The man who serves humanity best, is he who, rooted in his own nation, develops his spiritual and intellectual gifts to their fullest extent and thus, growing beyond the confines of his country, contributes to the whole of mankind.
Stresemann in September 1926 when Germany entered the League of Nations.
As one who knew him well through difficult years, who saw him triumph over grave opposition from without and from within, I hold that Germany has never had a wiser or a more courageous adviser.
Lord D'Abernon, British ambassador in Berlin, wrote this epitaph for Stresemann 1930.
[Stresemann] was respected by other nations as a great statesman, a loyal partner and a true friend of peace.
Sir Austen Chamberlain, 1935.
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929) and his foreign policy from 1923 to 1929. How much of a "good European" was the German foreign minister? "One of history's unsolved riddles," as Henry Kissinger called it, 1 was what attracted the attention of historians to Stresserman, especially since his premature death in 1929 preceded the Nazi assault. In Nazi Germany, Stresemann was in eclipse for a dozen years. The National Socialists hated him and tried with fanatical thoroughness to erase his memory. Young people who went through school or university during the Hitler era never heard his name, and many would show blank faces when he or the Locarno policy were mentioned.2
In spite of the efforts by the Nazis, beginning in 1933, it was difficult to discredit Stresemann. Most of the early writings, especially before World War II, were highly laudatory.3 They singled out his great ability as a statesman: the reorientation of Germany's foreign relations toward restoring it to its former position of power; the evacuation of the Ruhr in 1924; the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925, which confirmed the common borders between Germany, France, and Belgium; the establishment of the Rhineland as a neutral area; German admission to the League of Nations in 1926; and his crowning award, the 1926 Nobel Peace prize.
The problem is that writers made accusations of ambition and duplicity against Stresemann. These did not deny Stresemann's ability or minimize his achievement. What they felt uneasy about were his motives and aims, which to some critics seemed not fundamentally different from those of Adolf Hitler.4 This paper is an attempt to draw together the best available scholarship, both recent and not so recent, and from international and diplomatic historians, into a general interpretation. And, to not disturb the narrative, a topical approach was preferred, along with extensive footnoting to supplement the commentary and assessment. Of particular importance is the treatment of Stresemann in international politics. Was Stresemann an advocate of international understanding or a precursor to the Nazi assault?
Stresemann looked like a typical German petite bourgeois who recognized the relation of economics to politics. His narrow circle constituted perhaps the only successful, representatively bourgeois political group of the entire era.5 Before 1914 he had been an enthusiastic admirer of William II and as member of the Reichstag during the war years, he had been a rabid nationalist and annexationist and he supported the high command in all its demands.6 But Stresemann had been deeply shaken by the way the military leaders had deceived themselves and the German people about their chances in the war. He became convinced that a reorganization of German political life on a democratic basis was unavoidable, and when the republican German Democratic party failed to accept him, he founded his own party, the German People's Party, which aimed at the restoration of the monarchy but accepted the parliamentary system of government.
The Ruhr occupation and German passive resistance to French exploitation of the country's industrial heart had disastrous political and economic results. As German industrialists were anxious to reknit economic relations in the Rhineland, French industrialists were more inclined to negotiate because they believed that Stresemann was prepared to move to a policy of fulfillment. And, of course, Stresemann did understand that passive resistance could not be continued for long, but he resisted their pressures, hoping to maneuver the French into making some special concessions in exchange for the formal abandonment of passive resistance. Stresemann also knew that France had suffered even more than Germany from the war, that war pensions and reconstruction work in the eastern provinces were eating deeply into French revenues, and that Poincare knew he might have to appeal to London and Washington for loans at any time.7
Any attempt on our part to take advantage of the international situation in order to play off one Ally against another would be an act of folly which would recoil upon ourselves. (Cheers from the Right, in the Middle and the United Democrats. Deputy v.Graefe-Mecklenburg: it is still more foolish to say so.) Herr v. Graefe, that is an opinion to which I cannot subscribe.---Stresemann, 6th October, 1923 - Speech in the Reichstag.8
