Cuban government.[60]  Furthermore, between 1961-63, there were four separate congressional subcommittee hearings on the FPCC.  In a 1962 hearing, Congress cited the name of LeRoi Jones as a major contributor to the group.[61]  Undoubtedly then, the New York Office was correct in their suspicion of Jones.  In 1960, Jones had traveled to Cuba with the FPCC.  The trip changed Jones's worldview and brought him "further into the world of political commitment."[62]  Additionally, with his 1994 autobiography, Jones corroborated the FBI's information on his presidency by stating, "I [eventually] became .  .  . chairman of the New York chapter [of the FPCC]."[63]  Thus, with their stated goal of linking the Five Percenters to other subversive elements, it is reasonable to expect that the name LeRoi Jones and his connection to broader anti-government movements should have triggered a reaction by the FBI.  Curiously however, no response was forthcoming and LeRoi Jones was not mentioned again in the Five Percenter files.

The last element in the FBI's basic understanding of the Five Percenters involved the Bureau's focus on the organizational structure of the group.  In many ways, piecing together the structural organization of a group served as standard protocol for the FBI when dealing with subversive groups of any nature.  Particularly, the Bureau wanted to establish: a) the locations of any meeting places; b) sources of the Five Percenters’ funding and how the group used the money; c) the manner in which orders were given and instructions taken; d) the size of the group and how its membership increased.  To be sure, the FBI's Five Percenter operation reflected the execution of the Bureau’s protocol for understanding an organization.  At one point, the issue of structure even garnered an immediate response from Director Hoover.

            At the inception of the Five Percenter files, it is clear that the FBI was concerned with Five Percenter structure.  In the first correspondence between the New York Office and FBI Headquarters, the SAC concluded page three by observing, "They have no headquarters and 'hang out' on the street corners in Harlem."[64]  Eight days later, the SAC reported, "The total number is not believed to be more than 80 to 100."[65]  Then, in October, the New York SAC disclosed, "No information has been developed that money obtained from muggings and assaults by gang members is turned over to any specific leader or fund."[66]  In the same memo, the SAC also readjusted the number of Five Percenters to 200.  Overall, the memos represented standard procedure for organizational structure by the New York Office, one that they would employ until the following summer.

In August 1966, Director Hoover vigorously contacted the New York Office and demanded that agency fill in the holes regarding the Five Percenter organizational structure.  Hoover's response was a reaction to a Letter Head Memo included in the report on the aforementioned “Racial Incidents in the Beford Stuyvesant Area.”  Apparently, during a police interrogation, one youth charged with malicious mischief and disorderly conduct "admitted to police that he had been taking 'instructions' from the 'Five Percenters' for one week and [another arrested subject] admitted taking instructions for two weeks."[67]  Hoover's memo to the SAC on August 24, 1966 commanded the New York Office to delve deeper into the organizational structure of the Five Percenters.

Information furnished by [arrested subjects] to the New York City Police Department that they had taken 'instructions' from the Five Percenters for one and two weeks respectively should be immediately defined and resolved.  In absence of information being available to you to the contrary, you should interview [arrested subjects] to determine what was meant by 'instructions.'  In view of tense racial situation, information indicating organized training or schooling to teach riot techniques must receive intensive attention and be fully resolved.[68]

 

While we cannot know what Hoover meant by ”resolving” the situation, it is clear that he was threatened by evidence that suggested the Five Percenters were a sophisticated organization, complete with a hierarchy and methods of schooling.

In response to the Director's concern, agents of the New York Office sprang into motion to see what they could learn.  On the same day, the SAC wrote back that a reliable source advised that the Five Percenters had an "estimated membership of 300 youths.  He stated that they were a very loose organization with no real leadership."[69]  Then on September 1, another source furnished a description of the basic pattern of Five Percenter meetings:

These type of gatherings in the park are not necessarily planned but take place at any given hour when someone decides to discuss anything at the park.  The audience, which is comprised of over 80 teenagers, may simply be sitting in the park awaiting a turn on the basketball court, a deal at cards or simply a game of softball.  At these various gatherings no individual is considered the floor chairman and that anyone who desires to discuss anything simply stands and can be heard.  As for receiving actual instructions from any organization, [source] indicated that this was not true.[70]

 

Afterward, the FBI was content with its follow-up investigation of the organizational structure of the Five Percenters.  Based on its evidence, the FBI regarded the Five Percenter organization as weak.  At one point, the SAC said that because the Five Percenters had no "real organizational setup," there was no need for an "extensive investigation."[71]

Ultimately, during the course of its two-year surveillance, the FBI mustered little discouraging effect against the Five Percenters.  Indeed, with respect the Bureau's belief that they had 'succeeded in deterring' the Five Percenters, the facts suggest otherwise.  Perhaps the strongest written evidence comes from Beloved Allah, who contends that in spite of the file, surveillance, interrogations, and arrests, the Five Percenters "continued to grow" during the mid-1960s.[72]  By the time Clarence 13X was released in the spring of 1967, "thousands of Five Percenters turned out to welcome Allah's return."[73]  In retrospect, what the FBI regarded as weaknesses were actually cornerstones of Five Percenter strength.  This notion leads us to the next theme, for throughout the file, the FBI failed to acknowledge the vast potential of the Five Percenters.

Having become acquainted with the surveillance strategies of the Bureau and the contemporary history of the Five Percent Nation, it is possible to appreciate the ways in which the FBI underestimated the Five Percenters.  At least six times, the Bureau had documented information that suggested the Five Percenters were a sophisticated organization with an unprecedented philosophy.  However, in every instance, the FBI failed to supply the necessary intuitive energy for peering into the heart of the Five Percenters.  In addition, the decision about who would be responsible for the surveillance of the Five Percenters happened almost immediately.  In the end, the only one who came close to understanding the true nature of the Five Percenters was Hoover himself.

