

## Article Summary: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order

In his introduction, Ikenberry claims that surprisingly stable and cooperative relations remain firm among the industrial democracies despite structural changes and shifts in relative power distribution between the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. The mainstream theory of realism is particularly weak in describing the durability of this order because it doesn't take into account the extensive institutionalization and the consensual and reciprocal character of relations within it. He advocates an institutional explanation, developed in four steps. First is identifying the underlying logic of the current order. Ikenberry believes that immediately after WWII, the perceived basic problem was "how to build a durable and mutually acceptable order among groups of states with huge power asymmetries," which could only be achieved through strategic restraint of the hegemonic power.<sup>1</sup> Second, strategic restraint could only be possible if states' actions were made predictable and an exercise of non-restraint was pre-determined to result in only a momentary advantage. Third step further advances the importance of action predictability, particularly that of the hegemonic state. Ikenberry argues here that American hegemony was especially acceptable to Japan and Western Europe, because it "was built around decidedly liberal features... open and accessible internal institutions."<sup>2</sup> Fourth is a rather interesting concept of increasing returns to institutions, which succinctly describes Western order's increasing stability "over time because the rules and institutions have become more firmly embedded in the wider structures of politics and society."<sup>3</sup> He later streamlines these four steps into two core sub topics: constitutional character of the institutions and practices, and institutions' "increasing returns character."

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<sup>1</sup> G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security*, Vol. 23, N. 3 (Winter 1998/99), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Ikenberry. Pg 46.

<sup>3</sup> Ikenberry. p. 46.

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Ikenberry further evaluates the two mainstream approaches to international political order before embarking on his institutional explanation. In his sub topic titled "The Debate about Order" he focuses on the short-comings and achievements of three approaches to order: balance of power and hegemony from the realist approach, rationalism and constructivism from the liberal approach, and at last his third approach, which combines the two liberal explanations.


Balance-of-power theory is considered inapplicable because it had falsely predicted the downfall of alliances between United States, Western Europe and Japan, which have supposedly taken form primarily to leverage against an external threat, i.e. USSR. Hegemony also loses theoretical credibility in the eyes of our author because it has inaccurately predicted rising conflict and institutional disarray, as well as counterbalancing after USSR's collapse. Ikenberry disagrees with one of the core assumptions of hegemony, which sees order as a product of the hegemonic state's negative and positive incentives exercised toward secondary states. He believes Western order is achieved not through hegemonic state's coercive power, but exactly the opposite, through her strategic restraint. Ikenberry views liberal theories as helpful, yet not far-reaching in their "view in which leading states use intergovernmental institutions to restrain the arbitrary exercise of power and dampen the fears of domination and abandonment."<sup>4</sup> Ikenberry's 3<sup>rd</sup> approach sees institutions as both constructs and constraints, which not only provide a road map for appropriate action in the face of security dilemmas, but also restrain what that action can possibly be through contractual agreements. The point clearly advanced in conclusion of this analysis is that the condition of anarchy, whether inherently natural or historically learned, is severely hampered by increasingly powerful institutions. His institutional explanation attempts to supersede previous explanations of order through interdependence, which were seriously undermined after WWII broke out between England and Germany, two states with a great deal of economic interdependence before the war.

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<sup>4</sup> Ikenberry. p. 51.

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After discrediting competing theories, Ikenberry begins describing the logic and elements of constitutional bargain. At the end of WW II United States was faced with three primary courses action: dominate, abandon, or convert. While the first two options may be rather obvious, the choice of conversion, in other words, converting United States “favorable postwar power position into a durable order that commanded the allegiance of the other states within it,” proved most fruitful in yielding to today’s order after USSR’s collapse.<sup>5</sup> Durability and willing allegiance of other states would not have been possible without United States self-restraint in the use of its highly disproportionate post WW II power position. Hence a constitutional bargain occurs...



Ikenberry’s use of the word “constitution” appropriately addresses the winner-doesn’t- take-all feature of this bargain. Similar to the United States Constitution, which safe guards rights of the losing political party, this constitutional bargain establishes an environment in which the outcome of a fight today, i.e. over closing US military bases in Japan doesn’t determine the victor of tomorrow’s issue, i.e. lifting Japan’s import quotas on automobiles.