In asserting the hopelessness of the contest over the Ruhr, Stresemann risked his popularity, but he was aware that by assuming leadership in this matter he was opening the door to a positive role for himself in the political life of the Weimar Republic. In a number of speeches made all over Germany during the early summer of 1923, he prepared the public for the necessity of abandoning the Ruhr struggle.9 Henry Bretton noted the fact that Stresemann also enjoyed the confidence of the British Ambassador at Berlin, Lord D' Abernon, which had some bearing on his appointment. Bretton wrote that Germany was in need of an ally against France, and Britain had on several occasions shown a tendency to support the German point of view.10 A German chancellor acceptable to Great Britain was a most valuable asset to German foreign relations at such critical times. And in August 1923, Stresemann became chancellor,11 with a program for stabilizing the German currency in the form of the Rentenmark and resuming the fulfillment policy with an agreement on reparations with the Allies in 1924, known as the Dawes Plan. Massive investment followed, mostly from the United States, which enabled German industry to recover almost to 1913 levels, despite the loss of resources and land in 1919. In an interview in early November 1924 with a correspondent of the Frankfurter Generalanzeiger, Stresemann said the Dawes Plan had helped the political climate and had even led some people to talk of the possibility of a United States of Europe. He was cautious, but he did express the view that there could be something of an "economic flowering" in Europe if national hates were bridled, economic cooperation restored, and Germany freed from the economic restraints of Versailles.12
To be sure, Stresemann was helped by the fact that the chaotic situation, which had developed in central Europe, was having a damaging economic effect throughout the continent. All the great powers now recognized that for the sake of their own economic stability some compromise about German reparations payments had to be worked out. In addition, Stresemann remained confident that the nationalists would not wreck the Dawes Plan. It was well known that they were being subjected to heavy pressure on behalf of the measure by a number of special interest groups. Of these, the most important was the Army, which feared a leftist victory at the polls if the agreement was rejected, and industry, which was anxious to see the international loans go through.13 Consequently, the period between 1923 and 1929 saw a remarkable recovery and greater stability because of the influence exerted by Stresemann. In the 1920s, under Stresemann, Germany had already used her economy as a weapon in foreign policy; and in the 1930s this tradition of instrumentalizing economic affairs in the service of diplomacy continued.14
In the situation that Gustav Stresemann faced in January 1925, the objective of German foreign policy was virtually preordained: the prevention of a reversion to that French policy of force, which had been the basis of the Ruhr occupation of 1923. Resistance had failed, only compliance remained. But compliance necessitated cooperation and compromise. Under these circumstances, the German foreign minister launched his diplomatic offensive to negotiate a guarantee of the Rhineland frontier. There was a feeling among moderate elements in Germany and France that a large measure of understanding was possible, and nothing was doing so much to feed this feeling as the negotiations between Stresemann, Briand, and Chamberlain, anticipating a Rhineland Pact.15 Although Stresemann steadfastly refused to include the western boundaries of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the projected pact, the proposal was nonetheless being carefully studied in the chancelleries of Europe.16
Though Briand was trying hard to get at least the proposed arbitration treaty woven in with the Rhineland guarantee and the whole scheme placed within the framework of the League of Nations, he was now too deeply committed, emotionally and ideologically, to the goal of European pacification to reject any proposal that offered promise of a Franco-German rapprochement. Robert Grathwol wrote, "By August, Briand freely discussed with the German ambassador in Paris the possibilities of peaceful modification of the Polish-German frontier, and voiced his conviction that the existing Polish 'psychosis' could eventually be overcome once Germany took her place in the League Council and could speak on equal terms with the other European powers, and once Germany's natural economic influence and 'other factors' began to have their impact." "France", Briand assured the German ambassador, "certainly will not stand in the way of the realization of such possibilities in case they present themselves."17
British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain also entertained obvious thoughts of a modification of the eastern boundaries between Poland and Germany. Writing in mid-March to his ambassador in Berlin, he asserted:
es into the League, and plays her part there in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, I myself believe that within a reasonable number of years she will find herself in a position where her economic and commercial support is so necessary and her political friendship so desirable to Poland that, without having recourse to the League machinery, she will be able to make a friendly arrangement on her own account directly with the Poles. This is what Briand said to me and what other[s]...repeated. For the success of such a policy good will, patience, and tact are necessary.18