Returning to the issue of organization, the FBI had its chances to see the structural power of the Five Percenters.  On June 9, 1965, the New York Office reiterated that the Five Percenters "do not have any central meeting place or headquarters" and then proceeded to say, "Although each of the individual youth gangs formed from their respective neighborhoods has its own leader, they do not have any organizational set up."[74]  Indeed this statement is an oxymoron.  It suggests a lack of structure even though each neighborhood had a known leader.  With a little effort, the FBI could have learned of the 'First Born' and understood the Five Percenter idea of spreading the message like seeds of fruit.  Similarly, in July, the Bureau could have recognized they were dealing with a well-informed adversary.  Despite the efforts of the courts to reschedule the hearings of Clarence 13X, his trials were always known to a "number of young Negro supporters .  .  . that continually show up at the various court hearings."[75]  Finally, in September, the SAC wrote of Smith's former activities, "He is unemployed and spends his time hanging around .  .  . where he indoctrinates the youth of the area."[76]  Embedded in all of the statements were strong hints of Five Percenter potential.  The Bureau should have realized the Five Percenters were a youthful movement that was highly accessible on the street.  Instead, the FBI overlooked the novel phenomenon of this combination and made little effort to understand Smith's method of indoctrination.  Had they done so, they would have discovered perhaps the greatest strength of the Five Percenters -- their self-liberating message was repeatedly delivered in a catchy, mesmerizing rap.

Another underestimation by the FBI was its misunderstanding of the appeal and philosophy of the Five Percenters.  Perhaps as a rouse, after their arrest on May 31, 1965, Clarence 13X and his accomplices told police "they are members of [an] organization called [the] 'Five Percenters' which means .  .  . the five percent of Muslims who smoke and drink."[77]  Then, on June 9, the New York Office wrote of Clarence 13X's followers, "they like to consider themselves 'Muslim' and many of them shave their heads and take Arabic sounding names.  In fact, [however,] none of them follow the tenets of Orthodox Islamic religion."[78]  On the one hand, it might have been easy for the FBI to interpret the Five Percenters as naive, dope-smoking, Muslims impersonators.  On the other hand, the FBI completely neglected the implications of what it already knew.  An alternate interpretation of these early SAC documents describes the Five Percenters as a more user-friendly form of the NOI; one which certainly had an infinitely more appealing message to the youth culture than the strict, disciplined platform of Elijah Muhammad.

As a result of press exposure of the Five Percenters in October of 1965, the FBI finally came to understand the meaning of the moniker and the source of Five Percenter strength.  In an October 18 memo to the Director, the New York SAC informed Hoover, "the current meaning of 'Five Percenters' is that 85% of Negroes are cattle, 10% are Uncle Toms, and the remaining 5%, which they are, are the real leaders of the Negro people."[79]  In the same memo, a "[source] described the 'Five Percenters' as a particularly viscous type of street gang that has found in this Muslim overtone a mysterious type of ideology that seems to ignite and inspire them."[80]  In spite of this obvious evidence of a distinct and inspiring ideology, the FBI never came close to comprehending the explosive, youthful appeal of the Five Percenter philosophy or indoctrination rap.  Had this been done, the Five Percenter files might have been much thicker.

At the very least, with an accurate estimation of the Five Percenters, the FBI might have taken a more hands-on approach; instead, the Bureau quickly decided to delegate responsibility.  As early as June 9, 1965, the SAC wrote, "Because the 'Five Percenters' are a loose bunch of teenage street gangs and because their mentor is in jail, the NYO feels they represent a local police problem and not a threat to internal security."[81]  Over and over throughout the files, the SAC portrayed the Five Percenters as a “local police problem.”  By October, the Bureau clarified the angle taken by police: "The investigation is being handled by a special squad of the NYCPD.  .  . known as the 'Special Unit.'"[82]  The 'Special Unit' was otherwise known as the Bureau of Special Services (BSS or BOSSI) and indeed, the initials BSS can be repeatedly observed over the course of the Five Percenter files.  BOSSI was notorious for their work in opposition to the Black Power Movement.  A New York City police officer once anonymously revealed, “they [NYCPD] have a group called Bossi that is a special service group which does a lot of undercover work.  They are the group that infiltrates all of these radical groups like the Black Panthers or any kind of subversive group.  And these guys find out a hell of a lot of information.”[83]  To be sure, almost all of the FBI's information came from New York/BOSSI and the Bureau was content to let BOSSI directly handle the Five Percenters.  Thus, as we shall see again in the next section, the Bureau wanted to keep its hands clean of the situation in case of a discovery of the illegal surveillance against the Five Percenters.

Irrespective of BOSSI's reputation, no one in the New York Office ever furnished an accurate description of the Five Percenters.  In fact, the only person who somewhat gauged the Five Percenters was Director Hoover.  First, in an October 25, 1965, Director Memo to the SAC, Hoover noted the "Five Percenters is a gang of approximately 200.  .  .  The leaders have given instructions to each other in Muslim type ideology."[84]  Then, at the end of the 1966 Synopsis Report from the Smith file, Hoover handwrote a personal summary: "There are approximately 200 members of the 'Five Percenters' and subject is their leader.  He had extensive activity in NOI from 9/61 to 3/25/65.  He left NOI to follow Malcolm X and joined MMI.  He presently indoctrinates his followers in a distorted version of Muslim teachings."[85]  Finally, in the aforementioned 1966 Director Memo to the SAC, the note read, "The Five Percenters have been a constant source of trouble to the NYCPD.  They are not members of the Nation of Islam; however, they affect Islamic names and symbols."[86]  From these three items, it is apparent that Hoover knew the Five Percenters were a derivative of the NOI, an organization he feared.  Also, he understood the Five Percenters practiced a distinct, more youthful ideology than the Black Muslims.  As a consequence, he probably appreciated the potential appeal of the Five Percenters.  For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that Hoover had a master plan to repress the Clarence 13X's group, and this notion serves as the subject for the remainder of this study.

