Drifting Away From the ‘Cult
of Bismarck’:
The Historiography of
Bismarck as a Diplomatist
Ian M. Livie
The Historiography of Prince Otto Von Bismarck’s diplomatic career is one which leads slowly away from the idealized portraits of Bismarck as diplomatist forged after World War I through a protracted debate over the specific issues of policy. Early works in this field etch a portrait of Bismarck as a foreign policy genius. That image remained relatively unchallenged as even his harshest critics became ensnared in the charm of Bismarck’s perceived diplomatic astuteness. It is not until the late 1960s that more articulate and convincing critiques of Bismarck’s policies, and Bismarck himself, emerged, stemming the tide of the earlier laudatory arguments by Bismarck’s advocates. These critiques, while not casting off many of the traditional images that accompany Bismarck’s historical persona, display a development towards a more realistic portrait of Bismarck as statesman.
The end of the First World
War brought with it a flurry of scholarship in German diplomatic history of the
second half of the 19th century.
This was prompted presumably by the desire of historians to better
understand the circumstances that produced the war. Another event that fueled this emerging interest in the diplomacy
of Bismarck was the effort led by Friedrich Thimme that resulted in the release
of the records of the foreign office for the years 1871 to 1914.[1] The release of these documents provided a
new information foundation to build an effective history of early Imperial
German diplomacy.[2]
These events assisted in the
emergence of a school of thought that put forth a positive view of Bismarck’s
diplomatic career. This movement
emerged in the pages of historical works of primarily German authors who drew
from Thimme’s work,[3] as well as
pre-war studies that focused on the legacy of realpolitik and the era of unification.[4] This school of thought is best exemplified
in the work of Erich Brandenburg, who wrote From
Bismarck to the World War in 1927, based much of his analysis on the
retrieved documents of the foreign office.[5] The book paints a portrait of Bismarck as a
diplomatist who was primarily concerned with peace and stability in Europe.[6] His policy is portrayed as a stabilizing
force within Europe. Brandenburg
contends that Bismarck’s successors are liable for the failure of that balance.[7]
Brandenburg’s effort can be seen largely as an argument for a German interest
in European diplomatic and military balance to counter claims of German
negligence and war guilt brought up by World War I. The deeper message of Brandenburg’s effort is to forge a portrait
of Bismarck as a heroic figure whose actions were centered on the advancement
of German interests through peace.
While Brandenburg
illustrates the perspective of some German historians, works from outside the
German context depict a somewhat similar representation of Bismarck with a far
less nationalistic mode of argumentation.
William L. Langer’s writings in the early 1930’s represent Bismarck as
the answer to, and not the cause of, problems in Europe. In European
Alliances and Alignment 1871-1890, Langer contends that Bismarck’s foreign
policy was as a force for peace in Europe.[8] Moreover, Langer characterizes Bismarck’s
diplomacy as primarily defensive in nature, and as a system that was discarded
by his successors.[9] Not unlike the German school of thought from
which Brandenburg sprung, Langer characterizes Bismarck as a reluctant
colonialist who was at the helm of European politics.[10] In The
Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902 Langer states, “Rarely had one figure so
dominated diplomacy for so long a period.”[11] Langer contends that Bismarck was not an
infallible diplomatist, which is absent from Brandenburg’s analysis, but still
affirms the power and the wisdom of Bismarckian diplomatic thought and
Bismarck’s role in the implementation of that thought.[12]
Despite some significant
differences in the point of attack and structure, Langer produces a firm
argument for Bismarck’s skills as a diplomatist, and as a figure that shaped
the very nature of European politics similar to that of the early German school
evidenced in Brandenburg. Yet, as Brandenburg and his contemporaries rendered
the image of Bismarck’s diplomatic wisdom, a dissenting voice could be heard in
the distance. Joseph Vincent Fuller, in
his book Bismarck’s Diplomacy at its
Zenith, provides the first post-war historical critique of merit depicting
the foreign policy of Bismarck as lacking and eventually destructive. The book, written against the prevailing
views of Bismarck’s foreign policy provided by biographers, as well as Bismarck
himself, provides an excellent example of early formulations of
Anti-Bismarckian thought.[13] From the beginning, Fuller makes it clear
that the successors to Bismarck followed his program “without breaking the
thread of the narrative.”[14] Fuller attacks Bismarck’s statements
regarding policy as an assortment of ambiguous and misleading statements,
lacking a singular character or intent.[15] Fuller states that Bismarck’s remarks “often
conflict with each other and the facts.”[16] Fuller is quick to critique Bismarck’s
policies as being riddled with flaws, but he is also quick to praise in the
essence of his argument. Fuller writes,
“Bismarck’s performance was, when we appreciate the complex difficulties, a
consummate one.”[17] Fuller creates an overall impression of
Bismarck as a figure of respect and tempered admiration, negating in some
respects his critiques of Bismarck’s policy.