Moreover, Stresemann, who had been quick to sense the psychology of the Left Bloc, had a strong hand, and he was playing it brilliantly. On the one hand, he was playing to reassure the moderate elements everywhere, but especially in France, and on the other, he was endeavoring to dissuade his own countrymen from words and deeds that might provoke unnecessary anxieties abroad.19
The foreign policy of Stresemann, between 1923 and 1929, had focused on the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, and the army, under von Seeckt, had already begun to evade the military restrictions imposed on Germany in 1919. In a Reichstag speech of 18 May, 1925, Stresemann had complained that the Allied governments had not yet explained in detail just which violations of the disarmament regulations they were holding against Germany and he went on to accuse them of violating their own treaty by failing to evacuate Cologne. Briand was well aware that the detailed note concerning violations of the disarmament requirements was being withheld in hopes of avoiding further popular agitation in Germany during negotiations for a mutual security treaty, and he suspected the German foreign minister knew it, too. Consequently, Briand used the following words when addressing the French Senate a few days later:
M. Stresemann had to direct his speech not only to the delegates whom he was addressing, but also to the broader German public, without whose consent no government can act. One should therefore seek the reality of the fact behind the words. One must ignore those elements of his speech which betray the character of popular polemics and seek in the words of a statesman only those thoughts which point towards his real goals.20
How much Stresemann on his side worked against Seeckt is not clear, though there can be little doubt that the general's opposition was a source of constant concern to him. A good deal of valuable time and effort was spent in asserting the Foreign Ministry's position against Reichswehr interference, much of which interference was due to Seeckt's dislike and distrust of Stresemann.21 How far this suspicion and hostility were carried can be seen from the fact that as late as 1926, the Reichswehr Ministry tapped Stresemann's telephone lines, chiefly to check on his policy towards France.22
Despite the clear-cut imperatives of Stresemann's situation, the resultant politics of Locarno has been the subject of much criticism. The adverse assessment is frequently based on research into the Stresemann papers,23 particularly the work of Annelise Thimme, which cast in the context of the finassieren charge against Stresemann. This argument implies that his rapprochement with the west was really a blind to obscure from the Allies Stresemann's narrowly nationalistic intentions of revision in the east, an area where even war was an acceptable possibility.24 Indeed, when Aristide Briand first learned of the forth-coming publication of the Stresemann papers in 1930, he expressed his fears in February 1930 to the German ambassador von Hoesch that he was greatly disturbed by the prospect of indiscretions.25
If the Second Reich provided Hitler with at least some of his long-term objectives, the Weimar Republic helped shape his early approach. J. H. Morgan stated that, with Hitler's accession to power, there was no real break in the continuity of German policy and the difference between Hitler and his predecessors is not so great as it appears. Stresemann, before he took office, had inscribed on the program of Deutsche Volkspartei the "abolition" of the Treaty of Versailles and his substitution on his accession to power of the catchword "fulfillment" was merely a disguise for those sapping and mining operations against the Treaty which he initiated with the demand for withdrawal of the Control Commission and the evacuation of the Rhineland.26 Relying upon Germany's importance in Europe, and thinking in terms of international trade, he believed that the victorious powers could not easily afford to ignore or even destroy her. The price exacted by Stresemann for the Locarno Pact was not only the withdrawal of the Control Commission, but silence. He got it. It became "bad form" for any one to question whether Germany was, or was not, in a state of grace in the matter of disarmament.27
To assure a rapid return of defeated Germany to a position of first rank, he was prepared to utilize the resources of the young Soviet Republic and advised that friendly relations be maintained with the Bolsheviks.28 Stresemann skillfully used Germany's entry into the League both to increase his options toward the Soviet Union and to intensify German pressure on France for parity in armaments. Moscow took the hint and within a year of Locarno, in April 1926, a treaty of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed in Berlin. Having opted for the West and for democracy in 1919, Germany could regard herself as having been rebuffed by the West at Versailles. It was natural to reconsider the other option, alignment with Russia, without accepting communism. As a dissatisfied "revisionist" power, Russia could regard the League of Nations as an organization of the victors alone. The celebrated Treaty of Rapallo (1922) between Germany and Russia reflects this attitude.