Various incentives entice hegemonic power and secondary states toward this cooperative constitutional bargain system and away from the legacy of foreign policies developed in the shadow of realism’s self-help and anarchy. Two primary incentives for the hegemonic state are:


1. An institutionalized order promises long-term favorable arrangements, while postwar power advantages appear temporary.
2. Reduction in enforcement costs of maintaining order.

Two primary incentives for the secondary states’ participation in the constitutional bargain are:

<sup>5</sup> Ikenberry. p. 54.

1. Less costly because under a constitutional bargain, "the hegemonic power agrees to forgo some immediate gains."<sup>6</sup>
2. The threat of being dominated or abandoned is significantly reduced.

The constitutional bargain is also possible because hegemonic state is more concerned with her future return on power assets, while the secondary states are more concerned with their present return on power assets. Ikenberry showcases these concepts in two separate graphs. First graph on the left shows us that while the hegemonic state's relative power declines over time, her return on power assets remains relatively unaffected. The second graph shows a reciprocal favorable situation for the secondary state. The secondary state begins with a higher return on power assets than its real relative power capabilities normally would have allowed. The bargain however, requires that the secondary state retain that same level of



return on power assets, despite its increasing relative power capabilities over time.

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Because the role of creating trust falls primarily on the shoulders of the hegemonic state particularly at T(1), Ikenberry argues that United States was put in a position to pursue "strategies that involve bonding, binding, and institutionalized voice opportunities," in order to adequately reassure the secondary states that she will not unpredictably exercise its power to dominate them.<sup>8</sup> Despite the closeness in the

<sup>6</sup> Ikenberry. p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> Ikenberry. p. 58-59.

<sup>8</sup> Ikenberry. p. 60.

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definition of these three strategies, Ikenberry intends on using them to address related, yet distinct methods. Bonding is used to describe hegemonic state's role in convincing secondary states that her decisions will be at most fair and just, and at least predictable. This strategy hasn't been a great challenge to pursue due to the ready presence of open and fragmented institutions in United States' internal political system. Binding is a strategy that involves increasing interdependence through the use of international institutions, such as NATO, or the UN Security Council, which make disengagement from international political dialogue and unpredictable unilateral action almost impossible for the hegemony and secondary states. Lastly voice opportunities addresses secondary states' ability to participate in the decision making of the hegemonic power thru exploitation of openness of democratic institutions in the United States.

On a separate subsection, Ikenberry further elaborates on these three strategies and their unique contribution to creating a legitimate and durable US hegemonic system. He introduces the reluctant hegemony concept to illustrate how bonding is achieved. Ikenberry cites the State Department's proposal for free trade as "a vision of order that would require very little direct American involvement or management."<sup>9</sup> Ikenberry shows that this reluctant hegemony stance not only reduced United State's enforcement costs, but also alleviated her blame for the failures of post WW II policy outcomes. He further asserts that United States resorted to use of its material resources primarily to "induce Britain and the other European countries to abandon bilateral and regional preferential agreements and accept the principles of a postwar economy organized around a non-discriminatory system of trade and payments."<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, Ikenberry doesn't supply any historical evidence in support of this assertion. This makes one wonder whether the number of instances United States used her material resources primarily to increase her relative power position outnumbered instances of its more plausible power assertions for the creation of this "non-discriminatory system of trade and payments."

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<sup>9</sup> Ikenberry. p. 63.

<sup>10</sup> Ikenberry. p. 64.

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The point about open hegemony is backed up by good empirical evidence, proving the permeable character of the United States hegemony. For example, Japan may not have elected officials in the United States government, but she does have representatives and a chance to influence United States foreign policy. Two instances with WTO support the claim that United States cannot indiscriminately exercise her relative power to achieve her ends. First instance in 1993 shows United State's ineffectiveness in increasing Japan's numerical targets on automobile imports, despite threatened sanctions. Second instance illustrates WTO's rule against United States in the Kodak case, which the United States also attempted to assert unilateral sanctions against Japan. WTO rules, which would have designated such a United States sanction illegal, empowered Japan to refuse all bilateral discussions with the US negotiators on the issue. Ikenberry further drives home the point here that institutions are sticky: "They can take on a life and logic of their own, shaping and constraining even the states that create them."<sup>11</sup>