Although not conclusive, the evidence from the Five Percenter files overwhelmingly suggests that the FBI had a deliberate plan to keep Clarence 13X Smith off the streets and behind bars.  If true, the Bureau executed its plan with a succession of devious steps.  First, the charges and bail against Smith were trumped up and his journey through the court system was constantly delayed.  Then, In order to keep Clarence 13X in custody, Hoover devised what can be labeled as his “interdepartmental strategy.”  Finally, as a result of Hoover's strategy, the courts sent Clarence 13X off to a mental hospital for a period of “indefinite confinement.”  The FBI's actions in this regard should not come as a surprise; after all, Clarence 13X was the admitted leader of the Five Percenters and more often than not, part of the Bureau's protocol to diffuse Black Nationalist groups necessitated neutralizing the leaders.  In effect, Kenneth O'Reilly's Racial Matters and Karl Evanzz The Judas Factor are case studies of this very protocol.  O'Reilly's book explains how the FBI specifically targeted Martin Luther King, Huey Newton, and Bobby Seale to bring down their respective movements.  Likewise, Evanzz's book presents the Bureau's complex web of repression aimed at Malcolm X.  Correspondingly, based on the Five Percenter files, similar forces were working against Clarence 13X.

Almost immediately, events conspired against Clarence 13X.  Smith and five cohorts first attracted police attention on May 31, 1965, outside the Hotel Theresa for "interfering with street traffic," calling "on bystanders to attack police," and shouting "anti-white and anti-police invectives."[87]  Although he engaged in little more than angry self-expression, the charges against Smith were representative of more serious offenses.  On June 2, the SAC informed Hoover that "all six were charged with felonious assault, conspiracy to commit same, resisting arrest, assault with a deadly weapon and disorderly conduct.  In addition, 'Allah' was charged with possession of a marijuana cigarette and malicious mischief."[88]  The assault charges almost certainly stemmed from police witness, Wilbert Lee, who claimed the group had tried to attack him with sticks earlier in the evening.[89]  Indeed, it was convenient for the police to produce Lee after the fact.  The bail situation for Clarence 13X was also curious.  On June 1, the SAC noted "all [six subjects] held in three thousand to five thousand bail .  .  . Allah received additional charge .  .  . since he had a marijuana cigarette."[90]  Interestingly, on the following day in a Letter Head Memo, bail was "ranging from $2000.00 to $9500.00, the latter being the bail for Allah."[91]  In both cases, someone had made very quick decisions to single out Clarence 13X.

Clarence 13X's court experience exhibited similar signs of railroading.  At the trial, a source observed, "During the hearing 'Allah' claimed that he was God and stated that the Court could not charge them with anything since 'you can't charge Allah.'"[92]  According to Beloved Allah, Smith's subsequent custodianship by "Bellevue Hospital for psychiatric treatment .  .  . was the result of him proclaiming himself to be God."[93]  Though flimsy, this contention may be accurate, for in the next correspondence to the Director, the SAC offered an intriguing proposition: "Due to Smith's actions, rantings and ravings, particularly in front of the judge at his hearing, he appears to have a 'psychological problem', but the court has taken no action in this regard."[94]  Thus undoubtedly, Clarence 13X made a strong impression on the New York SAC and a month later, the court took action.  Apparently, the SAC's proposition of “psychological problems” was somehow absorbed by the court system because "Smith was committed to Bellevue Hospital, New York City for psychiatric examination" on July 9, 1965.[95]

Afterwards, authorities put the brakes on the process.  Following his committal to Bellevue, Clarence 13X endured repeated delays in the justice system.  On the occasion of a scheduled court date, the SAC noted, "the District Attorney and the Court appear to be continually adjourning these hearings to a later date."[96]  In the meantime, Smith's psychiatric evaluation dragged slowly.  He remained at Bellevue for three months without an actual, official sentence from the courts.  Then, to add further insult, "on 10/15/65 .  .  . Bellevue Hospital officials advised the presiding judge that they needed 10 additional days to complete their psychiatric treatment of subject [Smith]."[97]

It was during these ten days that J Edgar Hoover entered the picture.  A significant portion of the first Director Memo to SAC on October 22, 1965 appears to be directly related to Clarence 13X's experience in the justice and mental health systems.

As you are aware, the proper utilization of information received by the Bureau is foremost among our responsibilities.  .  .  Whenever information comes to the attention of the Bureau which appears to be of interest to another agency, that information should be forwarded to interested agencies.  You should contact [black-out] and advise him of the Bureau's responsibility with regard to the dissemination of pertinent information to other agencies and that the Bureau desires that the information .  .  . be disseminated to military services, the Department, and Secret Service.[98]

 

From this memo, it is clear that Hoover wanted other government agencies to be aware of the Five Percenters.[99]  More importantly, Hoover's words were the outline for the interdepartmental strategy to foil Clarence 13X.  With Clarence 13X in custody, the FBI had an opportunity to wield a decisive blow against his activities as leader of the Five Percenters.  In this context, the FBI needed to inform and coordinate other agencies so that the Bureau could continue to surreptitiously work against Clarence 13X.

On the surface, Hoover's words seem innocent enough, but the subsequent events and files shed light on how and why the interdepartmental strategy was to be executed.  First, as Hoover demanded, the New York Office had to change its procedure and let other relevant agencies in the loop.  Accordingly, in the November 4 SAC Memo, the cover sheet stated, "Copies of this LHM are being furnished in NYC to G-2 and Secret Service."[100]  Likewise, a later SAC Memo stated, "Information copies are also being furnished locally to G-2, ONI, OSI, Secret Service and the U.S. Attorney, SDNY."[101]  Next came the desired effect of the interdepartmentalism, which was manifested in the November 16 SAC Memo.  While informing Hoover of a hearing for Clarence 13X on the same day, the New York SAC wrote, "it is expected that when subject appears in above court on 11/16/65, subject will be adjudged criminally insane and will be committed to a mental institution."[102]

Unquestionably, the November 16, 1965 SAC Memo is the most curious document in the Five Percenter files.  How could the FBI “expect” that Clarence 13X “will” be sent to a mental hospital?  One would expect the SAC to use more uncertain, ambiguous words such as “may be” or “could be”; but the words “will be adjudged” clearly imply some prior knowledge of the verdict.  The only way the SAC could have had prior knowledge was if he had some form of interdepartmental contact with Bellevue Hospital, the District Attorney, and possibly the presiding judge.  If this was true, then one can ascertain the purpose of interdepartmentalism.  In essence, Hoover's orders in his October 22nd memo could have been sly code words for ‘contact the appropriate agencies” and “see that Clarence 13X is sent to a mental institution for being criminally insane.”

