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Back to the Future:
The Beginning of History and the First Global Citizen
By David Wallace
In a 1992 book, Francis Fukuyama triumphantly announced the end of an historical epoch—actually, the end of all historical epochs. With The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama declared that the only remaining model for human organization (i.e., civilization) is market economics and a limited, pluralist, democratic government.[1] The end of the cold war, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the final collapse of tyrannies on both the left and right, has left a new metaphorical Colossus astride the earth: a Global Capitalism best summed up, albeit ironically, by Lewis Lapham as “the eighth wonder of the world, a light unto the nations and the answer to everybody’s prayers.” And, as Lapham notes of this historical end mark, “Nothing must interfere with its sacred mysteries and omniscient judgment.”[2] America invented the future, after all. The entire concept of “modernity” is, in fact, inherently Western.[3] Game over. The West was not won. The West has won.
Fortunately for us (for historians, for “humankind,” for “civilization”), history is not so easily dismissed. As horrible as the events of September 11, 2001 were, as catastrophic as the damage was, and in spite of the horrifying number of “innocent” lives lost, from a macro viewpoint the date’s significance should prove particularly thrilling to historians today—for, despite the “unspeakable horror,” nothing serves better than this “most brazen and devastating attack in history”[4] as an emphatic example of how history, in fact, has not ended. Rather, it has begun anew—illustrated by an event that should literally boggle the mind of the modern historian working to synthesize the almost infinitesimal range of historical aspects of the event. One particularly intriguing aspect is the (karmic?) near-geographical tie to the “starting-point of the story of civilization.”[5] Beyond that, rich analysis can be mined utilizing current and emerging trends in world historiography. Some of these more notable trends include: the maturation of the field of macrohistory; a continuing fascination with—and fetishism of—economic history (as well as, to a lesser extent, the history of ideas and the history of science); the continuing incorporation of race, class, and gender into the historical narrative; and a general struggle to find new methods of analysis and interpretation for a world history that moves beyond, or at least attempts to encapsulate more than a “Western viewpoint,” in terms of learning more fully about not only who we were, but also whom we may yet become.[6]
The events of September 11 did not trigger this increased interest in world history. In conjunction with the end of the cold war, historiography of the world at large—particularly in the regions known as “Asia,” “Latin America,” and “Africa”[7]—has been revitalized as historians turn their attention to these heretofore neglected areas in search of new themes, stories, and lessons to be learned. For, even if one accepts the premise that history is at an end, these regions have much to offer in terms of incorporating their (both initial and continuing) experiences and interactions with the “final model of human civilization” (i.e., The West). This essay explores some of these historiographical themes and trends, as well as offers a suggestion—albeit a hopeful and admittedly “moralistic” one—as to where the field ought to head and what “benefits” could emerge from its doing so. Specifically, I suggest it is time for the world historian to step up and lead the way in saving the planet.[8] This rescue could be accomplished by incorporating the broad perspectives gained from intensive study of other regions’ histories—along with the “catalyst” events of September 11—to not only take us back to the geographical “roots” of civilization (i.e., Mesopotamia and the Middle East) to explore ways of ending the constant warfare and wholesale destruction of civilization that continues there today, but also to help redefine history as a whole. I would posit that it is against the nature of history to simply accept the triumphalism of global capitalism and the crowning of a “victorious” human organizational system (i.e., a limited, pluralistic, democratic form of government). Instead, we should incorporate the lessons of this system—and what it has wrought on the actual, physical space we live in/on (i.e., the Earth; i.e., “nature”)—into lessons from other systems. In this way we can gain a fuller perspective on how we can incorporate the wonders of this “triumph” into re-creating a world that provides not only “material” benefits for all, but also “spiritual” or “soul-nourishing” benefits. Most importantly, we should discern how to provide these benefits without continuing to leave so many behind—and without continuing to destroy our habitat. In sum, how can we now go “back to the future” and begin history again with its first global citizen?