This theme of Bismarck
“worship” within the anti-Bismarckian camp continues in the work of Mary Evelyn
Townsend, who critiques Bismarck’s foreign policy as conducive to
expansionistic colonialism.[18] In The
Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire; 1884-1918, Townsend contends
Bismarck cast himself as an imperial figure whose foreign policy was confounded
by contradictions and miscues.[19] This approach parallels the Anti-Bismarckian
school of thought set forth by Fuller that Bismarck’s foreign policy was
contradictory, but it also relates a similar message of Bismarck as embodying
“consummate skill in the conduct of foreign affairs.”[20] In this way, both authors attack Bismarck’s
policy only at specific points, while peppering that analysis with praise for
the man they are condemning.
In the mirroring of minor
praise within the writing of Fuller and Townsend, a hint of consensus emerges
around the school of thought that held that Bismarck was a brilliant
diplomatist who made only certain specific mistakes in policy formulation. By the end of the 1930s, this type of mixed
analysis was just as evident in advocates of Bismarck, as illustrated in the
works of Raymond James Sontag. Sontag’s 1938 book Germany and England: Background to Conflict 1848-1894 opened the
salvo on critiques of Bismarck’s insensitivity “to the sympathies and
antipathies of public opinion.”[21] This critique of Bismarck as unyielding to
the voice of public opinion was tempered by a general picture of Bismarck as a
master diplomat. Sontag depicts a
Bismarck guided by “luck, genius, and a defensive policy.”[22] The latter point, of “defensive policy” as
inherently Bismarckian, is present throughout the works of Bismarck’s
advocates, as it attempts to reconcile the complicated problem of
responsibility over World War I. This generally
positive characterization of Bismarck as diplomatist can be found in other
authors following the work of Sontag, such as Erich Eyck[23]
and Gordon A. Craig, whom draw specifically on Sontag’s work as a basis for
analysis.[24]
By 1958, the time Gordon
Craig wrote From Bismarck to Adenduar,
A. J. P. Taylor had already created yet another endorsing depiction of Bismarck
as a diplomatic figure, tempering his argument with the balanced rhetoric of
Sontag and Craig, but coming to far different conclusions on specific issues. In Bismarck:
the Man and the Statesman, Taylor characterizes Bismarck as an individual
who “disliked war and feared it,”[25]
depicting Bismarck as a force for peace.
Where Taylor differs from the Sontag-Craig synthesis is the matter of
Bismarck’s attitude and responsiveness to public opinion. Taylor maintains the opposite, stating in
his discussion of the North German Confederation era:
Those who maintain that he
(Bismarck) often disregarded public opinion fail to see that, whereas between 1862
and 1866 his political career depended on being on bad terms with the liberals,
now their support was essential for his political success.[26]
Yet, while disagreeing on this point, Taylor echoes
the works of Sontag, Craig, Langer and Brandenburg with his consistent praise
for the diplomatic skills of Bismarck, attempting to “explain away” problems
pointed out by anti-Bismarckian scholars, such as the apparent contradictions
in Bismarckian policy and “momentary shifts” in course.[27]
The work of Taylor, Sontag,
and others, building on the ideas set forth by the school of German historical
thought epitomized by Brandenburg, created a clear consensus among Bismarckians
that Bismarck was not perfect, but that he was a positive force in German
foreign policy. By the beginning of
1960s, this consensus came under fire once again, but with a far different
character from previous arguments.
These attacks were far more serious than those mounted by Fuller and
Townsend as they painted Bismarck as a darker, albeit pivotal figure in German
Foreign policy. Foremost among these works were Otto Plfanze’s Bismarck and the Development of Germany,
which attacked Bismarck’s state-building efforts during the period of
unification. Not unlike previous
critics, Pflanze directly questions Bismarck’s policy as conducive to tension
in Europe, countering the notion of Bismarck’s Germany as “an essentially
healthy institution.”[28] Pflanze goes further, characterizing the
debate among historians regarding Bismarck’s role in the events which led up to
both World Wars as ignoring Germany’s unique “historical development.”[29] Yet, Pflanze fails to blame Bismarck
specifically, and praises him in manner not dissimilar from Taylor, Sontag and
Fuller.[30]
By the end of the 1960s,
varied critiques of Bismarckian foreign policy mirrored Pflanze’s model.