The incarceration of Clarence 13X in a mental institution serves as another indication of railroading.  Though trumped up, the charges and evidence against Clarence 13X probably would not have landed him in prison for a long time.  Smith was a decorated veteran of the Korean War and undoubtedly, this too would have helped his cause during sentencing.  However, if Clarence 13X could be diagnosed as having a “psychological problem,” the law said the sentence of time did not apply.  Therefore, he could be "remanded to the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene for an indefinite confinement."[103]  This was the Bureau's ultimate goal.  With Clarence 13X in a mental institution with no recourse for release, he would, so the theory went, be out of the picture for good.

A problem ensnared this scenario, however, because Clarence 13X never had complications with his mind.  Based on his original philosophies and accomplishments as a leader, Clarence 13X was a man of high intelligence.  Yet, the court tried to pass him off in the November 16 hearing as being "unable to understand the charges against him."[104]  Indeed, the veracity of this statement is doubtful.  Then, in April of 1966, Matteawan State Hospital "made available [to the New York Office] the institution file relating to the captioned subject [Smith]."[105]  Even to the layman, this file hardly made for a clinical diagnosis.  In his synopsis, the SAC wrote, "The file reflects that the subject's original diagnosis was described as schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type.  He expressed delusions of grandeur of a religious nature and of persecution."  Indeed, both of these diagnoses seem purposefully ambiguous.  More than likely, their ambiguity was designed to fabricate and promulgate Clarence 13X's mental illness.

Because he could not be classified as a true mental patient, the hospital eventually had to let Clarence 13X Smith free on April 12, 1967.  Another factor in this decision may have been the growing frustration of the Harlem youth.  On January 1, 1967, the SAC warned Hoover of "actions, disorders, [and] riots" by Five Percenters on January 2 if Clarence 13X was not released.  Whatever the reason for his freedom, by the time of Smith's release, the Bureau was developing a secondary course of action to monitor his actions.  In midwinter, after there had been no disturbances on January 2, the New York SAC proposed, "As subject [Smith] has been in continuous confinement since rerep, there has been no reportable activity on his part.  In view of this, NY will not submit an annual report at this time.  In the event subject is released from the hospital, this case will be reopened for appropriate investigation."[106]

Hoover was not at all satisfied with the SAC's proposal and as a consequence, he plaintively refined the plan for Clarence 13X's release.  In his third and final Director Memo of the files, the Hoover responded:

In view of the subject's background and his current mental      condition, the Bureau feels that upon his release from incarceration at Matteawan .  .  . you should determine his whereabouts and ascertain whether he resumes his participation in Black Nationalist          activities.  Therefore, New York should place a stop with appropriate officials at the above hospital, in order that you will be promptly advised of any action indicating that the subject may be released from confinement.[107]

 

Without question, the New York Office followed Hoover's order and then produced the final correspondence of the files until Smith's murder in 1969.  On May 16, 1967, the SAC provided Hoover the basic facts of Smith's freedom.  Of most consequence to the Bureau was that Clarence 13X was "unemployed and has no permanent residence, but can almost always be located on 127th Street."[108]  Moreover, Smith had not participated in any altercations with police and "sources familiar with many phases of 'Black Nationalist' activity have not reported any additional activity on the subject's part."[109]

Of course, railroading would have reached its furthest extent if the FBI had any involvement with the murder of Clarence 13X, who, like Malcolm X, foreshadowed his own death.  According to legend, on the morning of June 12, 1967, the Five Percenter founder told his mother, "when they are ready, they will kill you."[110]  By the evening, Clarence 13X's words proved prophetic when he was gunned down by "three unknown negroes" on the front stoop of his apartment.[111]  Details of this information were sent to Hoover along with four newspaper articles and a pledge to open an investigation.  By June 25, the Bureau had their answer.  Based on the investigation, Clarence 13X, "may have been shot by a small group of extortionists who are 'shaking down' businessmen in the NY ghetto area and 'leaning' on anyone who opposes them."[112]  Supposedly, the extortionists were comprised of ten men (listed but blacked out) who were "active in [the] Fair Play Committee."[113]  The conjecture was that the "Fair Play Committee hired [three assailants] .  .  .  to assassinate .  .  . Smith" because the "Committee wanted Smith .  .  . 'out of the picture' because [he was] working for Mayor Lindsay or 'cutting into territory' of Committee."[114]

The FBI's explanation for Smith's murder gives pause for a little suspicion.  Once again, the file is mired with ambiguous phrases.  Furthermore, if we assume the Fair Play Committee is a derivative or the same as the FPCC, then there are three more reasons to question the files.  First, the FBI had used the FPCC as a scapegoat before; in 1963, the "government .  .  . implicate[d] Fair Play for Cuba in the Kennedy assassination."[115]  Second, the Five Percenters allegedly had a previous, friendly relationship with LeRoi Jones who was deeply involved with the FPCC.  Third, and most suspiciously, according to the FBI's own files, the "FPCC had been dissolved" since April 1964.[116]  Consequently, it would have been unlikely and undesirable for the FPCC to orchestrate the murder of Clarence 13X.  Thus, it is possible that the FBI's investigation of Smith's death was part of a cover up, which in turn, may indicate that the Bureau was somehow involved in the murder.  For his part, Beloved Allah believes this to be the case:

The one who killed Allah is the one who feared his power the most.  The one who would stand to gain the most by black youth not being awakened to the knowledge of themselves.  The one who enters our communities with the expressed purpose of concern for those in need .  .  . but with hidden motives of monitoring and sabotaging.  And now I ask you, who killed Allah?[117]

 

While the subject of the FBI railroading Clarence 13X is mostly a matter of speculation, the text of the FBI files leaves little doubt that a major part of the Bureau's master plan involved keeping the Five Percenters out of the public eye.  Accordingly, over the course of the files, the FBI kept a constant tab on the preeminent conduit of the public's information -- the press.  Especially with respect to the Black Power Movement, the Bureau was well aware of the power of the press.  In fact, the press was often used in "the FBI effort to discredit black dissidents.  .  .  Bureau officials hoped to accomplish their goal here by developing 'news media' contacts from coast to coast."[118]  And, whereas the FBI appreciated the media's ability to harm subversives, they were also cognizant of the reverse scenario.  That is, the Bureau knew press reports could also have the effect of bringing notoriety to black groups and apprehension to the public.  Apparently, this was the FBI's fear in the Five Percenter file.  Thus, it should come as no shock that the first Director Memo from Hoover was the direct result of newspaper articles.

