Despite the considerable volume of scholarship that produced about the origins of the Second World War, several issues remain unresolved. One such issue is the nature of the United States involvement in the growing European crisis before September, 1939. What role did the United States play in the "choosing of sides" which pitted Great Britain and France against Nazi Germany?
Although the United States proclaimed that it would be neutral in any forthcoming conflict, recent "revisionist" historians, such as David Hoggan and Charles Tansill, have called this into question. These men claim that one of the indicators that pointed to secret involvement in pre-war European politics on the part of the United States was the drastic shift in policy by Great Britain towards Germany. The British Government, led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, had, previous to March 1939, followed a policy of "appeasement." At first, it appeared that Britain would continue to follow that policy. Upon German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain responded with his standard call for "appeasement":
In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee and, accordingly, the condition of affairs...which was always regarded by us as being only of a transitory nature, has now ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation... It is natural... that I should bitterly regret what has now occurred. But do not let us on that account be deflected from our course... The aim of this Government is... to promote [the desire for peace, goodwill and understanding] and to substitute the method of discussion for the method of force in the settlement of differences.
Chamberlain's course of action, however, changed drastically in a mere two weeks. Britain soon found itself in opposition to Germany. This opposition took the form of a guarantee to Poland, Britain's ally on Germany's eastern border. This guarantee promised British aid to Poland in the event of invasion by a foreign power:
I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
This shift in British policy towards Germany was both immediate and extreme; from peace at all costs to the preservation of Polish sovereignty at all costs. What caused this sudden change of heart?
According to Hoggan, the interference of the United States played a large role:
Bullitt [William, US Ambassador to France] told Lukasiewicz [Polish Ambassador to France] on March 25, 1939, that he had instructed American Ambassador Kennedy at London to tell Chamberlain that the United States was in full sympathy with the Polish position in the alliance question. Bullitt contacted Kennedy again on March 26th. Kennedy was instructed to tell Chamberlain that the United States hoped that Great Britain would go to war with Germany if the Danzig dispute produced an explosion between Germany and Poland. Bullitt told the Polish Ambassador that he was confident that the British response to these suggestions would be favorable.
This passage gives the impression that Ambassador Bullitt, apparently at the urging of highly-placed officials in the United States Government, was applying subtle pressure on Neville Chamberlain to take a stronger stance against Nazi aggression.
Elsewhere, Hoggan states that this pressure was perhaps not so subtle after all:
Raczynski [Polish Ambassador to Britain] warned Beck that Kennedy appeared to be privately somewhat out of step with Bullitt in Paris and Anthony Biddle in Warsaw, but that otherwise he was reluctantly carrying out his instructions from President Roosevelt to warn the British that their failure to act [in defense of Poland] would produce dire consequences.
Hoggan clearly states here that President Roosevelt had given Ambassador Kennedy a direct order to apply pressure on Chamberlain. According to Hoggan, this pressure took the form of a veiled threat.
Though he mentions no U.S. threat, Charles Tansill agrees with Hoggan that the Americans were influencing the British:
[Joseph] Kennedy then broke into the discourse to express the view that President Roosevelt had decided 'to go in with Chamberlain; whatever course Chamberlain desires to adopt, he (Roosevelt) would think right.' Several days after Ambassador Kennedy had so generously promised Prime Minister Chamberlain American armed assistance in the event that Britain was drawn into a second world war.
This passage actually takes Hoggan a step farther. Whereas Hoggan believes that the United States prodded Britain with vague threats and urgings, Tansill claims here that the U.S., through Kennedy, promised unqualified armed support for Great Britain.
Robert Herzstein also paints a picture of the United States Government as interventionalist. He claims that Roosevelt, through his ambassadors, especially A.J.D. Biddle, Jr. in Warsaw, advocated an "encirclement policy....[Biddle's] Polish contacts...had reason to be encouraged by Roosevelt's policy. Polish diplomats often assured Biddle that they would remain part of the antiaggression front." According to Herzstein, "Roosevelt encouraged this course....Roosevelt was...convey[ing] something to Biddle and his Polish friends: Do not yield." The key difference between Hoggan and Herzstein is an unwillingness on the part of the latter to stretch United States involvement to encompass the guarantee of March, 1939. Herzstein, in fact, alludes to the guarantee as "Chamberlain['s]...safety net for the Poles." However, it must be emphasized that FDR was definitely an anti-Nazi interventionalist in the eyes of Herzstein, who claims that "Roosevelt...continued to mistrust Chamberlain.... [h]e moved to take the Polish-German dispute out of the prime minister's hands by appealing to Poland and Germany."
These quotes call to mind several important questions: Did the United States pledge military support to Great Britain before or during March 1939? Did the American Government exert pressure on Britain to support Poland? If so, what was the nature and extent of this pressure? Did U.S. involvement encourage Chamberlain to radically alter his policy of "appeasement" towards Nazi Germany and agree to the guarantee to Poland against Nazi aggression, made on 31 March 1939? These questions are of fundamental importance to the historian concerned with the immediate origins of the Second World War. If it was clear to the Western Allies that United States support of some kind was inevitable in the event of hostilities with Germany, this would have had a great impact on the political situation of the time, generally, and on Chamberlain's decision to guarantee the borders of Poland, specifically.