Whatever one’s opinions of economic history (e.g., re: how “interesting” or “useful” it is), a world historian today would be hard pressed to escape studying it to at least some extent—at least if said historian wished to remain within the cadre of what constitutes “well-versed world historians.” This is due to the fact that economic history not only became a major sub-field of historiography well before this current “craze” of world history interest, but also because economic history appears to be increasingly “insinuating itself” as the predominant field of historiography. Economic history is the main, if not only, focus in a wide variety of recent world historical works, such as Philip D. Curtin’s The World and the West, R. Bin Wong’s China Transformed, and Timothy Burke’s Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women.[9]
There are several reasons for an increasing emphasis on economic history as the “flavor of the month” in world historiography. For example, whether or not one “approves” of the Western economic system’s impact on the world at large, it is nevertheless difficult to convincingly argue that said impact does not exist. All of the works mentioned above address the issue of impact, some more specifically than others (e.g., Curtin), and argue that regardless of social-theoretical debates labeling the impact as “harmful” or “negative,” or—conversely—as either “benign” or “positive,” economic history should be studied in order to get the more comprehensive picture normally required in world historiography. Other reasons that economic history is enjoying a “heyday” include: an inescapable preference of Western historians (still the predominant contributors to world historiography) based on their cultural background,[10] the fact that economic history lends itself well to macro-historiography (an important component of world historiography); and the fact that economic history “offers about the biggest contrast to political history that can be imagined.”[11] This final point resonates because another emerging trend in world historiography is the effort to view history from different perspectives, utilizing a variety of approaches and analyses (e.g., moving away from the “Great Man” approach to history[12]).
The works mentioned above provide excellent examples of the differing approaches one can take to economic history, and highlight a variety of options regarding scope and analysis. For example, Burke’s work provides a study of the nature and role of commodities (i.e., toiletries), consumption, and needs in modern Zimbabwe—particularly in terms of the role consumption played in the development and maintenance of colonial domination. There are numerous compelling anecdotes in the work that show the clash between Western (i.e., “modern”[13]) marketing techniques and native preconceptions. More importantly, the book is “refreshingly”[14] illuminative as to how Western marketing of seemingly innocuous products can be an effective tool for demonstrating the “superiority” of the Western system to “ignorant savages.” Yet, tellingly, the book’s thesis is that, although the concept of “new needs” was pivotal in the development of Zimbabwe’s colonial political economy, the production of needs was less an imposition from above than a complex process impacted as much by the colonized as the colonizers.[15]
Burke’s work also highlights a trend in world historiography that is particularly pertinent to studies in Africa: utilizing oral history. Oral history provides a good example of sources heretofore given less “cachet” in Western historiography. As historian Gwyn Prins has noted,[16] oral history is still often viewed as less satisfactory from a Western viewpoint, and thus highlights an issue yet to be fully reconciled within the field. Yet, without this “sourcing option,” it would be difficult for Burke to illustrate how something as relatively limited as the history of toiletries in a particular region during a certain era can yield insight into race, gender, health, home life, and more on a broad historical and societal scale. In the end, Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women provides a nice building block for a New World History Tower.
Flipping the Script—But Only On Its Side
R. Bin Wong’s China Transformed is an excellent example of what may ultimately be the most “beneficial” of current trends in world historiography: the struggle to develop “post-theoretical” models of analysis for studying world history on a macro scale. Such a model would be useful not only for the new lessons we could glean from the past, but for potential insights we can gain into the future. Wong posits that a “sustained comparison”[17] approach to history—one that doesn’t simply discard admittedly inadequate Eurocentric views of the world—can not only suggest new ways of interpreting historical change, but also identify subjects for new research and contribute to a new social theory that incorporates both European and other regions’ historical pasts. In a recent article, historian Gale Stokes calls this “system-neutral” analysis and labels Wong a practitioner of a “new world history”—similar to the updated historiography being called for in this paper.[18] This new world history is not flipping the script so much as simply turning it on its side.