Articulated by W. M. Simon and others, the focus became more and more the rise
of the German problem as beginning with the institution of Bismarck’s control
over foreign policy and political structure. Simon contends that Bismarck’s foreign policy failures were due to
the structure of the German imperial state.[31] Bruce Waller, in Bismarck at the Crossroads offers a comparable critique to that of
Simon and Pflanze, acknowledging the significance of Bismarck as a theorist,
but critiquing his foreign policy practice as inconstant[32]
and lacking a “steady hand.”[33]
It was in the 1970’s that
true movement against the idol of Bismarck as diplomatist gathered rhetorical
energy. On the heels of the emergence
of a new wave of revisionist historical work, authors like David Calleo, in The German Problem Reconsidered, began
to challenge the personal significance of Bismarck and his “celebrated foreign
policy.”[34] Calleo, by utilizing the texts of Sontag and
Taylor, bolsters his attack on Bismarck as diplomatist. Calleo’s argument marks the birth of a truly
separate school of thought from those that either affirmed or critiqued the
policies of Bismarck, but failed to remove him completely from his status as a
positive diplomatic figure.
This type of critique was
further maintained in Bruce Waller’s diplomatic biography entitled Bismarck. Waller develops further his initial criticism of Bismarck as
statesman, citing Bismarck’s personal shortcomings such as his apparent personal
vindictiveness.[35] Waller also develops an extended critique of
the pro-Bismarckian school of diplomatic history, citing Langer’s work of the
1930’s and criticizing its propensity to magnify Bismarck’s importance.[36]
While it is tempting to see the historiography of Bismarck’s diplomatic career as merely an enduring debate between his advocates and his detractors, I have endeavored to show that the issues surrounding the topic of historical scholarship are not as simple as a mere ideological split. There has been a definite development from the early scholarship of Brandenburg, Langer, and Townsend to the works of Calleo and Waller. It is this movement which reflects a more realistic portrait of Bismarck as diplomatist by portraying him as a remarkable person, but a person nonetheless.
Ian M. Livie is 23 years old Californian. He is working toward a Masters in History at San Francisco Sate University. Ian's primary focus is Late Modern European History.
[1] A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1955), 270.
[2] A. J. P. Taylor, “ The Rise and Fall of ‘Pure’ Diplomatic History” found in From The Boer War to the Cold War: Essays on Twentieth Century Europe (London: Penguin Books, 1996) 1-7. In addition to spurring this direction in historical research, it can be argued that the very birth of what is commonly referred to as diplomatic history emerged, in its modern incarnation, at this point.
[3] A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck, 270.
[4] Ibid., 268.
[5] Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), v.
[6] Ibid., 2.
[7] Ibid., 515.
[8] William L. Langer, European Alliance and Alignments (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1931), 503.
[9] Ibid., 505.
[10] Ibid., 504.
[11] William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1935), 3.
[12] William L. Langer, European Alliance, 504.
[13] Joseph Vincent Fuller, Bismarck’s Diplomacy at its Zenith (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922), vii.
[14] Ibid., 3.
[15] Ibid., 4.
[16] Ibid., 15.
[17] Ibid., 321.
[18] Mary Evelyn Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism; 1871-1885 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1921), 195.
[19] Mary Evelyn Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire; 1884-1918 (New York: Macmillan Press, 1930), 60.
[20] Ibid., 100.
[21] Raymond James Sontag, Germany and England: Background to Conflict (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1938), 253.
[22] Ibid., 66.
[23] Erich Eyck, Bismarck After Fifty Years (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1948), 3-13. This work provides a similar, although perhaps more judgmental assault on Bismarck.
[24] Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1958) 13-16; 26.
[25] A.J.P Taylor, Bismarck, 108. It is important to note that this piece is the only biography I have chosen to consult in analyzing the development of thought regarding Bismarck’s diplomatic career as it is the most well known and authoritative work on the subject.
[26] Ibid., 105.
[27] Ibid., 157-8.
[28] Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 8.
[29] Ibid., 7-8;14.
[30] Ibid., 14.
[31] W.M Simon, Germany in the Age of Bismarck (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), 86-7. It is important to understand Bismarck’s powerful role in the design of the imperial state. Simon’s critique of Bismarck goes beyond the realm of diplomacy to attack Bismarck’s role in the building of the German State.
[32] Bruce Waller, Bismarck at the Crossroads (London: The Athlone Press, 1974), 9.
[33] Ibid., 11.
[34] David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 10-11. The term revisionist is used to refer specifically to the revisionist movement of the 1970s rather than revisionism in general.
[35] Bruce Waller, Bismarck (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 46.
[36] Ibid., 45. Despite this critique, Waller cites Langer’s work as the most significant done on Bismarck’s diplomatic career.
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