France had no objection prior to the world war to concluding an alliance with the autocratically governed Russia of the Tsars, in spite of the democratic and republican form of her government and the constitutional differences between the two countries. The attitude of the French was a very sensible one from the point of view of their own interests. Similarly, Germany likewise cannot be blamed if today she is anxious to establish cordial economic and political relations with Soviet Russia.---Stresemann, 1st April 1926, broadcast address regarding the Treaty of Berlin.29
This rapprochement provided purely practical cooperation between the two armies in matters of supply and training, without political implications. General Hans von Seeckt, the commander in chief of the German army, did harbor ideas of a future extension of the agreements into the economic and political spheres, and for this reason welcomed Rapallo, but that might not mean that Rapallo reflected Seeckt's anti-French views. The best proof of the compatibility of Rapallo with a continuing, fundamentally western, orientation of German foreign policy is the welcome Stresemann gave to Rapallo when he was in the middle of negotiations with the western powers on reparations. Stresemann approved the military cooperation agreements between Germany and Russia, though as a right-of-center politician he, no more than Seeckt, had any use for Russian domestic politics. He believed that a strong army would strengthen his hand in negotiations to relieve Germany of the other disabilities imposed at Versailles. He believed even more strongly in Germany's capacity for economic recovery and expansion, provided a lessening of political tension, a better international climate, could be brought about. He followed the 1922 Treaty with Russia with another in 1926, participated in a collective defense pact with four other countries at Locarno in 1925, and took Germany into the League of Nations in 1926.30
Therefore Stresemann's first concern was to win confidence abroad in the peaceful aims of German foreign policy, even while he was secretly supporting rearmament in violation of Versailles. What he needed above all, in the short run, was to gain time. Stresemann's long-range aims, if he could succeed in gaining time, were to put an end to the Allied occupation of the Rhineland; obtain a tolerable solution to the reparations questions; recover Danzig and the Polish Corridor and seek restorations of territory in Upper Silesia; ultimately, unite with Austria; and gain German admission to the League of Nations as a means of achieving these other goals.
Stresemann had not abandoned nationalism, but was determined to pursue it realistically, in the tradition of Bismarck, not after the fashion in which he had once been a fanatical annexationist.31 One of the few things the men of Locarno agreed on during the first half of 1926 was the desirability of conducting negotiations by means of informal and secret meetings of the Locarno foreign ministers held during sessions of the League Council: "the Geneva tea parties."32 And during the year following Locarno, the idea of settling outstanding Franco-German differences by means of personal conversations, rather than through normal diplomatic channels, strongly attracted both Paris and Berlin. When the Treaty was initialed in October and again when it was signed in London in December 1925, Stresemann suggested to Briand that the two of them hold a private conversation in the near future.
Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann, foreign ministers of France and Germany, met at Thoiry 17 September, 1926. They discussed the Saar, German disarmament, Eupen-Malmedy, and the termination of Allied military occupation. The Locarno Treaties had been signed only a year before and Germany had entered the League of Nations. The meeting was well prepared and each delegate was at first backed by his government. The heart of the discussion was the Rhineland-reparations deal, a plan to reduce military occupation of the Rhine and ease the French financial difficulties.33 Neither country followed up the proposals.
Thoiry now represents only what might have been. So, no comprehensive settlement and no Franco-German entente issued from the luncheon at Thoiry. In late October, Paris and Berlin decided not to follow up Thoiry with discussion among French and German experts. On 11 November, Briand suspended all formal discussion of the Rhineland-reparation nexus. The matters of disarmament and Military Control were finally resolved in July 1927, and advance payment and evacuation were not agreed to until 1929. The Saar remained as determined by the Treaty of Versailles until 1935, and Eupen-Malmedy remained with Belgium until Hitler conquered it, along with the rest of Belgium and Northern France, in 1940.34
When Stresemann's papers became available, they seemed to contradict the benign estimation of him. They revealed a calculating practitioner of Realpolitik who pursued the traditional German national interest with ruthless persistence. For Stresemann, these interests were straightforward: to restore Germany to its pre-1914 stature, to dispose of the financial burdens of reparations, to attain military parity with France and Great Britain, to revise Germany's Eastern border, and to achieve the union (Anschluss) of Austria and Germany. Kissinger concluded that Stresemann was therefore not a "good European" in the post-World War II sense of the phrase but it would be more accurate to view Nazi excesses as an interruption of Stresemann's gradual and almost certainly peaceful progression of achieving a decisive role for his country in Europe.35
Hans Gatzke suggested that Stresemann was a great German statesman rather than the "honest dreamer of peace and apostle of reconciliation,"36 which some uncritical admirers made him out to be. Moreover, truly good Europeans are extremely rare, and one should least expect to find them among politicians of a defeated country in an age where nationalism was still a potent force. In this way, Stresemann becomes a more plausible figure when regarded as a great German statesman rather than a "good European." Stresemann died in 1929, a year in which Germany was suddenly confronted by economic catastrophe. Meanwhile, lurking in the background, and preparing to take advantage of any such change of fortune, were Hitler and the Nazis.