Attempting such an endeavor is fraught with challenges, however—particularly in regards to the inherent difficulty in escaping cultural bias. Still, Wong successfully articulates methods that provide fascinating insights through a comparative history of the West and China. His work also offers the promise of new insights to be gleaned by utilizing these approaches to revisit other historical eras and entities. For example, after noting historiography’s “preference” for studying change rather than the absence of such, Wong shows how an analysis of why continuity occurs, rather than change, can be as illuminating. The work also offers compelling insights that emerge simply by replacing the “typical” approach of retrospective analysis with prospective analysis.[19]
Finally, Wong provides an intriguing example of how dramatically perspectives can change by just flipping the subject and object of “normal” comparisons (e.g., viewing Western history in comparison with a Chinese “standard” instead of vice-versa). This “re-formulation” of perspectives leads to compelling suggestions such as the one wherein Wong posits (albeit rather timidly) that current unifying trends in Europe could actually suggest a “catching up” with ideology formulated in China centuries ago.[20] Thus, if anywhere modernization might turn out in the end not to mean “westernization,” it could be in China. Of course, it should now be a given that Africans and Asians (among others) have their own histories—and that these can be as rich and varied as European or “Western” histories.[21] But Historian Hank Wesserling goes on to ask “whether we can stop here and simply consider world history as the sum of a great number of autonomous regional histories.”[22] He immediately suggests that most historians would agree that we should, in fact, try to do more. But what? And how much more?
The Beginning of the End of Triumphalism?
The events of September 11 certainly give credence to Philip D. Curtin’s assertion that although “humans have discovered more efficient ways of doing things . . . there is no evidence that they are wiser than their ancestors in deciding what to do with their new abilities.”[23] Arab “terrorists’”[24] diabolically clever utilization of “Western technology” to destroy “a temple to Western economic triumphalism” chillingly gives lie to historian David Landes’s contention that a systematic resistance to learning from other cultures is what continues to “hold back” Arab countries.[25] Unfortunately, until the masterminds of this attack are (if ever) brought to “justice,” one can only guess at their motives: i.e., was the attack in response to continued “Western imperialism” in Iraq? An attempt to ignite the conflagration of a global Jihad? Perhaps, metaphorically, it is simply an angry counter to Francis Fukuyama’s contention that, with the “triumph” of market economics and western democracy, “the end of history” can now be declared. Despite my admittedly somewhat facetious inclusion of this last possible motive, it is relatively safe to assume that one “collateral” result of this amazingly well-orchestrated attack will be a hastily arranged, more prominent, place at the world historical table for history of the Middle East.
As Mr. Wesserling stated, however, a simple, metaphorical move from the “kids’ table” to the “adults’ table” is not enough. Fortunately, as shown in this essay, world historians are suggesting that new theoretical frameworks need to be developed to move beyond Western perceptual biases—that to fully do justice to the burgeoning field of world history, either “post theoretical” analyses need to be developed and articulated, or a concerted effort to use such frameworks as “system neutral” analyses or “reciprocal comparisons” should be made. Furthermore, and conveniently relative to the ongoing, dramatic debate surrounding Arab motives for striking at “the West,” historians are suggesting that world historiography be studied to assess the significance of “Western domination” on the rest of the world. So while a “modern,” “civilized” (i.e., “Western”) historian could not possibly approve of the method utilized by the terrorists to vent their frustration over perceived western hegemony, said historian can still appreciate the intensified world historiography that will result from these events.