This paper seeks to answer these questions, primarily through an examination of American, British and German primary sources. Among British historians and politicians, as this paper will show, the shift in British policy during March, 1939 is usually portrayed as internally-generated, either by Chamberlain himself or by other highly-placed members of the British Government. The story is quite different, however, as told by American and German primary evidence. It is clear, from an examination of these sources, that Franklin D. Roosevelt and other members of the United States government were silently aligning the United States against Hitler. The nature of this alignment remains to be seen.
First, this essay will briefly survey the secondary literature on the matter as produced by several British historians. This will further set up the background for a discussion of the primary sources. Part II will analyze British and German sources. Part III presents American sources, which have the most to tell us on the subject, in two parts: sources from the U.S. Government in general and sources dealing solely with Roosevelt. Since the questions put forth above seem to hinge greatly on Roosevelt's course of action during this time, this section will be a focal point of the essay. Finally, Part IV will tie the argument together in a conclusion.
It is clear that the "revisionist" views stated above are not completely orthodox. This is especially true upon an examination of work produced by British historians. These books tend to portray the shift in policy towards Germany as generated from within the British Government. However, these scholars do have different explanations for the origins of the Polish Guarantee. For example, according to Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott:
Halifax had the answer. It was a triumph of ingenuity. Britain and France should offer Poland the same type of guarantee that they wanted Poland to offer Rumania....Abrupt changes of policy were made on inspiration [by a handful of men].
The implication here is that Lord Halifax, perhaps with the support of other British Cabinet members, was the spur for the change of policy. In this view, a weary Chamberlain, his policies of appeasement ineffective, gave way to members of the British Government that had, for some time, advocated a strong stance towards Hitler.
Simon Newman articulates this position further, agreeing Chamberlain did not institute the change, but Halifax and the Foreign Office did:
Chamberlain had virtually abandoned the intiative to Halifax and the Foreign Office....[T]here was no further major initiative from the Prime Minister. He became a sort of public-relations man for the Foreign Office, explaining their policy and justifying it to the public and to the politicians....Now the Foreign Office were attempting to exercise the options they had managed to keep open. It was natural enough that Chamberlain should allow the Foreign Office to get on with it.
According to Newman, then, Chamberlain's policy had clearly failed; the only option remaining was the course advocated by Chamberlain's political opponents. Newman portrays the Prime Minister as a defeated figure no longer exercising any hold over his ministers. This change was not unexpected, suggests Newman, for the Foreign Office had been pushing such a policy for quite some time; resistance to Hitler was simply the next step the British had to take.
Just as Newman stresses a certain continuity of policy by the British Government, so does R.A.C. Parker:
[Chamberlain] wanted to make possible renewed negotiation with Germany while the others [MPs and ministerial colleagues] wanted to restrain Germany by threats. Chamberlain meant the gesture to Poland to compel renewed Anglo-German discussions to secure European peace.
The difference between Parker's position, on the one hand, and Gilbert, Gott and Newman's, on the other, is that the former sees Chamberlain as partially instigating the policy shift, while the latter see the guarantee as primarily due to the impetus of others. Parker claims that, while other members of the British government wanted to be tough with Hitler, Chamberlain was still trying to play his "peace in our time" card. By bluffing with force, Parker believes that Chamberlain hoped to entice Hitler back to the bargaining table.
Finally, Ian Colvin states that the change in policy can be primarily attributed to Chamberlain himself. Colvin quotes the British Cabinet minutes of March 18th, 1939 to back up his assertion:
The Prime Minister said that up till a week ago we had proceeded on the assumption that we should be able to continue our policy of getting on to better terms with the Dictator Powers, and that although those Powers had aims, those aims were limited. We had all along had at the back of our minds the reservation that this might not prove to be the case, but we had felt that it was right to try out the possibilities of this course....[Chamberlain] had now come definitely to the conclusion that Herr Hitler's attitude made it impossible to continue to negotiate on the old basis with the Nazi regime.
As will be shown later in this essay, Colvin's view is similar to those which other members of the British Government expressed during this time; namely, that it was through Chamberlain that the Polish Guarantee received its life.
One can see a spectrum, then, among the British historians. It ranges from Gilbert, Gott and Newman, who see the guarantee to Poland as the surrendering of power by Chamberlain to others in the government, to Colvin, who upholds the view that Chamberlain himself cut his losses and decided to stand up to the Nazis. In between is Parker, who spreads the impetus among influential British politicians.
The British Government, in correspondence to its American counterpart, explained why it offered the guarantee to Poland:
The situation as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom see it is that the absorption of Czechoslovakia has clearly revealed Germany's intentions. It marks the first departure from the Nazi racial theory and there is little reason to suppose that it is not Germany's intention to extend over other countries in Europe...
Primary source material from the British government, as well as from individual British politicians, tends to support the position of Colvin. Though emphases slightly differ, there is little mention of any outside interference.
It is logical to first examine what Chamberlain himself had to say on the matter. Although he left no memoirs at the time of his death in 1940, his speeches during the time of the Polish Guarantee leave no doubt as to what Chamberlain claimed to be the impetus for the policy shift. In a speech on March 17th at Birmingham, Chamberlain stated that:
I have never denied that the terms which I was able to secure at Munich were not those that I myself would have desired... [A]fter Munich, our defence programme was actually accelerated and it was expanded as to remedy certain weaknesses ... Surely as a joint signatory of the Munich Agreement I was entitled, if Herr Hitler thought it ought to be undone, to that consultation which is provided for in the Munich declaration. Instead of that he has taken the law into his own hands... What has become of this declaration of 'No further territorial ambition.'?... [H]owever much we might take exception to the methods which were adopted in each of those cases, [Rhineland, Anschluss and the Sudetenland]...there was something to be said for the necessity of a change in the existing situation. But the events which have taken place this week...seem to fall into a different category...