Jessie Lewis III earned his B. A. in History from San Francisco State University in 1998. He was President of the San Francisco State University for the academic year 1999-2000. Jessie was part of the editorial staff of the 1999 issue of Ex Post Facto, and served as Managing Co-editor for this issue. He is planning to graduate with a M. A. in the Fall 2000 semester. His focus is Modern European History.
1 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy
(New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1994), 284. Chapter 11, titled
"Stresemann and the Re-emergence of the Vanquished," provides
analyses of the path of diplomacy during the 1920s. Kissinger argued that
unlike his nationalist critics and quite contrary to the Nazis, Stresemann
relied on patience, compromise, and the blessing of European consensus to
achieve a decisive role for his country. Stresemann's premature death has left
us with "the unsolved riddles," and that like the President of Egypt,
Sadat Hussein, Stresemann tried to drive a wedge between his adversary and its
friends by fulfilling reasonable demands, and, eventually turning into an
apostle of peace. In contrast, Kissinger believes Stresemann good, appeasement
in the 1930s bad.
2 Felix E. Hirsch, "Stresemann in Historical
Perspective," Review of Politics [University of Notre Dame] July 1953:
360-77.
3 Hans W. Gatzke, "Gustav Stresemann: A Bibliographical
Article," Journal of Modern History 1964 36 (1): 1-13. This article
comments on the sources which have become available from 1953 to 1964 as well
as the scholarly publications based on that material.
4 Ibid., 1.
5 David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political
Economy in Crisis (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 11. The bourgeois
governments of 1924-8, under Stresemann, Marx, and Luther, were able to
compromise and maneuver as much as they did only at the expense of the parties
which constituted the various coalitions.
6 Felix Gilbert and David Clay Large, The End of the European Era
1890 to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 196-7.
7 Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932
(University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 30. Of considerable significance
was the steady increase in contacts between business leaders especially across
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Hugo Stinnes, Otto Wolff, Paul
Silverberg, Albert Voegler, and others maneuvered feverishly and kept in touch
with Emil Mayrisch, Luxembourg's leading industrialist, who was doing his best
to get French and German businessmen together for the purpose of initiating
meaningful and promising negotiations.
8 Gustav Stresmann, Essays and Speeches on Various Subjects (New
York: Books for Libraries Press, 1930), 166.
9 Ibid., 197.
10 Henry Bretton, Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles: A
Fight for Reason (Stanford University Press, 1953), 8.
11 Ibid., 9. The Stresemann cabinet lasted one hundred days. It
fell primarily because the chancellor was convinced that intra- and interparty
conflicts over domestic issues had weakened the Great Coalition to the point
where the foreign minister could no longer count on a firm parliamentary
backing for his policy. Stresemann the chancellor was sacrificed to Stresemann
the foreign minister.
12 Pegg, 36. See the editorial "Stresemann und
Herriot," Vossische Zeitung, 4 Nov. 1924.
13 Henry Ashby Turner, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar
Republic (Princeton University Press, 1963), 172. In view of the influence the
Army and industry commanded within the DNVP, Stresemann apparently concluded
that their efforts would suffice to shift the balance within the rightist party
in favor of those who were willing to accept the Plan.
14 Harold James, The German Slump: Politics and Economics
1924-1936 (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986), 397. James believes that the
complicated regulations affecting currency, exports and debt repayment gave
Germany a useful level to pull on in international diplomacy.