What direction that historiography will take remains to be seen. Surely, as stated, many will “go back to the future”—to the region wherefrom Western civilization traces its origins. There, in the “Middle East” (as elsewhere), a wealth of world historiographical themes and sub-fields are available for utilization and interpretation. Some fields, such as science,[26] anthropology, and archaeology, were not covered in this essay—others, such as aspects of culture and gender, were. All provide virtually limitless possibilities. As world historiography incorporates these additions, hopefully through the use of “post-theoretical” frameworks, macro studies can then be produced that articulate a new “global” perspective and understanding. Perhaps a perspective or understanding could even emerge that leads to an end of the seemingly endless bloodshed in the cradle of civilization. A perspective that goes beyond/rises above the West’s “economic triumphalism” of high productivity and consumption to ensure that all global citizens live in harmony (but with “stuff”) while no longer continuing to tear up the planet. For, ultimately, if we end up destroying the earth, there will be no “winner.”
David
Wallace received his B.A., Honors Program, from San Francisco State
University. After a two year stint in the U.S.
Peace Corps (Kazakhstan),
and
some graduate work at SFSU, he is now in the process of relocating to
Burlington,
Vermont to explore various career options and conduct
genealogical
and historical research.
[1] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
[2] Lewis Lapham, “Res Publica,” Harper’s Magazine 303: 1819 (December 2001): 8-11.
[3] Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, California, 1990).
[4] San Francisco Chronicle 12 September 2001.
[5] J.M. Roberts, ed., History of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
[6] The Holy Grail for some (idealistic?) historians.
[7] Quotes in homage to the continuing, and expanding, impact of the “linguistic turn” in world historiography.
[8] For those of you already huffing indignantly over my “informal” style, this includes letting go of the field’s inexplicable attachment to dry-as-dust prose.
[9] Philip D. Curtin, The World & the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2000); R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Cornell University Press, 1997); Timothy Burke, Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, & Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 1996).
[10] This issue is addressed quite nicely, if a bit too “soul-searchingly,” in Wong’s work.
[11] John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods & New Directions in the Study of Modern History (New York: Longman, Inc., 1991), 94.
[12] In sum, the Great Man approach studies history in relation to epochs tied to major events or “great men” (e.g., Caesar, FDR, Mao Tse-Tung, etc.). For more on this topic, see Alan Knight, “Latin America,” in Michael Bentley, ed., Companion to Historiography (New York: Routledge, 1997).
[13] Emphasis—and intended irony—mine.
[14] i.e., even more refreshing than the soap being peddled to the “dirty” locals.
[15] For a similar, yet obverse distinction/thesis claiming that individuals appear as “products” as much as creators of their historical environment, see Knight.
[16] Gwyn Prins, “Oral History,” in Peter Burke, ed., New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2001), 120-152.
[17] Wong, 7.
[18] Gale Stokes, “The Fates of Human Societies: A Review of Recent Macrohistories,” American Historical Review 106: 2 (April 2001): 508-525.
[19] That is, rather than going back in time to “explain” how things came about, one “begins” from a point in the past and “comes forward” to study how/why things evolved. This is a seemingly subtle distinction with, I believe, almost limitless possibilities if applied diligently. It calls to mind the old chestnut that it is often difficult to remember that long ago events were once “in the future.”
[20] Wong, 284.
[21] For reasons no doubt soon to be “explained” by historians, history of the Middle East—at least pre-September 11—has yet to be significantly integrated (along with histories of Africa, Asia, and Latin America) into the “maturing” field of world historiography. Fortunately, this “oversight” can be corrected even as world historians debate the purpose and direction of the field.
[22] Hank Wesserling, “Overseas History,” in Peter Burke, 76.
[23] Curtin, x.
[24] Rather than consistently using the awkward “suspected Arab terrorists” nomenclature (which I nonetheless adhere to in principle), I am—admittedly somewhat lazily and for the sake of “fluidity of prose”—taking advantage of the new “Ashcroftian” presumption of guilt paradigm.
[25] David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1998).
[26] Because of its supposed concern with “objectivity,” science is viewed—as is economics—as a particularly appropriate field of study for helping to paint a more complete, less “judgmental,” picture of history. An excellent book that shows the peril in accepting this notion is Nancy Leys Stepan’s The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).