From the start of the files, the FBI made it a goal to keep the Five Percenters name away from the public's knowledge.  For instance, a Letter Head Memo after the arrest of Clarence 13X stated, "The June 2, 1965 editions of the 'New York Times' .  .  . and 'Daily News' .  .  . contained articles on the above incident and arraignment.  These articles described the six as 'Black Muslims', a term generally used to refer to members of the NOI."[119]  Here, one gets the sense that this item was included because the FBI was pleased to have the six subjects described as “Black Muslims.”  Had they been identified as “Five Percenters,” the public would have become aware and possibly fearful of a brand new Black Nationalist group.  Afterwards, the Bureau exhibited a similar kind of idea in the June 22 SAC Memo.  Therein, the SAC forwarded an arrest report of eight youths

because of the publicity received in NYC and their possible affiliation with the 'Five Percenters.'  It is felt that because of the present racial tension in NYC, the arrest of any members of these Harlem youth street gangs, particularly those who have adopted a 'Muslim-type' alias, will bring newspaper publicity which implies that these youths are part of some anti-white black nationalist movement.[120]

 

Indeed, this embodied a circumstance the FBI wished to avoid.

In this context, the Bureau's apparent desire to keep the Five Percenters out of the press came to a halt on October 15, 1965.  On that day, three separate articles on the Five Percenters appeared in the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, and New York Daily News.  All of the articles, which were included within the file, shed a negative and threatening shadow on the Five Percenters.  For example, the Daily News described the Five Percenters as a group who were "only too happy to turn the community into chaos and turmoil."[121]  The Herald Tribune compared the Five Percenters organization to the Ku Klux Klan and Hitler Youth and then proceeded to implicate them in a string of recent assaults on teachers in New York public schools.  Then, as if to fan the flames of fear, the article stated the Five Percenters were not connected to the NOI and added, "Harlem residents claim to see Five Percenters everywhere.  .  .  [People have] talked to police.  They [are] scared, they know the facts."[122]  Finally, in the Times article, which claimed to be based on a three-week independent investigation, the Five Percenters were said to be receiving "funds and advise from outside the United States, possibly from Cuban or Communist groups."[123]

Each of the three articles were triggered by the inflammatory words of Livingstone Wingate, president of Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited-Associated Community Teams (HARYOU-ACT).  In the files, the FBI called HARYOU-ACT a federally funded "anti-poverty program,"[124] but at other times, the Bureau described it as a "hate school."[125]  This negative perspective likely resulted from a known relationship between HARYOU-ACT and LeRoi Jones.  It is safe to assume that the Bureau was aware that Jones "must have got[ten] away with a couple hundred grand and even more in services" from HARYOU-ACT in 1965.[126]  Thus, when HARYOU-ACT president Wingate made a speech alluding to the Five Percenters as a violent military group, he had the attention of the FBI.

The New York SAC summarized the Wingate speech and newspaper articles as follows:

"His main theme was that if anything happened to HARYOU-ACT, there would definitely be racial violence.  On this latter point, Wingate referred to a mysterious 'armed' group of Negro youth who are 'prepared to die' in a struggle against white people.  He refused to identify by name this group stating he feared for his life if he talked too much.  .  . [The] articles indicated that Wingate was apparently speaking of a Black Muslim-oriented extremist youth group known as the 'Five Percenters'.  .  . [One article] set forth observations .  .  . developed in an 'independent investigation.'"[127]

 

Undoubtedly, the New York SAC was concerned that the informed public would perceive the Five Percenters as an ominous, new threat.  As a consequence, a response from the Bureau was imminent.

Following the October 15 articles, the FBI immediately stepped up their investigation of the Five Percenters.  For instance, the subsequent October 18 SAC Memo represented the most thorough portrait of the Five Percenters to date and had a girth of seven pages.  Therein, the SAC concluded, "In view of the publicity of the 'Five Percenters' in the attached articles as a result of the Wingate speech and particularly because of the allegations outlined in the Tribune article, SAC .  .  .  [remaining paragraph blacked-out]."[128]  The context and timing of the black out hints at some subsequent action that was or would be taken against the Five Percenters in order to resolve the situation.  Fortunately, we can observe the scope of that action in the rough draft of the same memo from Part II of the Five Percenter file.  There, the memo continued, " .  .  SAC [name blacked out] conferred on 10/15/65 with [agent from] Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department (BSS, NYCPD) and [other agents] of BSS."[129]  Thus, as a result of the articles, the New York Office felt compelled to have an emergency conference with local authorities.  Of the decisions made at the conference, the SAC said, "The results of this conference are not being set forth in an LHM on the specific request of [blacked-out] that none of the information be disseminated outside of the FBI, in view of the continuing investigation by NYCPD into the 'Five Percenters' and the recent publicity thereon."[130]  While it is possible that the conference served as the source of the FBI's plan to railroad Clarence 13X, that decision more than likely came from Hoover.

The articles in the press were apparently a matter of grave concern to the Director.  Based on their information, Hoover made two important decisions.  First, he articulated the design of the interdepartmental strategy to contain Clarence 13X and the Five Percenters.  Second, Hoover used the opportunity to redefine the goals of the Five Percenter operation.  In both cases, he applied evidence from the newspapers to justify his course of action.