Lastly, Ikenberry introduces the sub-topic of increasing returns to postwar institutions. Constitutional bargain brought in strategic restraint of the hegemonic state as a necessity to post WW II order. Furthermore, if United States was to retain its allies with minimal maintenance cost and minimal resistance, she had to establish durable and legitimate institutions, reducing her and secondary states' need for unilateral self-help action. The resulting institutions didn't simply exist. Binding generated a lock-in effect, and institutions increasingly gained autonomy from the interests of their founder state(s). Alternatives to the existing institutions became less plausible due to large initial start-up costs, and existing institutions' first mover advantages.

Ikenberry suggests that "American hegemonic institutions have characteristics that particularly lend themselves to increasing returns."<sup>12</sup> First, these institutions aren't based on hegemonic state interests, but on principles, which are particularly agreeable to secondary states because of the principles' seeming fairness and legitimacy. For example, non-member states like China and the old Warsaw Pact

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<sup>11</sup> Ikenberry. p. 68.

<sup>12</sup> Ikenberry. p. 73.

countries of Eastern Europe are eager to join these hegemonic state institutions, IMF, WTO, or NATO, because the institutions operate under the guidelines of multilateralism, openness and reciprocity. Second, states have become increasingly dependent on the resources of these institutions, designating change into a different format not just disloyal, but costly.

In conclusion, Ikenberry ends with an optimistic note that despite structural changes, the American century is far from ending. He believes that United States liberal hegemonic rule encompassing the larger democratic Western political order is unusual- if not unprecedented in the history of international political order. The durability of order in this structure may be attributed to two core features of its institutions. First, an agreeable constitutional bargain was agreed upon by the hegemonic power and secondary states. This bargain depended on institutions' ability in reducing returns to power as well as its ability in providing assurance of non-destruction in the face of momentary loses. Second, "the overall system organized around principles of openness, reciprocity, and multilateralism has become increasingly connected to the wider and deeper institutions of politics and society within the advanced industrial world."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ikenberry p. 78.

Questions	Focus Theory	Supporting Theory
<p><b>1. Does anarchy best describe our current international political system?</b></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>"...institutions are potentially more 'sticky' than liberal theories allow, capable under specific circumstances of locking states into stable and continuous relations that place some limits on the exercise of state power, thereby mitigating the insecurities that neorealism traces to anarchy and shifting power balances."<sup>14</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>"Governments can only enforce laws and regulations when the vast majority of the population willingly complies... International relations among the developed democracies has taken on many of the characteristics of relationships in domestic societies."<sup>15</sup></p>
<p><b>2. Are institutions central to explaining order in the post-Cold War era?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"...Western order has what might be called 'constitutional characteristics' –a structure of institutions and open polities that constrain power and facilitate 'voice opportunities,' thereby mitigating the implications of power asymmetries and reducing the opportunities of the leading state to exit or dominate."<sup>16</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"Prodded by the examples of two destructive world wars and the possibility of a third that would likely be fought with nuclear weapons, leaders sought ways to escape from the deadly consequences of self-help systems. They developed and nurtured supranational institutions, Norms, and rules that mitigated anarchy and provided incentives for closer cooperation among states."<sup>17</sup></p>
<p><b>3. Is democracy a necessary condition to institutionalized order?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"The democratic character of the United States and the other Western countries facilitated the construction of these dense interstate connections. The permeability of domestic institutions provided congenial grounds for reciprocal and pluralistic 'pulling and hauling' across the advanced industrial world."<sup>18</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"Deutsch and his colleagues found two essential conditions for pluralistic security communities...The most vital of these conditions is the first; shared values make responsiveness and predictability possible. The pluralistic security community of developed democracies is based on many common values and ideals..."<sup>19</sup></p>

<sup>14</sup> Ikenberry. p. 53.

<sup>15</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization*, Vol. 48, N. 2 (Spring 1994). p. 277.

<sup>16</sup> Ikenberry. p. 45.