In this quote one can see several positions stated. Chamberlain claims that he was always ready to oppose Hitler; the British rearmament program was proof of this. A second consideration was the fact that Hitler broke the Munich Agreement. A third was a perceived shift in policy in the part of the Germans; while earlier territorial gains had been pursued in order to incorporate Germans into the Reich, the invasion of Czechoslovakia could only be construed as blatant Imperialism. Here we see an affirmation of Colvin's view that Chamberlain was calmly shifting foreign policy gears into the apparently not entirely unexpected position of adamant resistance to Hitler.
This is a far from definitive answer, however. Chamberlain himself takes a slightly different approach in a speech two weeks later, on April 3rd in front of the House of Commons; after the guarantee was given by the British:
[I]t is the nature of the complete insurance policy [to Poland] which is such a complete departure from anything which this country has undertaken hitherto. It does really constitute a new point-I would say a new epoch-in the course of our foreign policy... If [the] policy [of further expansion] were the policy of the German Government it is quite clear that Poland would not be the only country which would be endangered.
Chamberlain here proposes that the guarantee to Poland was "a complete departure" from his earlier policy. Though the reason given here for the guarantee is similar to the ones given in the Birmingham speech quoted above, Chamberlain backtracks from his earlier assertion that he was always ready to stand up to the Nazis.
It is unclear, then, from a reading of Chamberlain, if any other force, internal to the British government or external, influenced him to produce this guarantee. It does not appear, despite Chamberlain's claim at Birmingham, that Chamberlain's policy transition was a smooth one. This is manifested in the almost confused language that he uses to justify his action. Chamberlain gives the impression, instead, that he is casting about for answers to a situation that was forced on him unexpectedly.
Others in the British Government, however, also agree that the shift was Chamberlain's alone. Lord Halifax, for example, speaking contradictorily to the role given him by Gilbert, Gott and Newman, supports Chamberlain's explanation of the origins of the Polish Guarantee:
From month to month evidence seemed to accumulate that Hitler was not interested merely in the re-assembly of racial elements accidentally separated from the parent stock... After March and the final rape of Prague, it was no longer possible to hope that Hitler's purposes and ambitions were limited by any boundaries of race, and the lust of continental or world mastery seemed to stand out in stark relief. Here indeed was the simple explanation a few weeks later of the guarantee given to Poland.
Though Halifax does not explicitly say that he was not the determining voice in giving the guarantee, he alludes to Chamberlain's explanation of April 3rd as the correct one. He also states that the popular perception of "Chamberlain for no good reason [swinging] over to the opposite extreme of an indiscriminate distribution of guarantees in Europe... is misleading." Halifax explains British appeasement in 1938 in light of opposition to war within Britain and in "the British Commonwealth, which [though] unanimously behind war in September 1939, would certainly not have been united for war in 1938."
The fact that Halifax speaks in terms of "the evolution of Chamberlain's policy" is illuminating. He takes little credit for the guarantee; a decision that was generally applauded in Western Europe and in the United States from the time it was made and throughout the war. If Halifax was the key force in instituting this shift in policy, it is certainly odd that he does not take more credit for it in his memoirs.
Winston Churchill, often an opponent of Chamberlain's, also gives him credit for the guarantee. Though Churchill could not explain the Prime Minister's drastic shift in policy, he agreed with it, and so "no questions were asked":
It is not easy to imagine a greater contradiction to the mood of the Prime Minister's statement two days earlier in the House of Commons. He must have been through a period of intense stress. On the fifteenth he had said: 'Do not let us be deflected from our course.' But this was 'Right-about-turn.'... This was no time for recriminations about the past. The guarantee to Poland was supported by the leaders of all parties and groups in the House... The Birmingham speech brought me much closer to Mr. Chamberlain.
The only explanation given here by Churchill is "stress." Churchill, however, like Halifax, speaks always in terms of Chamberlain's decision. This further supports the view of the guarantee as generated by Chamberlain.
Anthony Eden, another opponent of Chamberlain's, agrees that resistance was the only option left after the failure of appeasement:
[The Guarantee to Poland], I thought, was the only course now left open to us, but it was a far from happy one. At last the Government had apparently abandoned their continuing attempt to appease the insatiable, but the decision had been taken in haste and without any plan... War could now have been avoided only if we had continued to appease to the point of surrendering our national existence.
Once again, though Eden does not mention Chamberlain by name, it is clear that he is referring to his policy of "appeasing the insatiable." By implication, the abandonment of this policy was also Chamberlain's. Because Eden was not overly fond of Chamberlain, it is hard to see why he would not deflect credit for the guarantee from Chamberlain, if he thought that the truth was otherwise. Instead, he merely scolds him for not abandoning appeasement earlier.
Similarly, the German Ambassador in London attributed the policy shift to an internal impetus. However, he believed that the changing climate in British public opinion forced the British politicians into the Polish Guarantee:
The Paramount difference between the British mood in the autumn of 1938 and now is that at that time the mass of the people did not want to fight and were passive; now they have taken over the initiative from the Government and are spurring the Cabinet on. Unfounded and dangerous as this attitude of the British public is, it must be taken as a serious reality, especially in a country like Britain, where public opinion plays so decisive a role.