As evidence for the former decision, Hoover wrote, the

Tribune .  .  . sets out that ranking police officers in Harlem have been briefing leaders .  .  . regarding the 'Five Percenters' and have asked their cooperation in fighting what they described as a very dangerous group.  This article also sets out that two Harlem weekly newspapers .  .  . published stories regarding the menace posed by the 'Five Percenters' reportedly at the request of police.[131]

 

This was a subtle way of saying that the police were doing a sloppy job with the Five Percenter operation and that their surveillance system had to be fixed or obscured.  Not coincidentally, in the subsequent paragraphs, Hoover implemented the interdepartmental approach that would temporarily doom Clarence 13X.

            With regard to Hoover's latter decision, Hoover observed, the "Tribune article continued with a comment to the effect that one source linked the 'Five Percenters' to the Chinese and Cuban Communists and to the group recently convicted of attempting to dynamite the Statue of Liberty."[132]  If true, then the Five Percenters truly were a threat to Hoover's America.  Thus, he made a point to reiterate the operation's focus on the bigger picture.

"The Bureau agrees that the activities of the' Five Percenters' represent a local police problem; however, in view of the allegations that the 'Five Percenters' may be linked with certain subversive and racist           elements, as indicated in the newspaper articles, your continuing investigation of these subversive and racist elements should specifically determine whether or not the 'Five Percenters' are actually linked to these elements."[133]

 

Undoubtedly, in late December, this order led the New York Office straight to LeRoi Jones and his connection to the Five Percenters.

Hoover wrote to the New York Office on three occasions:  1) after the preceding situation revolving around the press, during which he implemented the interdepartmental strategy; 2) a year later after there was evidence of hierarchical instructions; 3) in Spring of 1967 when Clarence 13X was due to be released.  In this regard, what is odd is not when these memos were sent, but rather, when Hoover failed to send a Director Memo.  Most striking was the case of LeRoi Jones in the Winter of 1965.

In conjunction with the articles from the New York Times and Herald Tribune, the possible affiliation to LeRoi Jones just three months later represented the second piece of evidence that the Five Percenters were connected to the Cuban/Communist movement.  The FBI was aware that Jones was once president of the FPCC.  Moreover, the Bureau also knew that "Leroi Jones [was] .  .  . then with Haryou," which was the organization responsible for the newspaper articles in the first place.[134]  Thus, the FBI had evidence that the FPCC, LeRoi Jones, HARYOU-ACT, and the Five Percenters were all tangled in the same web.  Based on his stated goal of linking the Five Percenters to the larger subversive picture, it is indeed surprising that Hoover did not want to delve deeper into this issue.  Perhaps however, the reason for Hoover's lack of interest stems from the idea that the Bureau already had a plan to break the web.

There is evidence to suggest that by the winter of 1965, authorities had orchestrated a coordinated effort to bring down HARYOU-ACT, LeRoi Jones, and the Five Percenters.  First, as covered in this paper, various agencies conspired to incarcerate Clarence 13X in a mental hospital.  Also in Autumn of 1965, federal funding to HARYOU-ACT ceased abruptly and then, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, along with federal authorities, placed the group, including leader Livingstone Wingate, under investigation following charges of fiscal mismanagement.[135]  Interestingly, "it was about this [same] time that words of the 'racist' Black Arts program began to surface in the media -- 'teaching racism with government funds'!"[136]  From what we know of the Five Percenter files, the correspondence relating these three events is very suspicious and each seems to suggest against covert FBI’s actions.  In the same time frame, funding was cut, the press was used as a weapon, leaders were railroaded, and in each case, an interdepartmental strategy was employed.

Another glaring omission from the Five Percenter files is the nature of the relationship between the Five Percenters and the NOI.  According to an article from New York Magazine in 1968, a substantial rift existed between Clarence 13X and Elijah Muhhamed.  The article described it as an "older animosity" that stemmed from Clarence 13X "considering himself the real Allah, believed Elijah Muhammed should be his messenger, which the Black Muslim leader felt was sacrilege."[137]  Then, authors Gloria Steinem and Lloyd Weaver implicated the NOI in a 1964 murder attempt on Clarence 13X and asserted that he was "on the list after Malcolm X."[138]  If this was the case, then it is fair to expect that the FBI might have wanted to exacerbate the rift between the NOI and Five Percenters.  Yet, there was no evidence to this effect in the files.  Out of the numerous occasions when NOI sources were contacted, only one derogatory comment about the Five Percenters was recorded from a NOI member.  That was, in October of 1965, a NOI source from Savannah described the Five Percenters as "instigators of violence."[139]

One explanation for Hoover's reluctance to exacerbate the rift between the NOI and Five Percenters could be that they did not feel the need for “hands-on” interference with what the Bureau perceived as little more than a street gang.  Another explanation is that rift between the NOI and Five Percenters did not exist.  In an impromptu question and answer phase of a lecture given in 1977 at Arizona State University, Minister Louis Farakhan remarked of the relationship:

Brother, I'm telling you that the Honorable Elijah Muhammed respected those young brothers and sisters who called themselves the Five Percenters.  Now, I talked to the Honorable Elijah Muhammed about that group that was developing in New York and now spreading.  He said, 'That's good.  That is good.  They are studying that which Allah questioned me on and they are studying my answers to those questions.[140]

 

Assuming the Clarence 13X files concerning his murder are some sort of cover-up, perhaps the FBI in 1969 already had a sense of what Minister Farakhan later said.  It may be that the Bureau knew there was no rift to exacerbate; therefore, they could not logically pin Clarence 13X's death on the NOI without someone crying foul.  Consequently, they chose an unlikely patsy -- the FPCC.