<sup>17</sup> Lebow. p. 275.

<sup>18</sup> Ikenberry. p. 69.

<sup>19</sup> Lebow. p. 272.

Question	Focus Theory	Supporting Evidence
<p><b>4. Does the continuous expansion of organizations fuel the durability of post-Cold War institutional order?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"...great shifts in the basic organization of the Western order are increasingly costly to a widening array of individuals and groups that make up the order...the constituency for preserving the postwar political order among the major industrial countries is greater than ever before."<sup>20</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"The Bank [World Bank] had 44 members when it commenced operations...and the staff numbered 434 persons of 31 different nationalities. As of fiscal year 1994 there were 178 members and approximately 10,000 staff members... The Fund [IMF] started operations [1947] with 44 member countries. End of 1994, the IMF had 178 members. Today the IMF has a staff of about 2,000, much larger than the 100 people working at the Fund in 1947."<sup>21</sup></p>
<p><b>5. Are arrangements based on principles more elastic than those based on interests?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"...the principled basis of hegemonic order also makes it more durable...arrangements based on generalized organizing principles should be more elastic than ones based on particularistic interests and situational exigencies."<sup>22</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"Since 1975, political dialogue and the consensus rule, as a fair and non-coercive process for rule making, has been a source of the OSCE's power to regulate state behavior and deter undesired behavior... In Chechnya, this political process has facilitated Russian participation in a Permanent Council resolution condemning the "disproportionate use of force by the Russian Armed Forces" in Chechnya, as well as unprecedented Russian acceptance of an on-site "OSCE Assistance Group" to monitor human rights and promote dialogue and negotiation..."<sup>23</sup></p>
<p><b>6. Is US' strategic restraint critical to current international order?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"A second reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that -if the hegemon is able to credibly demonstrate strategic restraint-it does buy them some protection against the threat of domination or abandonment. As realist theory would note, a central concern of weak or secondary states is whether they will be dominated by the more powerful state."<sup>24</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"Despite the Community's [European Community] opposition to the Soviet-style regimes, it was favorable to what was then known as East-West trade. There was a sharp difference between European and American views of this. U.S administrations tended to suspect that what looked to Europeans like interdependence was in fact dependence on an unscrupulous Soviet leadership. These things, on top of the demonstration effect of a free, prosperous, and democratic Community, gave it a flying start when a new relationship became possible from 1989 onwards, and helped give the more independent-minded people in the East the courage to throw off the Soviet constraint."<sup>25</sup></p>

<sup>20</sup> Ikenberry, p. 75.

<sup>21</sup> Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996). p. 285-289.

<sup>22</sup> Ikenberry, p. 74.

<sup>23</sup> Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, p. 43.

<sup>24</sup> Ikenberry, p. 57.

<sup>25</sup> Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, p. 169.

## Supporting Theory and Evidence

- Question 1-** Ikenberry doesn't deny that anarchy is still part of the international political order. However, he certainly repeats in more than one instance that institutions significantly reduce the incentives for self-help driven unilateral state action. Institutions accomplish this by imposing constitutional-like arrangements upon the interactions of its member states. Lebow's statements regarding the nature of relations among the developed democracies concede to Ikenberry's analysis. Lebow also believes that hegemonic state is able to enforce its way only when the majority of secondary states' agree with the hegemonic agenda.
- Question 2-** Further common ground between Ikenberry and Lebow is on the importance of institutions in explaining order in the post-Cold War era, despite realists' predictions of counterbalancing after USSR's collapse. Both authors advocate the point that institutions were the glue holding together US hegemony and its satellite states, and not the secondary states' attempt to counterbalance an external threat.
- Question 3-** Both authors limit their discussion primarily to sustained order between United States, Western Europe and Japan particularly because they believe the institutionalization approach requires participation of democratic institutions. Non-democratic institutions aren't predictable, and too wined up in self-help internally to project anything contrary to anarchy in their foreign policies.
- Question 4-** One reason institutions have been durable despite shifts from bilateral to unilateral international political structures is the increasing number of countries and policy elites who are employed by the international organizations. Ikenberry's assumption that the enlargement of organizations has made them stickier and hence more durable is illustrated by the steady growth of World Bank and the IMF since 1947 despite United States decreasing share of votes. United States and

United Kingdom's share has shrunk to less than 22%.<sup>26</sup> This supports Ikenberry's view that these organizations are not dependent on the hegemonic state's interests for their continual growth and existence. Since 1947 an additional 134 countries agreed to the IMF intrusive exercise of surveillance over their exchange rate policies, contributing to the expansion of formal and informal networks, which have a vested interest in the survival and success of these institutions.