Ambassador Dirksen, then, takes the initiative out of the hands of Chamberlain and the Cabinet and puts it into the hands of the British people and press.
These sources certainly may be telling the truth. It is not surprising, though, that there is little mention of either outside interference or internal dissention by British sources. Such a picture would indicate weakness on the part of Chamberlain and the British Government. By caving in to American pressure, the credit for initially opposing Hitler could go to the United States, as well as to Britain and France. It is also important to note that there are clues to possible United States influence on Britain to resist to be found in these sources, as well.
Chamberlain, in the explanation of his shift in policy given on April 3rd, briefly turned to Roosevelt:
Members will recall that the President of the United States in a New Years' message dwelt on the same thought. At the end of that month I alluded to that New Year's message, and said that a challenge of that kind, a demand to dominate one by one other nations without limits to where that might go, was the only challenge which could endanger the peace of the world, but that if it were made then I felt, like President Roosevelt, that it must be resisted.
Though there is no explicit statement of U.S. involvement made in this passage, Chamberlain declares himself of a common mindset with Roosevelt. This speech points, at the very minimum, to an indirect influence on Chamberlain by Roosevelt. Chamberlain portrays Roosevelt here as a leader in the fight against Nazi aggression. It is unclear if this is due to influence by the United States or a desire to subtly ally Britain with the U.S. on an ideological basis, with the hope that this might soon turn to a promise for material aid.
Churchill also briefly mentions possible United States involvement:
Look back and see what we had... thrown away: ... President Roosevelt's effort to stabilise or bring to a head the European situation by the intervention of the United States waved aside.
Two things are not made explicit in Churchill's statement: which effort by Roosevelt he is referring to and the nature of this attempted intervention. Churchill makes this statement in the same section as his discussion of the Polish Guarantee, so it is apparently not in reference to offers of mediation made by Roosevelt after March, 1939. Although Roosevelt's offered intervention was "waved aside," the offer itself could have had an effect on the British Government, who may have seen it as a trump card. What this passage does make clear is Churchill's portrayal of Roosevelt as being interested in direct involvement in Europe before the Polish Guarantee.
Anthony Eden also mentions that Roosevelt was concerned with Britain's ability to resist Nazi Germany. In a meeting with Roosevelt on December 13th, 1938:
[Roosevelt]...expiat[ed] on the inferiority of the air-power of Britain and France compared with Germany's. He kept insisting that we should strengthen ourselves in the air, and described his own intention to increase the armaments of the United States.
Eden claims that Roosevelt attempted to drum two things into the British politician's head: that Britain should prepare for war against Germany and that the United States was ready to do the same. Although indirect, in the form of hints, this can be seen as a thinly-disguised attempt to influence a member of the British Government into taking a strong position with regard to Hitler. Roosevelt also implies here that the United States could eventually get involved in a war with Germany.
Apparently, the promise of American support was important to some members of the British Government, for Halifax, in a Foreign Policy Committee meeting, made it clear that the United States helped to stiffen his resolve to resist Hitler:
We were faced with the dilemma of doing nothing, or entering into a devastating war. If we did nothing this in itself would mean a great accession to Germany's strength and a great loss to ourselves of sympathy and support in the United States, in the Balkan countries, and in other parts of the world. In those circumstances if we had to choose between two great evils [Halifax] favoured our going to war.
Though other reasons for resisting Germany are given in this passage, it is clear that the position of the United States on this issue favored a strong stand. Halifax was, in addition, clearly worried that possible United States aid might not be forthcoming if Britain did not end its policy of appeasement. The reason for this worry is unknown, but it clearly was a factor in his decision.
Taken as a whole, the British sources are obscure on the effect that United States influence had on British foreign policy. Most of what can be drawn are hints and innuendoes. However, it seems clear that, at the very least, the role of the United States was on the mind of the British. It is similarly apparent that Roosevelt was concerned with Nazi aggression and was willing to subtly become involved in strengthening anti-Hitler forces in Europe.
Although it is hard to extract a clear picture of American influence in the guarantee of March 1939 from British sources, many Germans certainly thought that the U.S. played a key role in the stiffening of British resolve. Ambassador von Dirksen, for example, did not blame the British public solely for this policy shift; he also believed that the United States spurred on the British:
The [German] Embassy soon traced the crisismongers: they were American circles working through the American Embassy in Warsaw. This was the first, but a very distinct, sign that Roosevelt was interested in an aggravation of the situation, or in war, in order to secure, first the repeal of the neutrality law, and then his re-election thanks to the war.
Although the last clause of this passage is ludicrous, von Dirksen is not the only source to trace American pressure on the British to American embassies in Europe, as will be shown later. Although it is hard to separate random smear tactics from fact in von Dirksen's statement, it must be remembered that this survey was prepared for the German Government; because it was not expected to be preserved for posterity, the perception that Roosevelt and the American embassies were involved at some level in influencing the British Government cannot be discounted. Of course, it is also equally possible that von Dirksen was attempting to ingratiate himself to the Nazi authorities by parroting a description of the situation as they saw it.
Other German officials, however, also saw the United States as a grave potential threat. Fritz Wiedemann, German Consul General in San Francisco, in a letter written immediately after the Polish Guarantee, echoed von Dirksen's opinion that "Roosevelt is Hitler's most dangerous opponent....Britain and France are no longer dragging America behind them. Today, America is dragging them both before her." Wiedemann stated here, in no uncertain terms, that he thought the United States was at the center of the emerging anti-German alliance.