            Finally, it is interesting to note the point at which the surveillance of the Five Percenters ceased in the files.  The FBI stopped their active operation against the Five Percenters and Clarence 13X Smith in May of 1967.  Shortly thereafter in September, perhaps as a response to their experience with Five Percenters, the FBI launched the Ghetto Informant Program "designed to establish listening posts in black areas of virtually every major city."[141]  The program "required all field agents to develop ghetto informants" and by 1968, the Bureau had recruited 3,248 such people.  Thus, with the Ghetto Informant Program, the Bureau had no need for the file and it could keep an eye on the Five Percenters without tying up the New York Office.  Around the same time, Clarence 13X substantially increased his power and became a fixture in the public eye.  Correspondingly, after 1967, the Five Percenter Movement emerged as a major player in urban-New York culture and the FBI could have easily followed their progress out in the open public.  If, as Beloved Allah contends, the "white power structure still viewed [Clarence 13X] as a dangerous man," they at least had no need for a secret surveillance system anymore.

Indeed, in the years 1967-1968, Clarence 13X and the Five Percenters were able to overcome all of the obstacles previously presented to them by the FBI.  In the Summer of 1967, New York Mayor, John Lindsay, felt compelled to develop ties with community leaders by creating an Urban Task Force and Clarence 13X was "high on the  Mayor's list of priorities."[142]  As a result of the ensuing association, the Mayor's Office came to learn "that what Allah really wanted was some education for his young disciples" and afterwards, the Mayor's top aide convinced the New York Times to print a retraction and "change a story referring to them [Five Percenters] as 'anti-white.'"[143]  In the same summer, the Mayor's Office informed the Five Percenters "they had plans to secure a building for them at Seventh and 126th Street."[144]  A month later, Allah opened the Five Percenters Street Academy at 2122 Seventh Avenue (where it still stands and operates today).  Then, most significantly, on the night of Martin Luther King's shooting, Clarence 13X and a group of Five Percenters walked with Mayor Lindsay through Harlem in order to dissuade rioting.  Afterwards, Clarence 13X "received public and media praises for his participation in maintaining peace" as well as a "commendation from Mayor Lindsay."[145]  On his plaque, the "inscription read, 'To Allah, thanks a lot, John V. Lindsay.'"[146]

Thus, in the short run, the FBI failed miserably in their attempt to subvert the Five Percenters.  Theirs was an effort to railroad Clarence 13X and keep the Five Percenters name out of the press.  Yet, as a result of perseverance and the events of 1967-1968, Clarence 13X became powerful civic leader and the Five Percenters were known all throughout the city.  Moreover, in retrospect, the FBI did not only fall short of their objectives in the short run.  Over the long haul, the Bureau's relationship with the Five Percenters ultimately contributed to the ability of the Five Percenters to become a permanent, nationwide organization.  Upon return from his unholy experience with the justice system, Clarence 13X changed the power structure of the Five Percenters for the better.  He "told his Five Percenters before he left them that his death would born the Nation of Gods and Earths" and "that they did not need a leader because they were all leaders of themselves."[147]  Indeed, these words were precautionary measures designed to ensure the propagation of the Five Percenters.  Clarence 13X did not want to replicate the oppressive power relations of hierarchy for a specific reason.  In his own words, "when black people have leaders the devil can easily execute them to derail the movement."[148]

As Clarence 13X foretold, his death did bring about the reconfiguration of the Five Percenters into the Nation of Gods and Earths.  Thirty years later, the Nation of Gods and Earths has become a cultural experience for thousands of followers who cut across class and race lines throughout the country.  As evidence, their webpage cites official membership at over 25,000 people.   Additionally, the Five Percenter message of self-knowledge has become a powerful force of resistance for prison inmates.  This is all largely the result of the Five Percenters becoming prolific in rap music.  Taking up where the 1960's indoctrination rap left off, in the late 1980's the rap industry began spreading the word of the Five Percenters; in 1990, Brand Nubian completely based the rhymes of their breakthrough album, “One For All,” on Five Percenter philosophy; on their album inlet, the Poor Righteous Teachers gave, “a Universal Greeting to the Father of our Nation, Clarence 13X Smith”; and legendary lyricist Rakim once credited his inspiration to the Five Percenters[149].  Indeed, by the early 1990s, these rappers and countless others had brought Clarence 13X's vision into popular culture.  Returning to the personal aspect of this study, the ideas of the Five Percenters were so pervasive and appealing that they became an integral part of my own youthful experience.

That in 1991, a teenage, middle-class Caucasian could learn self-knowledge and truths about American society from Five Percenter rap music must have had J. Edgar Hoover turning in his grave.  The Director, however had his chances to stop the Five Percenter movement from 1965-1967.  During this time, the files strongly suggest that his Bureau attempted to strip Clarence 13X and publicity away from the Five Percenters.  But, ultimately, it was all in vain, because from the beginning the FBI had misunderstood and underestimated the Five Percenters.  In no way could the FBI comprehend the cultural force that the Five Percenters would eventually become, for they were unable to appreciate the power of the Five Percenter structure and message.  It goes to show, that while the FBI had proven methods to stop political movements, they were not well equipped to handle a cultural movement.

 

 

 

 



[1] Nelson George, Hip Hop America (Middlesex, England: Viking Penguin, 1998), 68.

[2] <http://www.worldwd.com/allahtea.

[3] Beloved Allah, "'The Bomb': The Greatest Story Never Told," The WORD: National Newspaper of the Nation of Gods and Earths, July-November 1987, lkd. Gangs or Us Page, <http://www.metalab.unc.edu/nge/thebomb.html>, 4.  Heretofore, will cite as 'The Word.’

[4] Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, http://www.fbi.gov.

[5] The Word, 1.

[6] James Krikpatrick Davis, Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program, (New York: Praeger, 1992), 101.

[7] George, 68.

[8]"Why We Are Not Muslims," lkd. Gangs or Us Page, <http://www.metalab.unc.edu.nge/notmuslims.htm>, l.

[9]El Amar Supreme, "Supreme Mathematics and Alphabets," lkd. Knowledge This! Page, <http://www.73.cyberhost.net/allahtea/Amarsupreme.htm>, 1-2.

[10] The Word, 1.

[11] Ibid., 5.