**Question 5-** The institutions advanced here by Ikenberry are not driven by hegemonic state interests, and cannot be easily gotten rid of when those interests change. Beyond state interests, what lends institutions durable and credible is their self-identification with more universal principles. OSCE's success in placing the first foreign monitored human rights group in Chechnya despite predictable Russian objections shows the triumph of an argument for human rights over Russian interests. A more recent example shows that despite United States disagreement over the Kyoto Protocol, Japan and Germany lead the way for a safer and cleaner environment for generations to come.<sup>27</sup>

**Question 6-** Last question on this section proves that United States exercised self-restraint in the face of European Community's trade with the communist Europe in the East. Despite United States views on the issue, the hegemon's restraint later proved detrimental to the collapse of the Eastern block.

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<sup>26</sup> Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, p. 288.

<sup>27</sup> "Japan May Act on Pact Without U.S." CNN.com, <http://www.cnn.com/world> (Aug. 9, 2001).

Question	Focus Theory	Opposing Theory
<p><b>7. Does interdependence promote international political order?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>“Binding... a practice of establishing institutional links between the units that reduce their autonomy vis-à-vis one another. In agreeing to be institutionally connected, states mutually constrain each other and thereby mitigate the problems of anarchy that lead to security dilemmas and power balancing.”<sup>28</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>“Interdependence ... multiplies the occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and even war. The closer the social bonds, the more extreme the effect becomes, and one cant sensibly pursue an interest without taking other’s interest into account. One country is then inclined to treat another country’s acts as events within its own polity and to attempt to control them.”<sup>29</sup></p>
<p><b>8. Have systemic changes taken place in the Post-Cold War era?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>“The persistence of the postwar Western order is particularly a puzzle for neorealism. Neorealism has two clearly defined explanations for order: balance of power and hegemony... It is actually the ability of the Western democracies to overcome or dampen the underlying manifestations of anarchy (order based on balance) and domination (order based on coercive hegemony) that explains the character and persistence of Western order.”<sup>30</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>“The world...has not been transformed; the structure of international politics has simply been remade... Structural change affects the behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce. It does not break the essential continuity of international politics. The transformation of international politics alone could do that. Transformation, however, awaits the day when the international system is N longer populated by states that have to help themselves.”<sup>31</sup></p>
<p><b>9. Can institutional durability be explained by institution’s autonomy from state interests?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>“A durable and legitimate postwar order was possibly precisely because the United States had the ability to engage in strategic restraint...The United States had an incentive to move toward a ‘constitutional’ settlement after the war-that is, to create institutions and operating principles that limit what the leading state can do with its power.”<sup>32</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>“A deeply entrenched international bureaucracy can help to sustain the organization, but states determine its fate. The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.”<sup>33</sup></p>

<sup>28</sup> Ikenberry. p. 62.

<sup>29</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 25, N. 1 (Summer 2000).p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> Ikenberry. p. 43-44.

<sup>31</sup> Waltz. p. 39.

<sup>32</sup> Ikenberry. p. 55.

<sup>33</sup> Waltz. p. 20.