15 See Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West
1925-1929 (1972), 3. Jacobson describes that on October 16, 1925, the place was
Locarno, a small lakeside resort in southeastern Switzerland; and what evoked
the "orgiastic gush," were the feelings of goodwill, the hopes for
the future, and the enthusiasm over what had been accomplished on that day when
the representatives of seven European powers initialed five agreements called
the Treaties of Locarno.
16 Pegg, 48. Even La Paix parle droit and L'Europe nouvelle
expressed fear that Stresemann's real purpose was a free hand for Germany in
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
17 Z.J. Gasiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland before
Locarno," Journal of Central European Affairs 18 (April 1958): 43.
Microframes 571873-74 of the National Archives films of the German foreign
office documents. Qted. in Robert Grathwol, "Gustav Stresemann:
Reflections on his Foreign Policy," Journal of Modern History 1973 45 (1):
53.
18 Schinkel, 148, quoting from Sir Charles Petrie's biography of
Austen Chamberlain (2:268) qtd. in Robert Grathwol, 54. In late March,
Chamberlain even suggested indirectly in the House of Commons that Poland could
perform a great service for European peace by freely entering into negotiations
to resolve the question of her boundaries.
19 Ibid., 47-8.
20 Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic (Harvard
University Press, 1963 v2) 9. This was spoken like a statesman and, at the same
time, with the skill of an experienced tactician who knows how to take the wind
out of his own critics' sails.
21 Hans Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (The
John Hopkins University Press, 1954), 13.
22 Ibid., 13-14. quoted from Stresemann's "Nachlass,"
3100/7138/149451.
23 Gustav Stresemann, Vermachtnis: Der Nachlass im drei Banden
(Berlin, 1932-33). Henry Bernhard was Stresemann's long-time trusted political
secretary who served as editor of the three volumes of Stresemann's papers.
Throughout, Bernhard tried to be cautious and excluded certain top-secret
documents and omitted passages in others which either he or the Wilhelmstrasse
considered to be of a potentially explosive nature. It is also apparent that in
this controversy the basic source material used has been the Stresemann
Vermachtnis, the publication of which, despite the good intentions of its
editor, has probably raised more questions than it has settled.
24 Robert Grathwol, 54. Reviews interpretations of the foreign
policy of Stresemann and accusations against him of ambition and duplicity by
writers such as Annelise Thimme because of the narrow focus on the Stresemann
papers. Grathwol is referring to Annelise Thimme's "Gustav Stresemann,
Legende und Wirklichkeit," Historische Zeitschrift 181 (April 1956):
331ff., for a discussion of Stresemann's letter to Crown Prince Wilhelm, from
which the finassieren controversy stems. Miss Thimme's contentions have been
thoroughly criticized and refuted in this article.
25 Hirsch, 362. Briand had conducted his personal conversations
with Stresemann on a level of utmost confidence and frankness and might have
said some things not suited for publication.
26 J. H. Morgan, Assize of Arms: The Disarmament of Germany and
Her Rearmament 1919-1939 (Oxford University Press, 1946), 302-3.
27 Ibid., xiii. To have proceeded, under such circumstances,
with the publication of a history of the attempt to disarm her under the Treaty
of Versailles would have involved such a revelation of the bad faith of
Germany, in her all too successful obstruction to the work of the Control
Commission, as the amount, in the language of diplomacy, to an unfriendly act;
particularly in view of her spectacular entry into the comity of the League of
Nations. The truth was too blunt...to a pacifist world in a state of ecstasy,
bordering on hysteria, over the signature of the Pact.
28 Bretton, 25-6.
29 Stresemann, 261.
30 Stephen J. Lee, The European Dictatorships 1918-1945 (New
York: Metheun, 1987), 139.
31 Gerhard Rempel, The Weimar Republic II: Foreign Policy
Problems (Western New England College) N.p.: n.p.,n.d.
32 Jon Jacobson, Conduct of Locarno Diplomacy, op. Cit., 68-70.
qtd. in Jon Jacobson and John T. Walker, "The Impulse for a Franco-German
Entente: The Origins of the Thoiry Conferences, 1926," Journal of
Contemporary History [Great Britain] 1975 10 (1): 157-81.
33 Ibid., 175.
34 Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West
1925-1929 (Princeton University Press, 1972), 89-90, 134, 343-6.
35 Kissinger, 283-4.
36 Gatzke, 115.
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