[12] Alex Tordorovic, "They Call Themselves Five Percenters: The Department of Corrections Calls Them Trouble," lkd. Gangs or Us Page, <http://www.mindspring.com/~scpoint/point/9604/p06.html>, 3.

[13] The Word, 4.

[14] Tordorovic, 3.

[15] The Word, 6.

[16] Ibid., 5.

[17] Gloria Steinem and Lloyd Weaver, "Special Report: The City on the Eve of Destruction," New York Magazine, April 22, 1968, lkd. Knowledge This! Page, <http://www.73.cyberhost.net/allahtea/Thecity.htm>, 6.  Heretofore will cite as 'New York Magazine.

[18] The Word, 6.

[19] David Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," American Historical Review, 94, 3, (June 1989).

[20] Harlan, 585.

[21] Frank Kidner, professor of history, class lecture, San Francisco State University, History 700, 22 November, 1999.

[22] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Informative Note," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part I, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http:www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[23] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part I, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http:www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[24] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[25] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 31, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[26] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 23, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 4.

[27] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 4.

[28] Kenneth O'Reilly, "Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 274-275.

[29] Ibid., 274.

[30] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director -- Synopsis Report," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, January 17,1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 33/2.

[31] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division to Director," Clarence 13X, #100-444636, March 17, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[32] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, September 25, 1967, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[33] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, June 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[34] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, June 22, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[37] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, July 31, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[38] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 6.

[39] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, November 24, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[40] Ibid., 2.

[41] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 23, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 3.

[44] Ibid., 3-4.

[45] The Word, 6.

[46] Ibid., 5.

[47] see note 22.

[48] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, July 31, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[49] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, July 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[50] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director, Synopsis Report" Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, January 17, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 7-17.

[51] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 23, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 4.

[52] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, November 4, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[53] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, December 29, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[54] Ibid., 2.

[55] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, December 29, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov> 1.

[56] William L. Van DeBurg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 177.

[57] William J. Harris, The Poetry and Poetics of Amiri Baraka: The Jazz Aesthetic (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 9.

[58] Van DeBurg, 177.

[59] Harris, 9.

[60] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Appendix on the FPCC," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, December 29, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[61] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Castro's Network in the United States (Fair Play For Cuba Committee), Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Congress, session 1, April 10, 1962 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), 28.

[62] Amiri Baraka, The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1997), 249

[63] Ibid., 250.  Unfortunately, no corroborative evidence was found in the book to verify the FBIs' evidence of a connection between Jones and the Five Percenters.

[64] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[65] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[66] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 6.

[67] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 23, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[68] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to SAC New York," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 24, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[69] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, August 23, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 4.

[70] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, September 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[71] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[72] The Word, 6.

[73] Ibid.

[74]Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[75]Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, July 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[76] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, September 20, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[77] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[78] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[79] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 5.

[80] Ibid., 7.

[81] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[82] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 4.

[83] Nicholas Alex, New York Cops Talk Back: A Study of a Beleaguered Minority (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), 157.

[84] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to New York SAC," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 22, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[85] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director, Synopsis Report" Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, January 17, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 33/2.

[86] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to SAC New York," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, August 24, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[87] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[88] Ibid., 3.

[89] Ibid., 1.

[90] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[91] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[92] Ibid.

[93] The Word, 6.

[94] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, June 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[95] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, July 9, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[96] Ibid., 2.

[97] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, October 19, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[98] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to SAC New York," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 22, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[99] In order to conceal evidence of collaboration between state and federal government, Hoover could not list the New York City District Attorney's Office as one of the desired agencies, though it is probable that the New York City D.A. had a role in the    interdepartmentalsim.

[100] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, November 4, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[101] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, November 24, 1965 & part 2, December 31, 1966, lkd. Freedom of          Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[102] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, November 16, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[103] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, November 26, 1965 & December 1, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[104] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, November 26, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[105] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, April 4, 1966, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[106] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, January 12, 1967, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[107] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to SAC New York," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, March 23, 1967, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[108] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, May 16, 1967, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[109] Ibid., 3.

[110] The Word, 8.

[111] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, June 13, 1969, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[112] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, June 25, 1969, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[113] Ibid., 2.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Baraka, 271.

[116] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Appendix on the FPCC," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, December 29, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[117] The Word, 10.

[118] O'Reilly, 283.

[119] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Letter Head Memo," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 2, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[120] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, June 22, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[121] Theodore Jones, "5 Percenters Called Hoodlums; Actions Blamed on Frustration," New York Daily News, October 15, 1965; from Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director, Enclosure" Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 12.

[122] James W. Sullivan, "Harlem '5 Percenters' -- Terror Group Revealed," New York Herald Tribune, October 15, 1965; from Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director, Enclosure" Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 9.

[123] Homer Bigart, "Wingate Warns of Negro Revolt if Haryou's Program is Curbed," New York Times, October 15, 1965; from Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director, Enclosure" Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 15.

[124] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[125] O'Reilly, 248.

[126] Baraka, 307.

[127] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 1, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[128] Ibid., 3.

[129] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 3.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Director to SAC New York," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 22, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134] O'Reilly, 248.

[135] O'Reilly, 401 & Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Five Percenters, #157-6-34, part 2, October 18, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page,  <http://www.fbi.gov>, 2.

[136] Baraka, 311.

[137] New York Magazine, 8.

[138] Ibid., 10.

[139] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "SAC New York to Director," Clarence 13X Smith, #100-444636, October 11, 1965, lkd. Freedom of Information Act Reading Room Page, <http://www.fbi.gov>, 1.

[140] Louis Farakhan, lecture at Arizona State University, October 1977; from Wakeel Allah, "Did the Most Honorable Elijah Muhammed Recognize the Five Percenters?," lkd. Knowledge This! Page, <http://73.cyberspace.net/allahtea/5percentprops.htm>, 3.

[141] Davis, 102.

[142] The Word, 7.

[143] New York Magazine, 6.

[144] The Word, 7.

[145] Ibid., 8.

[146] New York Magazine, 10.

[147] The Word, 10.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Poor Righteous Teachers, "Holy Intellect" (New York: Profile Records, 1990).