This German perception of Roosevelt as an enemy of the Nazis existed as early as 1936, as the German Ambassador to France made clear:
At any rate, it is asserted here in circles close to the Quai d'Orsay that Roosevelt's speech in Buenos Aires must be taken to mean that in the event of an unprovoked German attack on France, America will assist the latter as she did in 1917.
The German Government, then, was already acutely aware of the United States as a potential threat, despite American pledges of neutrality. Ambassador Welczek asserts, in addition, that the United States was inspiring the French to resist the Nazis well before the crisis leading to the Second World War escalated.
By 1938, the Germans considered the United States an enemy. Dr. Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, German Ambassador to the United States, perceived Roosevelt as definitely hostile. According to Dieckhoff, Roosevelt "assumes so unfriendly an attitude as he has unfortunately done for a long time,...not [because] he is uninformed but [because] he wants to." A memorandum by the Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry compared Roosevelt to Wilson, by describing FDR as "an apt pupil of Wilson. Just as the latter, from 1914 on, systematically prepared his countrymen for a war with Germany, so Roosevelt too has."
It is clear, then, that the German government both thought of Roosevelt as a threat and of the United States as being in the same camp as the British and French. Two separate comparisons were made between the situation of the United States in the late 1930s with its situation in 1917. This was not new to 1939; the perception of Roosevelt and the American Government as hostile to Germany was evident as early as three years previous. The Nazis certainly thought that the Americans were very influential in their dealings with France and Britain. It is hard, however, to determine fully the usefulness of the German sources; just because the Germans thought of the United States as a bulwark to Great Britain and France does not mean that it was necessarily so. The German opinions are, in other words, second hand; they had no insight into the secret dealings between the American and British governments. The British position has already been explored. The search, therefore, now leads to the United States and Roosevelt.
Because the indications of U.S. involvement illustrated so far have pointed towards Roosevelt working through the American embassies in Europe, it is logical to start with sources originated by or discussing the views of the U.S. ambassadors in Europe during this time.
As early as 1938, William C. Bullitt, U.S. Ambassador to France mentioned the possibility of maneuvering by Roosevelt to oppose Hitler:
At the time the President considers appealing for a conference he might send for the German Ambassador and... cite some facts well known to him-Germany's popularity in the United States in 1914, their popularity at (the) moment well known to him, firml y trusts that Herr Hitler will not place him in the same position that Woodrow Wilson was placed in and with circumstances much more difficult today than they were at that time.
Although the Under Secretary of State responded that "[t]hat cannot be undertaken at the moment," Bullitt clearly believed that such a suggestion was not unthinkable. Like the Germans, Bullitt also saw a parallel between the U.S. in 1938 and in 1917. The comparison of Roosevelt to Wilson is most definitely, in this case, a veiled threat of United States intervention in Europe on the side of the British.
Whatever the intentions of Roosevelt were, it was clear to the American ambassadors, as it was to the German diplomats, that Roosevelt's stance on Nazism was encouraging Britain and her allies. For example, the U.S Ambassador to Poland, Joseph Biddle , mentioned that Roosevelt had "stiffened" European resistance to Hitler:
Your firmness of attitude, your armament program, and your decision to afford the French and British opportunity to purchase planes from us, have been greeted by official circles here with a genuine sense of satisfaction... The firm attitude you have m anifested, and the effective steps you have taken, have served (a) as a "stop, look and listen" sign to the dictators... (b) to stiffen Paris and London; (c) as an important contribution towards consolidating the British dominions behind a firmer attitude in London; (d) to "ginger up" the French.'
It is significant that the British guarantee to Poland was produced a month after Biddle's letter. According to Biddle, Roosevelt had, as early as March, 1939, agreed to sell Britain and France war material. Such a promise would certainly have reassu red the Allies that the United States was on their side. It also could have been construed as pointing to future direct involvement by the Americans. In a similar vein, Biddle wrote to Cordell Hull that "the firm attitude manifested by President Rooseve lt and his Government associates, together with our sale of planes to France and Britain and our Government's armament program," was "music to [the] ears [of]...Beck and his associates in [the Polish] Government and military circles." Whether or not Roos evelt "stiffened Paris and London," the reaction in Poland to his foreign policies was apparently quite favorable.
Joseph E. Davies, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, at the same time had a similar perception:
From all I get among the diplomatic corps... there is no doubt but what President Roosevelt's utterances and your own... have been among the most effective factors in deterring the aggressors.
Bullitt similarly believed that Roosevelt was making a statement of opposition to Hitler:
I thank you profoundly for having had Welles make that statement about Czechoslovakia... It was splendidly done and, coupled with your brief indication with regard to the need for a change in the Neutrality Act, will have some effect at least in Europe .
Bullitt wrote to Hull that the French believed that "[i]t was most valuable to France and England in their efforts to achieve reconciliation with Germany to have the United States as an unreconciled potential threat in the background....[T]he Germans.. .were afraid of the United States." According to Bullitt, then, France and Britain wanted America to play the "Bad Cop" role to their "Good Cop."
Bullitt soon outlined the United States' role more clearly. He wrote to Welles that the French told him that "the immense improvement in the situation since last September... in major part... was due to the policy which had been followed by the Govern ment of the United States." Therefore, all three of these ambassadors, Biddle, Davies and Bullitt, stated immediately before the British guarantee to Poland that Roosevelt was instrumental in solidifying European opposition to Hitler and that the United States position was central to the democracies' policy towards Germany.