Question	Focus Theory	Opposing Evidence
<p><b>10. Has strategic restraint legitimized United State's hegemonic state order?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"...critical element to order formation was the ability of the United States to engage in "strategic restraint"—to convey to its potential partners credible assurances of its commitments to restrain its power and operate within the agreed-upon rules and principles of postwar order"<sup>34</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>"When United States fails to lead, it causes confusion in the Atlantic alliance and damages America's standing in the world... By February 1998, there was no dispute that ethnic cleansing was indeed underway in Kosovo. The temporizing, timidity and empty threats that emanated from Washington made many, including our closes allies wonder about American purpose and resolve. Milosovic did not seem to take them seriously."<sup>35</sup></p>
<p><b>11. Is the current postwar order most effective in reducing returns to power and fears of domination and abandonment?</b></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"The United States got the acquiescence of the other Western states, and they in turn got the reassurance that the United States would neither dominate Nr abandon them. The postwar hegemonic order is infused with institutions and practices that reduce the returns to power... It has become increasingly difficult for potential rival states to introduce a competing set of principles and institutions."<sup>36</sup></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>"Clinton was initially cool on NATO expansion... But once the president had embraced NATO expansion, he and his foreign policy team exhibited the habit of unproductively excluding the Europeans from important decisions and communications. Cables between European allies at the time of expansion debate, in particular between the French and the Germans, complained bitterly about American domination and control of a process they, more than the U.S., had set in motion."<sup>37</sup></p>
<p><b>12. Does the U.S. exercise of coercive power improve secondary states' participation in the post-war hegemonic order?</b></p>	<p><b>NO</b></p> <p>"...hegemon...can reduce the 'enforcement costs' of maintaining order. The constant use of power capabilities to punish and reward secondary states and resolve conflicts is costly...reason why weaker states might opt for the institutional agreement is that-if the hegemon is able to credibly demonstrate strategic restraint-it does buy them some protection against the threat of domination or abandonment."<sup>38</sup></p>	<p><b>YES</b></p> <p>"Of course, governments across Western Europe supported the NATO intervention in Kosovo ... But behind the scenes there were grave doubts about American leadership, and growing concern about future Western European dependency on the U.S.... America shouldered the burden of military action in Kosovo. The U.S. did so not because the Europeans lacked the will to intervene, but... because they lacked the technical and infrastructural means to share the responsibility... Both he (German Defense Minister) and German foreign minister Joschka Fischer have complained about Europe's near total dependence on the U.S ... "<sup>39</sup></p>

34 Ikenberry. p. 54.

35 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). p. 181-185.

36 Ikenberry. Pg 78.

37 Kagan and Kristol. p. 190.

38 Ikenberry. p. 57.

39 Kagan and Kristol. p. 190-192.

## Opposing Theory and Evidence

- Question 7-** Waltz devalues the importance of interlocking features of institutions. While Ikenberry coins the term binding to often describe how interconnectedness increases exit costs, Waltz shows us the uglier side of this interdependence.
- Question 8-** While Ikenberry clearly sees a disappearance of anarchy from the world order, Waltz doesn't agree with institution's success in eliminating the self-help driven conflicts. Hence, according to Waltz, realism still remains the theory for describing world order.
- Question 9-** As far as institutional durability is concerned, Waltz advocates the point that state's still designate their fate, despite intertwined bureaucratic ties. While Ikenberry interprets NATO as principle's victory of state interests, Waltz sees it as an example of how United States can sustain the life of an institution who's original purpose has disappeared in order to maintain the U.S. hegemony and prevent excessive European interdependence.
- Question 10-** While Ikenberry views hegemonic strategic restraint central to maintaining hegemonic order, Europe interprets United State's lack of involvement and leadership in Bosnia and Kosovo as a factor that weakens United State's hegemonic legitimacy.
- Question 11-** Another central point for Ikenberry is the success of existing order in eliminating European and Japanese fears of domination and abandonment. However, NATO survives, despite undiplomatic actions of the United States towards its European partners in the treatment of their contributions to NATO expansionist plans.
- Question 12-** Contrary to the principles of hegemonic order from the realist camp, Ikenberry believes that US hegemony survives not because US uses her power to enforce its will on the secondary nations. However European's lack of technical skill in conducting operations in Bosnia illustrate the real reason behind secondary nations support for the United States.

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Indeed European nations were incapable of healing the ulcer, which could have grown into a larger regional conflict in the Balkans. Europeans supported the US led NATO intervention despite their reservations because they succumbed to the United States capabilities and their lack of it. European fears of dependency on the United States signal their actual dissatisfaction with the U.S. led intervention and their resentment of U.S. exercise of punishment and reward. The quote demonstrates that the post-war order survives thru domination and not through hegemonic restraint.