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[508 U.S. 520, 532]
II-A
In our Establishment Clause cases, we have often stated
the principle that the First Amendment forbids
an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion
in general. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist.
66) v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion); School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 106-107 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). These cases, however, for the most part, have
addressed governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions,
and so have dealt with a question different, at least in its formulation
and emphasis, from the issue here. Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor
their religion because of the religious ceremonies it commands, and the
Free Exercise Clause is dispositive in our analysis.
[At a minimum, the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some
or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons.] See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953). Indeed, it was ["historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to
those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause."] Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). See J. Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint
1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 464, and n.
2 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); [508
U.S. 520, 533] Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342 (1890). These principles, though not often at issue in
our Free Exercise Clause cases, have played a role in some. In McDaniel
v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978), for example, we invalidated a state law that disqualified
members of the clergy from holding certain public offices, because it "impose[d]
special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious status," Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S., at 877. On the same principle, in Fowler v. Rhode Island,
supra,
we found that a municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional
manner when interpreted to prohibit preaching in a public park by a Jehovah's
Witness, but to permit preaching during the course of a Catholic mass or
Protestant church service. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 272-273 (1951). Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982) (state statute that treated some religious denominations
more favorably than others violated the Establishment Clause). 4 |
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