Both Tansill and Hoggan express the view that Joe Kennedy, Ambassador to Great Britain, was the key to American pressure on Chamberlain's Government. Kennedy himself was, it has been argued, pro-German and anti-British; an odd combination for an ambas sador to the United Kingdom, to be sure. Tansill and Hoggan, therefore, insist that Kennedy was forced by Roosevelt to, against his will, put pressure on Chamberlain to resist Hitler. Several sources tentatively support this position. In a dispatch to Roosevelt on March 3rd, 1939, however, Kennedy gave the impression that the United States should intervene on behalf of the British.
This is a rather hurried outline of the subject we talked about... Should the British Empire disintegrate as a result of war... the consequence to the United States must be most serious... Can the United States afford to run the risk of seeing Britain and France defeated by the totalitarian regimes? The result of such a defeat would be the disintegration of the last bulwarks of democracy in Europe... Indeed, it is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that... the very man power and resource s of France and Great Britain might be place at the disposal of the authoritarian powers for action against America... In short, America, alone in a jealous and hostile world, would find that the effort and cost of maintaining "splendid isolation" would b e such as to bring about the destruction of all those values which the isolation policy had been designed to preserve.
This is quite a remarkable statement, coming from a man who is widely considered to be an isolationist; Kennedy is actually arguing for American intervention. The key sentence in this quote, however, is the first; "This is an outline of the subject we talked about." Roosevelt apparently instructed Kennedy to prepare a report on the negative effects of a German-dominated Europe on the United States. It was probably not Kennedy's fondest desire to prepare such a report. The key point here is that Roo sevelt, according to this letter, is considering American involvement on the side of Great Britain before the Germans occupied Czechoslovakia on March 15th.
Despite the misleading nature of the above report, Kennedy was certainly a most unwilling participant in any attempt to force Britain to make a stand. Kennedy, in the following passage from Anne Morrow Lindbergh's diary, expressed his irritation with Roosevelt and Bullitt for trying to push U.S. involvement:
[Kennedy] said that Bullitt was the most responsible for pushing war there and here. (I think a lot of this is personal jealousy-of B.'s influence on Roosevelt, so must to some extent be discounted.) He is evidently very irritated at the President, but maintains a kind of personal loyalty because the President appointed him (an Irish Roman Catholic) to the Court of St. James's. He said he was going to put everything he had into keeping us out of the war. I felt he was sincere in this and had great power... I felt he was the most powerful person in the United States at this moment (could swing the country to war or peace). He, very evidently, also thought so.
Whether it was Bullitt "pushing war" or Roosevelt, it is apparent that Kennedy thought that the United States had its hands in British politics. Though Kennedy was quoted here well over a year after the British guarantee to Poland, it is evident that the situation which Kennedy is annoyed with had existed for quite some time.
James Forrestal, in his diary, illustrates Kennedy's state of mind quite explicitly:
Played golf today with Joe Kennedy. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French not the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington... Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversation with Roosev elt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside. Kennedy's response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not... Wha t Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain sho uld have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt's request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon.
Although this sounds as if Kennedy is trying to find a scapegoat for dragging America into World War Two, it is obvious that Roosevelt was attempting to persuade the British Government to stand up to Hitler. This was done through intermediaries, such as Lothian, Dillon and Kennedy. For this reason, Chamberlain's statement that America had forced Britain into the war is most striking. Because it is second-hand, it can't be known whether or not Chamberlain actually ever said this. The overall impress ion, though, is overwhelmingly one of the United States trying desperately to influence the British. The primary mover in these attempts is clearly shown to be Roosevelt.
Other government sources support the perceptions created by the correspondence of the U.S. ambassadors. Cordell Hull agreed with the ambassadors by stating that U.S. action was perceived as influential by Europe:
The British Foreign Secretary [Lord Halifax] felt that the action of the United States Government-the recall of Ambassador Wilson from Berlin, our rearmament program, and statements by the President-had been a major influence for peace.
Although Hull goes on to say that the decision for the guarantee was Chamberlain's, he does not discuss what motivated it.
Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, stated on January 25th, 1939:
All of us agree that Section 1 of the Neutrality Act should be repealed... The main reason for wanting to see this change is that the British and French would then know in advance whether or not they could obtain supplied from the United States in time of war instead of having the question mark.
Moffat here says that sentiment backing United States involvement in European politics was widespread in the U.S. government. He also suggests that U.S. support would influence British and French policy by notifying these two nations whether or not th ey could expect U.S. aid. As has already been shown in the correspondence from Biddle, such a promise of U.S. aid, in the form of planes, was soon given.
Sumner Welles, like Moffat, said that, the United States':
major objective was clear. That was to make it plain to Germany, Italy and Japan that the United States could not remain indifferent if they persisted in preparing for world conquest. They must learn that, should a new war break out, the United State s... might well be compelled to join in protective measures against the aggressor governments. A further purpose was to arouse the will to resist of the peoples of the European democracies, large and small.
This position, according to Welles, was developed in conversations with Hull and Roosevelt in 1937. The principles that were to guide American foreign policy towards Germany in the years to follow were now in place: deterrence of Germany and the "aro usal of the will to resist " of the European democracies.
So far, an abundance of sources have been studied which point to some U.S. influence in British policy, either direct, by promising military aid, or indirect, in the form of bold statements that "stiffened" the European democracies. This involvement has most often been characterized in the form of attempts to create a mood of defiance towards Germany. These efforts apparently were made through the American embassies in France, Poland and Great Britain. Roosevelt is portrayed as being the movi ng force behind this movement to form an anti-Hitler front. Therefore, it remains to examine evidence from Roosevelt himself to shed further light on the subject.
Although it is hard to nail Roosevelt, the consummate politician, down on any opinion, several times he gave an indication that he would welcome any attempt to restrain German aggression. As early as 1937, Roosevelt made this known in his famous "Quar antine Speech" at Chicago on October 5th. Roosevelt spoke of "unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties." This was a clear reference to German involvement in the Spanish Civil War and Germany's occupation of the Rhineland and Saar. These actions, said Roosevelt, meant that "[i]nnocent peoples and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane co nsideration." Roosevelt next warned of the imminent spread of further aggression, possibly against the United States; "[i]f those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy...." The solution, said Roosevelt, was to "quarantine" the disease of aggression; the "peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignoring of humane instincts which today are creating a state of i nternational anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality."
In this speech, Roosevelt presented his view of Nazism as clearly as possible, given the desire for isolation that was common in the U.S. at this time. In retrospect, it can be seen as a warning to the Nazis that, though the United States might not im mediately intervene against Germany, there was no doubt, in the long run, as to which side the Americans would take in the event of an international showdown. It is clear, then, that Roosevelt's messages of support for the "Western Democracies," far from originating in 1939 with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, was already apparent two years previous.
FDR was soon working through his ambassadors in an effort to "quarantine" Nazi aggression. In a November, 1937 letter to Biddle in Warsaw, Roosevelt stated that he:
is glad that the Chicago speech has...made a real dent in government thinking in Europe even though it is heartily disliked by some of the "powers that be"... I appreciate the difficult position of Poland but I hope that the Polish government will not find itself compelled to do things which would be regarded by the democratic nations as yielding to Germany... We cannot stop the spread of Fascism unless world opinion realizes its ultimate dangers. I am awfully glad to have you and Margaret in Warsa w where you are literally on the firing line.
By late 1937, then, Roosevelt was working to promote a strong stand against Nazism in Poland. He already saw Poland as "the firing line." It is not much of stretch, then, to believe that, after another year-and-a-half of Nazi aggression, Roosevelt sh ould support a guarantee to Poland's borders.
By March of 1939, it was even more evident that Roosevelt was vehemently opposed to Hitler. Roosevelt was preparing, in his own mind, politically and materially by building up American armaments, for a future conflict with Germany. Although the follo wing speech was never publicly delivered, its text mirrored FDR's mindset on the subject:
The Sentiment of this country is not hostile to any other people. It is aroused against governments [like Germany] that show their contempt for international decency and justice... It is because this doctrine of force is ever increasing ly apparent in this world of today that we here in the United States are engaged in building up our own armament... It is for this reason [defense of the U.S.] that I believe the people of the United States will recognize that our present neutrality legis lation should be changed... In our own interests the American people should not penalize those nations who are threatened with aggression... [W]e should make it possible for other peace-loving nations who are the victims of brutal attack to obtain in this country the munitions and the supplies which they require to fight off aggression.
Sumner Welles prepared this speech for Roosevelt. It is unclear why it was never delivered; perhaps it was a stronger statement than Roosevelt was prepared to make in public at this time. In the correspondence that accompanied the speech, however, We lles notes that the speech "follows the lines [Roosevelt] had in mind as [he] indicated them to [Welles]." It is clear, then, that Roosevelt was thinking along these lines. According to Welles, this topic had been discussed "last week." Perhaps the rec ent knowledge of the British Guarantee meant that such a speech was now unnecessary; Roosevelt's purpose of making a strong statement to Hitler had already been accomplished by the British.
Therefore, it is no surprise that upon announcement of the British Guarantee to Poland, FDR responded enthusiastically at a press conference in Warm Springs:
[I]t is felt by people in every continent that where there was a limit last autumn, there is no limit today... From our point of view such a policy [of aggression] could, in the absence of any check to it... mean German domination... [that] might exten d very possibly to other continents... [I]t has been put squarely up to Germany that if there should be war it would come only by an invasion of some other nation by Germany; that there will be no war if there is no such invasion. Thereby, the world is being put on notice as to where the responsibility will lie if there is war. Now, don't put (quote) this.
Roosevelt was clearly wary of alienating American public opinion by too strong of a statement against Germany. However, he was also just as clearly squarely in the anti-Nazi camp. FDR expressed here his unilateral support for the British Guarantee. If he was willing to encourage the British in public, he certainly must have been willing to do so in private.
FDR was soon making his position clear to Hitler. Two weeks after the guarantee to Poland, Roosevelt sent a personal warning directly to Hitler:
Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations [31 listed, including Poland]... Such an assurance clearly must apply to the present day but also to a future... [of] a minimum period of assured non-aggression--ten years at the least--a quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead... I think you will not misunderstand the spirit of frankness in which I send you this message.
Roosevelt sent this message soon after the guarantee to deliver added punch; it was clearly meant to work with the British guarantee in order to make Hitler feel as if he was being surrounded. It was also meant to show support for the British action. It is extremely doubtful that Roosevelt really thought Hitler would agree not to show aggression toward any one of 31 countries for a period of 25 years. FDR knew Nazi tendencies better than that. It was not seriously meant to be an offer; it was a war ning. In addition, the message was delivered long enough after the guarantee not to panic isolation-minded Americans or suggest that the guarantee was in any way influenced by Roosevelt. That it was so timed reveals much about Roosevelt's inner desire t o build an anti-Nazi alliance.
FDR's derision was not reserved solely for the Fuhrer. He was brow-beating the Italians, as well. The minutes of a meeting between Welles, Roosevelt and the Italian Ambassador in March, 1939 amply illustrated Roosevelt's concern with stopping any further aggression on the part of Hitler or the Italians. They also showed Roosevelt's desire to isolate Hitler from potential allies:
The President then stated that he believed that Il Duce [Mussolini] had a very great opportunity presented to him today to prevent the world from being thrown into war. He said that in the first place there was no question that the neutrality legislat ion in the United States would be speedily amended and that should war break out for the reasons he had previously indicated [military aggression], the people of the United States would certainly insist that such assistance as this country could render th e countries which were the object of aggression in Europe be rendered to the fullest extent possible. The President said that Il Duce must surely bear in mind the fact that... if Hitler persisted in his present course he would undoubtedly throw over M ussolini at any moment that seemed expedient....
Roosevelt used several tactics in this meeting. First, he appealed to Mussolini's vanity by suggesting that he could improve his international image by taking the major role in preventing war. Secondly, FDR threw out a veiled threat of U.S. intervent ion in the event of further aggression. Finally, Roosevelt warned that Hitler will stab the Italians in the back at the first opportunity.
These tactics are reminiscent of the "carrot and stick" approach. Roosevelt played the role of beneficiary by warning the Italians about the Nazis and offering Mussolini a chance for international stardom, while simultaneously warning that the Italian s didn't want to find themselves on the opposite side from the U.S. FDR was clearly trying to make an "end run" against Hitler in this passage by weakening his alliance with Italy. This meeting was held on March 22nd, 1939, over a week before Britain's guarantee to Poland. While the British were working to complete their alliance, Roosevelt was simultaneously aiding them by trying to weaken the emerging Axis.
When composing an analysis of Roosevelt on this matter, much must remain conjecture. It has already been mentioned that he left no memoirs. There was no explicit statement by Roosevelt which tied him into attempts to pressure the British; he was too wise to be clearly connected with a position that would have been unpopular with many Americans. However, due to the many sources which describe Roosevelt's efforts to deter Hitler and his attempts to convince the British to take a strong stand against t he Nazis, in the end, there is no doubt as to which side Roosevelt was on. It is similarly obvious that this show of support could only have inspired the British and the French.
In conclusion, several points are clear with regard to the United States position in early 1939. It is apparent that Roosevelt and other influential members of the U.S. Government were adamantly opposed to Hitler and the policies of the Nazis. This a ttitude was manifested through numerous correspondence and speeches. This point is unassailable. Secondly, it is similarly clear that the opinions of Roosevelt inspired the leaders of France, Britain and Poland. This is illustrated both by the leaders themselves and by American ambassadors overseas, who reported on the overwhelmingly positive reception Roosevelt's statements of disapproval for Nazi actions created throughout Europe. In addition, pressure for Britain and France to resist German aggression was often shown to have been exerted through U.S. ambassadors. Indirect pressure on the axis was also exerted in the form of hints and subtle warnings. These were even carried out by FDR himself. A final point is that Roosevelt subtly promised he would do anything in his power, given the restrictions placed on him by domestic politics, to aid France and Britain in the event of an attack by Germany.
It is difficult, finally, to weigh the exact amount of influence that American support had on Great Britain's decision to guarantee Polish sovereignty. There is no evidence that directly ties promises of support by the United States to the Polish Guar antee. Nor is there any statement by Chamberlain or other members of the British government that admits that United States support or pressure inspired or forced the drastic foreign policy shift. Although it is certainly clear that the United States bo lstered the resolve of France and Britain to resist Germany, there exists no concrete proof that the U.S. Government specifically pressured Britain into making a guarantee to Poland. If such a statement does exist, it is unlikely, given the desire on the part of governments to keep secret dealings with each other secret, that it would be available to the researcher.
The evidence that is available, however, contains numerous statements outlining U.S. involvement in British foreign affairs. The numerous assurances that the U.S. gave to Britain, both direct and indirect, should not be underestimated. The United Sta tes continually made it known that it opposed Hitler and was sympathetic to Britain, France and Poland. Actions such as American rearmament and promises of material support were carried out in an effort to deter the Germans and strengthen the British res olve. Many contemporary observers recognized that these statements and actions influenced the British. The British themselves were definitely looking for support and encouragement from the U.S.. Ample examples of these points are found around or prior to the British guarantee to Poland.
Therefore, though there is no single "smoking gun" quote that proves that the guarantee was American-inspired, the number and the nature of the widely varied statements outlining American attempts to bolster the British lead to the conclusion that such efforts must have had a significant effect on the British decision to back Poland. It is not inaccurate to say that, without American support, be it promised in the form of military aid or political, the guarantee would never have been made. For those of us who have lived their lives in conjunction with an era of relative peace in Nazi-free Europe, it is certainly fortunate that this support was given.
Matthew DeFraga received his Bachelor of Arts at UC Santa Barbara in 1994. He is now pursuing his M.A. in modern European history and is currently studying for his Comprehensive Exam. He is planning to write and teach high school or co mmunity college.